Originally posted by bbarr
In short, Soothfast's suggestion doesn't help anything or solve any problem. All it does it render knowledge something rarefied, contrary to actual usage, and mess up the notion of justification in the process.

Oh, not so, but admittedly as I went forward with the dialogue I have had to settle on some positions that, at the outset, were not quite firm, and as a result I may have left you and Lemonjello off-kilter and even nonplussed. Sorry for that. My viewpoint regarding knowledge of the physical world (as opposed to fields of mathematics that operate under a given set of axioms) is ultimately nondeterministic and fraught with probabilities, standard deviations, expected values, and other statistical delights. In that regard I think I am actually quite flexible and nowise committed to leaving knowledge fettered by rigid pedantry that bids us doubt the very nose on our faces.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Thanks for that clarification. I think now it would be wrong to claim that this position makes Soothfast an infallibilist because the claim that if (1) is not met we must also reject (3) is still at the end if the day compatible with the idea that generally S can know P despite not having certainty (of course only if (1) is met). I agree instead with the ...[text shortened]... ns to be false, which I think is quite unsatisfactory and undermines normal intuition and usage.

Good grief, you guys are handling the word "infallibilist" like a close cousin of "pedophile".

Originally posted by bbarr
That is certainly one possibility, but I think infallibilism is a thesis about knowledge, not epistemic justification. S may be justified in believing P despite S having reasons insufficient to guarantee the truth of P. But S can't know P under those circumstances. We could claim S reasonably believes P, or perhaps even that it would be irrational for S to ...[text shortened]... ppens in this case is we stop caring about knowledge and start caring about reasonable belief.

S may be justified in believing P despite S having reasons insufficient to guarantee the truth of P. But S can't know P under those circumstances.

Are you saying, then, that (3) can be true and yet "S knows P" false? But then, if P happens to be true, it should be possible for (1)&(2)&(3)&(4) to be true while "S knows P" is false. Thus the two statements are not logically equivalent after all, which contradicts the assertion that (1)&(2)&(3)&(4) is the definition of what "S knows P" means. Unless there is something about (4) that would compel it to be false.

EDIT: I'm going to go study the "Gettier counterfactuals" more closely.

Originally posted by Soothfast
I don't think you're reading what I'm saying with the necessary care. I spelled it out already: If S claims to have (2), (3), and (4) sewn up, and yet (1) is false, then that can only be because (3), in particular, hasn't actually been secured. That is, S may think he is warranted in believing P, but he is mistaken. His data must be incomplete, boson? Better be strict! The reason zebras have stripes? Less strict.

I don't think you're reading what I'm saying with the necessary care. I spelled it out already: If S claims to have (2), (3), and (4) sewn up, and yet (1) is false, then that can only be because (3), in particular, hasn't actually been secured.

I have read what you have said with extreme care. You're just wrong on this point: (2)&(3)&(4) can all be satisfied and yet (1) can be false. Period.

Like I have already said, your view precludes that one could be warranted in believing P if P happens to be false. That is quite unsatisfactory and undermines normal intuition and usage.

As bbarr mentioned, your view simply makes justification itself an external condition.

Originally posted by Soothfast

It will basically commit you to the idea that one could know a proposition that is in fact false. Again, are you prepared to take that on?

EDIT: I have to strike what I said here from the record, because it was in error.

I understand that you take the position that it is possible for (2), (3), and (4) to be true and yet (1) false. V ...[text shortened]... om being in the definition of "S knows P". You're likely misinterpreting something I said.

I'm not misinterpreting anything. What I said is that IF you are going to deny (1), then it basically commits you to the idea that one can know a proposition that is in fact false. You have said that you have no intention to deny (1), so okay then.

Originally posted by Soothfast
Good grief, you guys are handling the word "infallibilist" like a close cousin of "pedophile".

Well, infallibilism is pretty much as bonkers as it gets, so....

Originally posted by Soothfast

S may be justified in believing P despite S having reasons insufficient to guarantee the truth of P. But S can't know P under those circumstances.

Are you saying, then, that (3) can be true and yet "S knows P" false? But then, if P happens to be true, it should be possible for (1)&(2)&(3)&(4) to be true while "S knows P" is false. Thus ...[text shortened]... be false.

EDIT: I'm going to go study the "Gettier counterfactuals" more closely.

bbarr was there just giving a rough outline of what infallibilism holds. Of course, bbarr is not an infallibilist.

