What is Truth?

Grampy Bobby View Profile

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03 Apr '14 02:00

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04 Apr '14 06:30
Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
"The trouble about man is twofold. He cannot learn truths which are too complicated; [The hypostatic union and kenosis]
he forgets truths which are too simple." ["Believe in the Lord Jesus and you shall be saved. " (Acts 16:31a)]
Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason
Yes, just as I expected. These are simply two things that you personally tell yourself are "true".

Why not give us a couple of concrete examples of

[1] truths which are too complicated to learn, and

[2] truths which are too simple to remember...

...which both Christians and non-Christians can subscribe to, and so make Rebecca West's [otherwise facile] quotation work on some sort of level regarding "truth" and "trouble about man"?
twhitehead
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04 Apr '14 07:07
Originally posted by Suzianne
This is an exceedingly better example.

We can have no idea if the 'given' statement is true or not. So we assume it is true.
Statements 1. and 2. are definitions and are therefore essentially true. Statement 3. follows from 1. and 2. and is therefore true. No assumptions are necessary.
But these statements being true does not directly tell us anything about reality or even a hypothetical reality. If however Grundles and Junbins were found to exist in reality then we could conclude 3. about reality too. That is the power of the abstract. You can go through all the logic first and then apply it to concrete examples later on. We do this a lot in mathematics where we discover certain patterns in Sets where the set follows certain rules, then we look for concrete examples of sets that follow those rules and presto!, we know those sets will have certain patterns. You don't have to work out the logic for each individual set.

The same can be done with non-mathematical logic. For example if one proved that a loving, all powerful, all knowing God could not co-exist with evil, then the conclusion would stand as true regardless or whether or not a loving, all powerful, all knowing God existed. But maybe I am confusing myself here and the initial properties could be said to be for a hypothetical world. But my point is that they are not true or false until we start to compare them with the real world.
Grampy Bobby
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04 Apr '14 09:08
Originally posted by twhitehead
Statements 1. and 2. are definitions and are therefore essentially true. Statement 3. follows from 1. and 2. and is therefore true. No assumptions are necessary.
But these statements being true does not directly tell us anything about reality or even a hypothetical reality. If however Grundles and Junbins were found to exist in reality then we could conc ...[text shortened]... my point is that they are not true or false until we start to compare them with the real world.
"But my point is that they are not true or false until we start to compare them with the real world." -twhitehead

"From a philosophical perspective, there are three simple ways to define truth: 1. Truth is that which corresponds to reality. 2. Truth is that which matches its object. 3. Truth is simply telling it like it is." (OP)
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04 Apr '14 18:192 edits
Originally posted by twhitehead
Statements 1. and 2. are definitions and are therefore essentially true. Statement 3. follows from 1. and 2. and is therefore true. No assumptions are necessary.
But these statements being true does not directly tell us anything about reality or even a hypothetical reality. If however Grundles and Junbins were found to exist in reality then we could conc ...[text shortened]... my point is that they are not true or false until we start to compare them with the real world.
I think the Junbin argument is interesting. I think we agree in our conclusions that 3 is true but differ in our analyses.

On your analysis, 1 and 2 are true since they are definitions, and then 3 is also true because it logically follows from 1 and 2. I do not agree with any of that. I think definitions, strictly, do not have truth values and differ in this sense from propositions or axioms (otherwise, I think we get a whole bunch of absurdities; I think the best treatment I have seen up to now is that definitions are a sort of generalized identity that satisfies certain criteria, such as an eliminability criterion and a conservativeness criterion** ). So, on my view in a strict sense, 1 and 2 are neither true nor false; and 3 does not logically follow from 1 and 2 because 1 and 2 are not propositional in nature and thus do not enter into logical relations in such a way. So, this cannot be what explains the truth of 3.