Originally posted by LemonJello
bbarr was there just giving a rough outline of what infallibilism holds. Of course, bbarr is not an infallibilist.

I think I have it sorted out, including (4). When it comes down to it I guess I just found the definition of "know" to be intriguing, and my readings into the matter quickly turned up no end of debate among philosophers as to how exactly "S knows P" is best defined. Fun!

Sorry for hijacking the thread. Mayhap Bennett will yet outline his arguments against the Christian God.

Originally posted by Soothfast
I think I have it sorted out, including (4). When it comes down to it I guess I just found the definition of "know" to be intriguing, and my readings into the matter quickly turned up no end of debate among philosophers as to how exactly "S knows P" is best defined. Fun!

Sorry for hijacking the thread. Mayhap Bennett will yet outline his arguments against the Christian God.

Repent of your sins and be baptized in the name of the Lord!

Originally posted by Soothfast
I think I have it sorted out, including (4). When it comes down to it I guess I just found the definition of "know" to be intriguing, and my readings into the matter quickly turned up no end of debate among philosophers as to how exactly "S knows P" is best defined. Fun!

Sorry for hijacking the thread. Mayhap Bennett will yet outline his arguments against the Christian God.

I don't think you hijacked anything. I thought your most interesting claim, though, was not about knowledge per se but rather about justification and how you handcuff it to the external truth condition. Here would be a general example why I find your claim quite unsatisfactory. Suppose there is a lottery with 10^X tickets and one and only one ticket wins. Suppose S holds the ticket that will win but S believes the ticket will not win on the basis that the epistemic probability of the ticket winning is only ~10^(-X). On your view S is not justified in this belief no matter how large X may be. I take that as a reductio of your claim.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't think you hijacked anything. I thought your most interesting claim, though, was not about knowledge per se but rather about justification and how you handcuff it to the external truth condition. Here would be a general example why I find your claim quite unsatisfactory. Suppose there is a lottery with 10^X tickets and one and only one ticket wins. ...[text shortened]... justified in this belief no matter how large X may be. I take that as a reductio of your claim.

If he already has the ticket, why should it matter what is the probability of winning? Now, if he has not bought the ticket yet, then I could see where it might matter.

Originally posted by RJHinds
If he already has the ticket, why should it matter what is the probability of winning? Now, if he has not bought the ticket yet, then I could see where it might matter.

Sorry, I don't understand your question. I'm saying that the epistemic probability of the ticket winning should "matter" to the question of whether or not S is epistemologically justified in believing that the ticket will not win in the example. I think that whatever account of justification we have, it should definitely affirm that S is justified in believing that the ticket will not win if the epistemic probability of the ticket winning is, say, extremely low but non-zero. Under Soothfast's account, though, we cannot conclude this, since he claims that if the ticket in fact turns out to win, then we must conclude that S was not justified in believing that the ticket will not win. So, on his account as he articulated it (when he stated, regarding the analysis of knowledge at issue, that if (1) turns out to be not met, then we must also conclude that (3) was not met), we must conclude that S was not justified in believing the ticket will not win in the example even if the epistemic probability that the ticket will win is vanishingly small, hence making the epistemic probability that the ticket will not win arbitrarily close to 1. Hence, I think his account is absurd. Does this make it more clear?

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't think you hijacked anything. I thought your most interesting claim, though, was not about knowledge per se but rather about justification and how you handcuff it to the external truth condition. Here would be a general example why I find your claim quite unsatisfactory. Suppose there is a lottery with 10^X tickets and one and only one ticket wins. ...[text shortened]... justified in this belief no matter how large X may be. I take that as a reductio of your claim.

Yes, I understand your point. As I said, my viewpoint evolved as the discussion progressed, and my final word on the matter ultimately came to resemble my first words (which brought up the probability issue). My final assessment was this:

If you want to interpret "warranted" as meaning "Ho hum, seems good enough for gubbamint work," well, that's fine; and then one can allow for the possibility that (2), (3), and (4) are true yet (1) is false. As I intimated earlier, the strictness we want to assign to the word "warranted" could even vary depending on the seriousness of the consequences of concluding that we "know P" when P is in fact false. God and the Higgs boson? Better be strict! The reason zebras have stripes? Less strict.

This is the position I'll settle on, and I think it rhymes with your own probability argument. I suppose I should add that another instance when we want to be very strict before concluding that (3) is true is when the consequence of being wrong in our conclusion stands a good chance of costing lives.