My account of why 3 is true (analytically) is different. As I said, on my view, 1 and 2 are definitions and therefore neither true nor false. However, 3 is not a definition, but rather a proposition that takes the form of a universal quantification. I agree with you that 3 is true even if no Junbins exist, but that point is not so interesting. Any universally quantified formula is vacuously true if its domain happens to be empty. Non-vacuous truth for universal quantification happens only when the domain is non-empty and its predicate properly applies to every member in that domain. So, it still comes down to operations of comparing propositional content with some reality space. What is interesting in this case, however, is that 3 is true under any possible interpretation of a non-empty 'Junbin' domain. It does not matter how one reinterprets the Junbin domain: every possible reinterpretation will be such that blue properly applies to every member in the domain, since it is an analytical relation in virtue of the generalized identities in 1 and 2. So 3 is analytically true. This is what I meant before about "modal force" of analytic or logical truths: they remain true under all reinterpretations of reality or meta-reality. This is still an example of a truth consisting in correspondence relation to some reality or universe of discourse; it's just that the correspondence relation persists under all reinterpretations.

As I see it, the remaining issue here is that of vacuous truth. Here are a couple of examples of vacuous truth:

(a) Any universal quantification is true over the empty set. It's not like "All Junbins are blue" is true and "All Junbins are red" is not, when there are no Junbins. BOTH statements are true when there are no Junbins!!! That's just a consequence of this particular convention in classical logic (it may not hold for alternative logics).

(b) Any material conditional of the form "if P then Q" is true whenever P is false. This can be very counter-intuitive as well.

The question would be, how do we make sense of "correspondence to reality" when it comes to such instances of vacuous truth? I do not think this is any easy question. After all, if the reality is that there are no Junbins, then how does "All Junbins are blue" correspond to that reality? Further, on (b), the following material conditional is true: "If the moon is made of green cheese, then LemonJello died when the Titanic sank". How does that correspond with reality?

In some sense, I see your point as being that there is some unresolved problem for a correspondence-to-reality view of truth as it relates to an instance of vacuous truth (for example, a universal quantification over the Junbin domain, when that domain is empty). I may agree with you to an extent, although I do have some rough (not fully satisfactory) ideas for how to think about vacuous truth on my view. However, you would not need an analytic truth to make this point. Like I said, in classical logic, any universally quantified formula is true in the empty domain. "All Junbins are yellow with red polka dots" is also true if the Junbin domain is empty (but will fail to be true in any non-empty domain).

------
**For example, this site may be of interest: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/
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04 Apr '14 18:29
Originally posted by twhitehead
Or in some cases it may be dealing with abstracts - in which case there is no need to compare with any form of reality - as is the case with mathematics.
1. Define a Grundle as a type of blue object.
2. Define a Junbin as a type of Grundle that has three legs.
3. All Junbins are blue.
Statement 3 is true regardless of whether Grundles or Jubins exist ...[text shortened]... ality.
Definitions if not incoherent are always true, or rather have no need for a truth value.
Even a lie must tell some form of the truth, eh?
Grampy Bobby
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04 Apr '14 19:251 edit
Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
[b]In short, truth is simply telling it like it is; it is the way things really are, and any other viewpoint is wrong. A foundational principle of philosophy is being able to discern between truth and error, or as Thomas Aquinas observed, "It is the task of the philosopher to make distinctions." (Part 1)
____________________________________________ ...[text shortened]... tolerable only in those areas that are matters of taste rather than matters of truth.” (Part 2 of 4)
The Offensive Nature of Truth

"When the concept of truth is maligned, it usually for one or more of the following reasons:

One common complaint against anyone claiming to have absolute truth in matters of faith and religion is that such a stance is “narrow-minded.” However, the critic fails to understand that, by nature, truth is narrow. Is a math teacher narrow-minded for holding to the belief that 2 + 2 only equals 4?

Another objection to truth is that it is arrogant to claim that someone is right and another person is wrong. However, returning to the above example with mathematics, is it arrogant for a math teacher to insist on only one right answer to an arithmetic problem? Or is it arrogant for a locksmith to state that only one key will open a locked door?

A third charge against those holding to absolute truth in matters of faith and religion is that such a position excludes people, rather than being inclusive. But such a complaint fails to understand that truth, by nature, excludes its opposite. All answers other than 4 are excluded from the reality of what 2 + 2 truly equals.

Yet another protest against truth is that it is offensive and divisive to claim one has the truth. Instead, the critic argues, all that matters is sincerity. The problem with this position is that truth is immune to sincerity, belief, and desire. It doesn’t matter how much one sincerely believes a wrong key will fit a door; the key still won’t go in and the lock won’t be opened. Truth is also unaffected by sincerity. Someone who picks up a bottle of poison and sincerely believes it is lemonade will still suffer the unfortunate effects of the poison. Finally, truth is impervious to desire. A person may strongly desire that their car has not run out of gas, but if the gauge says the tank is empty and the car will not run any farther, then no desire in the world will miraculously cause the car to keep going.

Some will admit that absolute truth exists, but then claim such a stance is only valid in the area of science and not in matters of faith and religion. This is a philosophy called logical positivism, which was popularized by philosophers such as David Hume and A. J. Ayer. In essence, such people state that truth claims must either be (1) tautologies (for example, all bachelors are unmarried men) or empirically verifiable (that is, testable via science). To the logical positivist, all talk about God is nonsense.

Those who hold to the notion that only science can make truth claims fail to recognize is that there are many realms of truth where science is impotent. For example:

• Science cannot prove the disciplines of mathematics and logic because it presupposes them.

• Science cannot prove metaphysical truths such as, minds other than my own do exist.

• Science is unable to provide truth in the areas of morals and ethics. You cannot use science, for example, to prove the Nazis were evil.

• Science is incapable of stating truths about aesthetic positions such as the beauty of a sunrise.

• Lastly, when anyone makes the statement “science is the only source of objective truth,” they have just made a philosophical claim—which cannot be tested by science.

And there are those who say that absolute truth does not apply in the area of morality. Yet the response to the question, “Is it moral to torture and murder an innocent child?” is absolute and universal: No. Or, to make it more personal, those who espouse relative truth concerning morals always seem to want their spouse to be absolutely faithful to them." (Part 3 of 4) http://www.gotquestions.org/what-is-truth.html
ChessPraxis
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05 Apr '14 05:44
Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
[b]What is Truth?

"A Proposed Definition of Truth: In defining truth, it is first helpful to note what truth is not:

• Truth is not simply whatever works. This is the philosophy of pragmatism – an ends-vs.-means-type approach. In reality, lies can appear to “work,” but they are still lies and not the truth.

• Truth is no ...[text shortened]... b]Two Questions:[/b] 1) What [i]is Truth from your perspective? 2) Does Truth matter to you?[/b]
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Grampy Bobby
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05 Apr '14 20:43
Originally posted by Grampy Bobby
The Offensive Nature of Truth

"When the concept of truth is maligned, it usually for one or more of the following reasons:

One common complaint against anyone claiming to have absolute truth in matters of faith and religion is that such a stance is “narrow-minded.” However, the critic fails to understand that, by nature, truth is narr ...[text shortened]... to be absolutely faithful to them." (Part 3 of 4) http://www.gotquestions.org/what-is-truth.html[/b]
Why Truth is Important (Part 4 of 4)

"Why is it so important to understand and embrace the concept of absolute truth in all areas of life (including faith and religion)? Simply because life has consequences for being wrong. Giving someone the wrong amount of a medication can kill them; having an investment manager make the wrong monetary decisions can impoverish a family; boarding the wrong plane will take you where you do not wish to go; and dealing with an unfaithful marriage partner can result in the destruction of a family and, potentially, disease. As Christian apologist Ravi Zacharias puts it, “The fact is, the truth matters – especially when you’re on the receiving end of a lie.” And nowhere is this more important than in the area of faith and religion. Eternity is an awfully long time to be wrong.