Returning to the original matter, I may be able to grant that "bbarr knows P" if P is "The Christian god does not exist" (it depends on the case he makes); but if P were instead "no god exists" then I would still be skeptical that (3) is satisfied.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Sorry, I don't understand your question. I'm saying that the epistemic probability of the ticket winning should "matter" to the question of whether or not S is epistemologically justified in believing that the ticket will not win in the example. I think that whatever account of justification we have, it should definitely affirm that S is justified in be ...[text shortened]... bitrarily close to 1. Hence, I think his account is absurd. Does this make it more clear?

I am referring to the practical application, not theoretical. If he has not bought the ticket yet, then he must decide if spending the money to buy it is worth the price based on the probability that he might buy a winning ticket.

I heard of a women that took a second mortgage out on her home in Florida, I believe it was, to buy as many lottery tickets as she could. She was certain that with all those tickets, she would most likely be a winner. But sadly to say, not one ticket was a winner of any prize. Of course if she had won the big prize she could have covered her mortgage and have plenty of money for the rest 0f her life. But if you have already bought a ticket or tickets, the money is already gone, so what is the use of speculating on the odds of winning. Just wait. 😏

Originally posted by sumydid
[b]So, similarly, you don't know there does not exist a poltergeist in your freezer. After all, it's logically possible there is a poltergeist in your freezer and your only evidence that there is not a poltergeist in your freezer comes from your personal experience.
No, not similarly. There aren't 2 billion people claiming personal experience with sai ...[text shortened]... that God doesn't exist, and maybe that will help clarify both our positions.[/b]

You're right, there are billions of people that claim having personal experiences they explain by reference to this god or that god, or to angels, demons, ancestors or ghosts. There are billions of people that believe in Vishnu who have not had experience of your God. And millions of Buddhists who have not had experiences of any personal God. And millions of atheists who have not had experiences of any supernatural sort at all. There are so many claims, and so many conflicting mythologies! The thing is, you don't get to pick and choose the testimonies to which you lend credence. If you accept testimonial evidence, then look at the entire set of testimonies! For me, when confronted with conflicting and contradictory testimony concerning the divine, I look to my own experiences. And I find nothing to indicate the existence of a personal God that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Rather, my experiences during meditation indicate something non-personal, non-conceptually articulable, and different... It's hard to talk about meaningfully.

Thank you for answering my question, I appreciate your candor.

Yes, if I claim to know P, I am claiming that P is the case. This is just a conceptual truth. But that's not all! I am also claiming that I have sufficient evidence to justify my belief that P. This is what distinguishes claiming to know P from merely guessing that P. Both are assertorial, but the former has entailments regarding evidence, reasons, justification.

I am glad that we have determined that we use 'know' differently. I don't distinguish between 'knowing P' and 'really, absolutely knowing P'. I do distinguish between 'knowing P' and 'being certain that P'. Maybe that's the distinction you have in mind. I know that the concept 'God', as theists use it, doesn't apply to anything real. I know this in just the same manner that I know my name, address, etc. I know all these things, despite it being logically possible that I am wrong. Although I know these things, I am not epistemically certain of them. This is what it means to be a fallibilist about knowledge.

And this is not unfair. It would be unfair to apply radically different epistemic standards to knowledge claims just because somebody is making a claim having to do with something you happen to favor. When I claim that I know my address, you will not object that I could possibly be wrong. When I claim that I know God does not exist, it is unfair to object that I could possibly be wrong. It's you that imports the additional requirement of certainty in the latter case. That's changing the rules of the game, and you're the one that's doing it, and that's unfair.

So, when I begin the thread that articulates my case, I expect you to be fair. I expect you to refrain from mandating that I have to establish my claim with epistemic certainty. You can't meet that standard regarding the non-existence of a poltergeist in your freezer. I can't establish that regarding the non-existence of God.

Further, I expect you to refrain from claiming that I've said otherwise. I never used the term 'prove'. If you look back at the thread where originally claimed I knew that God doesn't exist, all I said was "I know God doesn't exist, and I have the arguments." That is the quote. You are the one who started talking about proof. You are the one who then misattributed this to me. And now you are the one who, having forgot that you made this up, now claims that I've changed my position. It's hard not to think that you're just being disingenuous here. I'm trying to give you the benefit of the doubt. But, please, go back and check for yourself. I never said that my arguments could establish with absolute logical certainty that God doesn't exist. What they do show is that for a particular conception of God, the theistic conception, it is extremely unlikely that such a creature exists. It's just as unlikely as there being a poltergeist in my freezer...