God and Truth

During the six trials of Jesus, the contrast between the truth (righteousness) and lies (unrighteousness) was unmistakable. There stood Jesus, the Truth, being judged by those whose every action was bathed in lies. The Jewish leaders broke nearly every law designed to protect a defendant from wrongful conviction. They fervently worked to find any testimony that would incriminate Jesus, and in their frustration, they turned to false evidence brought forward by liars. But even that could not help them reach their goal. So they broke another law and forced Jesus to implicate Himself.

Once in front of Pilate, the Jewish leaders lied again. They convicted Jesus of blasphemy, but since they knew that wouldn’t be enough to coax Pilate to kill Jesus, they claimed Jesus was challenging Caesar and was breaking Roman law by encouraging the crowds to not pay taxes. Pilate quickly detected their superficial deception, and he never even addressed the charge. Jesus the Righteous was being judged by the unrighteous. The sad fact is that the latter always persecutes the former. It’s why Cain killed Abel. The link between truth and righteousness and between falsehood and unrighteousness is demonstrated by a number of examples in the New Testament:

• For this reason God will send upon them a deluding influence so that they will believe what is false, in order that they all may be judged who did not believe the truth, but took pleasure in wickedness” (2 Thessalonians 2:9–12, emphasis added).

• “For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who suppress the truth in unrighteousness” (Romans 1:18, emphasis added).

• “who will render to each person according to his deeds; to those who by perseverance in doing good seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life; but to those who are selfishly ambitious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, wrath and indignation” (Romans 2:6–8, emphasis added).

• “[love] does not act unbecomingly; it does not seek its own, is not provoked, does not take into account a wrong suffered, does not rejoice in unrighteousness, but rejoices with the truth” (1 Corinthians 13:5–6, emphasis added).

What is truth? - Conclusion

The question Pontius Pilate asked centuries ago needs to be rephrased in order to be completely accurate. The Roman governor’s remark “What is truth?” overlooks the fact that many things can have the truth, but only one thing can actually be the Truth. Truth must originate from somewhere.

The stark reality is that Pilate was looking directly at the Origin of all Truth on that early morning over two thousand years ago. Not long before being arrested and brought to the governor, Jesus had made the simple statement “I am the truth” (John 14:6), which was a rather incredible statement. How could a mere man be the truth? He couldn’t be, unless He was more than a man, which is actually what He claimed to be. The fact is, Jesus’ claim was validated when He rose from the dead (Romans 1:4).

There’s a story about a man who lived in Paris who had a stranger from the country come see him. Wanting to show the stranger the magnificence of Paris, he took him to the Louvre to see the great art and then to a concert at a majestic symphony hall to hear a great symphony orchestra play. At the end of the day, the stranger from the country commented that he didn’t particularly like either the art or the music. To which his host replied, “They aren’t on trial, you are.” Pilate and the Jewish leaders thought they were judging Christ, when, in reality, they were the ones being judged. Moreover, the One they convicted will actually serve as their Judge one day, as He will for all who suppress the truth in unrighteousness.

Pilate evidently never came to a knowledge of the truth. Eusebius, the historian and Bishop of Caesarea, records the fact that Pilate ultimately committed suicide sometime during the reign of the emperor Caligula—a sad ending and a reminder for everyone that ignoring the truth always leads to undesired consequences." http://www.gotquestions.org/what-is-truth.html
Suzianne
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07 Apr '14 15:131 edit
Originally posted by twhitehead
Statements 1. and 2. are definitions and are therefore essentially true. Statement 3. follows from 1. and 2. and is therefore true. No assumptions are necessary.
But these statements being true does not directly tell us anything about reality or even a hypothetical reality. If however Grundles and Junbins were found to exist in reality then we could conc ...[text shortened]... my point is that they are not true or false until we start to compare them with the real world.
All definitions are essentially true? That's news to me.

So, you are saying that 1. All atheists are stupid, 2. You are an atheist, therefore 3. You are stupid, is just as true, since 1 and 2 are definitions and therefore "essentially true"?

If this is what you're saying, then it obviously demonstrates how the application of "logic" can have many shortcomings.
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08 Apr '14 17:361 edit
Originally posted by Suzianne
All definitions are essentially true? That's news to me.

So, you are saying that 1. All atheists are stupid, 2. You are an atheist, therefore 3. You are stupid, is just as true, since 1 and 2 are definitions and therefore "essentially true"?

If this is what you're saying, then it obviously demonstrates how the application of "logic" can have many shortcomings.
Your 1 and 2 are not definitions, so this example of yours shows nothing.

If we want an example to see the problem with taking definitions as true or false, then we could consider the following. Consider the definitions of 'prime' number and 'composite' number. I choose these here because any prime number is not a composite number, and vice versa. So consider these definitions:

(D1) N is a prime number iff N is a natural number greater than 1 that has no positive divisors other than 1 and itself.
(D2) N is a composite number iff N is a natural number greater than 1 that has at least one positive divisor other than 1 and itself.

Now, if we claim that definitions D1 and D2 are both true with respect to the axioms of the system, then in virtue of the law of non-contradiction, we must also conclude that definitions D3 and D4 are both false in the same respect:

(D3) N is a composite number iff N is a natural number greater than 1 that has no positive divisors other than 1 and itself.
(D4) N is a prime number iff N is a natural number greater than 1 that has at least one positive divisor other than 1 and itself.

(ASIDE: Otherwise, if D3 & D4 were also true, we would have an infinitude of contradictions, such as the following example:

Aside1: N = 2 is a natural number greater than 1 that has no positive divisors other than 1 and itself.
Aside2: So, from D1, N = 2 is a prime number.
Aside3; So, from D4, N = 2 is a a natural number greater than 1 that has at least one positive divisor other than 1 and itself.
=> CONTRADICTION.)

So, there are at least two major conclusions here:

First, it cannot be that all definitions are "essentially true" just in virtue of being definitions, as twhitehead claimed. Just by the law of non-contradictions, if some definitions are true, then it follows that others must be false.

Second, and even more fundamentally, it cannot be that definitions are true or false at all to begin with. The terms 'prime' and 'composite' are just arbitrarily chosen with respect to the axioms of the system. If we just switched them around from their normal convention, nothing of substantive interest would follow. We all know this. However, per the above where we supposed that D1 & D2 are true (and hence D3 & D4 are false), we are somehow not at liberty to just switch the convention around. This is absurd.

So, definitions are neither true nor false. As I mentioned earlier, they are better construed as generalized identities, subject to satisfaction of specific criteria.
RJHinds
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09 Apr '14 02:462 edits
Originally posted by LemonJello
Your 1 and 2 are not definitions, so this example of yours shows nothing.

If we want an example to see the problem with taking definitions as true or false, then we could consider the following. Consider the definitions of 'prime' number and 'composite' number. I choose these here because any prime number is not a composite number, and vice versa. S ...[text shortened]... ey are better construed as generalized identities, subject to satisfaction of specific criteria.
You were making sense until you said this:

So, definitions are neither true nor false.

How is it possible to communicate (with words), if there are no true or false definitions?
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09 Apr '14 16:21
Originally posted by RJHinds
You were making sense until you said this:

[b]So, definitions are neither true nor false.

How is it possible to communicate (with words), if there are no true or false definitions?[/b]
So I was making sense all the way through my argument that purports to show that definitions are neither true nor false but I somehow ceased making sense the moment I explicitly stated that conclusion. 🙄
If you do not agree with the conclusion, then you should look for something wrong in the preceding argument. So what is wrong with my preceding argument? Or are you saying that the conlusion "definitions are neither true nor false" does not follow from my preceding argument? If so, why not?

Anyway, why exactly would it be impossible to communicate with words in the case that definitions are neither true nor false? If definitions are not true or false, but rather simply a sort of generalized identity; then we can still have mutually shared definitions, in virtue of which it is commonly understood how terms apply. It will still be the case that propositions are true or false, so we can communicate cognitively meaningful ideas in words through those. And in the course of such communication with words, those mutually shared definitions -- while neither true nor false -- will still regulate how those words are taken to apply, thus giving shape to the propositional content. Besides, there are also modes of communication with words that are non-propositional, serving to express conative or affective states, often through an elicitive sort of language.

That definitions are neither true nor false is not a hindrance to communication. If definitions are not mutually shared, though, that could be at least a temporary hindrance, manifested as instances of talking past one another for example.
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09 Apr '14 16:424 edits
Originally posted by LemonJello
So I was making sense all the way through my argument that purports to show that definitions are neither true nor false but I somehow ceased making sense the moment I explicitly stated that conclusion. 🙄
If you do not agree with the conclusion, then you should look for something wrong in the preceding argument. So what is wrong with my preceding argum ...[text shortened]... at least a temporary hindrance, manifested as instances of talking past one another for example.
You stated, "Just by the law of non-contradictions, if some definitions are true, then it follows that others must be false."

So for you to state that definitions are neither true or false does not follow as a conclusion.

As I pointed out, language communication is logically impossible if the true meanings of the words are not defined. So there must be true definitions for those words or else we could pretend they mean anything and it would be like God confounding the language of the people at Babel.

Scientists are trying to decipher the true meanings of the DNA code language. Most of it was at one time just declared junk DNA, but as more study is being done, that assessment has turned out to be wrong. There is meaning and purpose to it if we learn to understand the true definitions.

It is true that words can have different meanings assigned to them based on how they are used. But there must be a true definition that applies in each case so we can understand correctly. Some words sound alike but have different definitions depending on spelling and how they are used in the sentence. However, this does not mean there are no true definitions.
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09 Apr '14 17:264 edits
Originally posted by RJHinds
You stated, "Just by the law of non-contradictions, if some definitions are true, then it follows that others must be false."

So for you to state that definitions are neither true or false does not follow as a conclusion.

As I pointed out, language communication is logically impossible if the true meanings of the words are not defined. So there must ...[text shortened]... d how they are used in the sentence. However, this does not mean there are no true definitions.
You stated, "Just by the law of non-contradictions, if some definitions are true, then it follows that others must be false."

So for you to state that definitions are neither true or false does not follow as a conclusion.

Nope, you are wrong. That definitions are neither true nor false does follow from my argument as a whole (and this one line you have quoted here is not the whole of my argument): that is exactly what my argument purports to show.

Your confusion here probably lies in thinking that "definitions are neither true nor false" is inconsistent with "Just by the law of non-contradictions, if some definitions are true, then it follows that others must be false". They are not inconsistent. "If some definitions are true, then it follows that others must be false" is a conditional statement. It is quite consistent with the claim "definitions are neither true nor false". In fact, the truth of the latter actually entails the truth of the former conditional, since it entails that the antecedent of the conditional is false and hence that the conditional is true.

As I pointed out, language communication is logically impossible if the true meanings of the words are not defined.

Nope, I've already explained why your claim that communication is impossible if definitions are neither true nor false, is false. Why don't you try to give us an actual argument that shows or supports this claim of yours?
RJHinds
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09 Apr '14 18:11
Originally posted by LemonJello
You stated, "Just by the law of non-contradictions, if some definitions are true, then it follows that others must be false."

So for you to state that definitions are neither true or false does not follow as a conclusion.

Nope, you are wrong. That definitions are neither true nor false does follow from my argument as a whole (and th ...[text shortened]... se. Why don't you try to give us an actual argument that shows or supports this claim of yours?
I did, but apparently I can not logically communicate with you because you do not accept that there are true definitions to the words I use.