I'm sorry if this topic has already been discussed somewhere in the nearly 3,000 posts preceding this one, but...
I was reading an essay recently by Plantinga where he argues against naturalism. In the essay, he does not argue that naturalism is false. Rather, he argues that the act of endorsing naturalism is an irrational act. He thinks that naturalism is self-defeating in a way that ought to make any rational agent view it as unacceptable. Here, I just wanted to open up to discussion one important aspect of his argument.
Plantinga argues that if evolutionary theory is true, then it's not very likely that our cognitive systems are reliable (or, at least, it's not very likely that our cognitive systems are reliable in areas other than the production of beliefs relevant to survival), where a reliable cognitive system is taken to be one that produces a preponderance of true beliefs. Basically, Plantinga thinks that if our cognitive faculties have evolved as many think they have, then there are no good reasons to think they are accurate, particularly in theoretical areas.
Here are some quotes from the essay that demonstrate his general point:
"If our cognitive faculties have originated as [evolutionists] think, then their ultimate purpose or function (if they have a purpose or function) will be something like survival (of individual, species, gene, or genotype); but then it seems initially doubtful that among their functions -- ultimate, proximate, or otherwise -- would be the production of true beliefs....What evolution underwrites is only (at most) that our behavior be reasonably adaptive to the circumstances...hence (so far forth) it does not guarantee mostly true or verisimilitudinous beliefs....natural selection is interested not in truth, but in appropriate behavior...survival or fitness....even if you think Darwinian selection would make it probable that certain belief-producing mechanisms -- those involved in the production of beliefs relevant to survival -- are reliable, that would not hold for the mechanisms involved in the production of the theoretical claims of science, such beliefs, for example,...as the evolutionary story itself."
My question for those who are versed in evolutionary theory: are there good reasons to think that evolutionary processes would or could produce reliable cognitive faculties (particularly in relation to areas that don't seem to have much to do with survival, per se)?
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from Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function. 1993.
Originally posted by LemonJelloI don't think this has been brought up in this form so far. Woohoo! A new angle to explore! We may make it to 3000 after all.
I'm sorry if this topic has already been discussed somewhere in the nearly 3,000 posts preceding this one, but...
I was reading an essay recently by Plantinga where he argues against naturalism. In the essay, he does not argue that naturalism is false. Rather, he argues that the act of endorsing naturalism is an irrational act. He thinks that natura -------------------------
from Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function. 1993.
Daniel Dennet, in Conciousness Explained, shows various ways in which our perception of reality is, exactly as would be expected if conciousness had evelved, full of flawed approximations and inaccuracies that simply help us (or our ancesters) to survive.
Micheal Shermer also goes into this a little in Why People Believe Weird Things.
However, this is all the more reason to distrust our instinctive beliefs and to use the scientific method as the best way we currently have to understand the real world since it makes predictions that can be tested so that we can see where our beliefs are wrong.
The fact that our concousness is flawed should alert us to be sceptical of any human claim to knowledge of an absolute Truth.
--- Penguin.
Originally posted by LemonJelloYes, quite. Personally I'm all for the notion of 100% behavioural induction in the human mind. I think there is a lot to be said for the Quine-Duhem thesis and also the idea that our mental processes are just complex cross-pollinations of evolved survival mechanisms. Quine and Chomsky suggest that we have at least a basic biologically coded construct for language and since I see existence as just 'quarks & bullsh;t' it seems reasonable to me to consider a biologically coded template for thought as well.
I'm sorry if this topic has already been discussed somewhere in the nearly 3,000 posts preceding this one, but...
I was reading an essay recently by Plantinga where he argues against naturalism. In the essay, he does not argue that naturalism is false. Rather, he argues that the act of endorsing naturalism is an irrational act. He thinks that natura ...[text shortened]... -------------------------
from Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function. 1993.
However, I think there was a consciousness boundary beyond which the evolution of the mind is now moving away from instinctual and towards reasoned self-awareness. Whilst we have the natural mechanisms already, we can now analyse, investigate, explain and propagate our own conscious development. Perhaps we move away from the pressures of natural evolution in the mind and towards self-realisation.
Just a few meandered and poorly tied together ideas to be going on with, I'm hardly awake 🙂
Originally posted by FreakyKBHAnd despite your misconceptions otherwise, the existing laws of physics can easily encompass a vacuum of Planck size with non-zero curvature expanding exponentially. It falls right out of Einstein's general relativity, and though he made nothing of it, today it's called the inflationary theory. I suggest checking out Alan Guth's The Inflationary Universe for a layman's-level explanation written by one of the first developers of the model.
Despite fantastic dreams otherwise, it is not likely that the laws of physics have changed fundamentally since time began.
Originally posted by LemonJelloPlantinga's argument is simply an argument to consequences, and isn't a very good one at that. As far as processing real world information, yes, it's fairly reliable because one needs to know what the threats are and where they are. As far as beliefs about the world, no, it need not be reliable, but that can be turned against Plantinga's argument very easily: since the evidence is there that humanity evolved, maybe religion is just a form of primitive anthropomorphization left over from a distant evolutionary heritage, and which we should outgrow in this modern age. No evolutionary biologist I know, nor any philosopher (with the possible exception of Plantinga), thinks that human minds are or have to be infallible. That's one reason why many regard scientific investigation as superior to idle contemplation: since we're constantly checking the evidence against the one place where our senses are fairly reliable, we then can deduce facts about the world. Since the theologian has no laboratory, we can largely discount the things they come up with.
My question for those who are versed in evolutionary theory: are there good reasons to think that evolutionary processes would or could produce reliable cognitive faculties (particularly in relation to areas that don't seem to have much to do with survival, per se)?
Originally posted by NullifidianPlantinga's argument is simply an argument to consequences
Plantinga's argument is simply an argument to consequences, and isn't a very good one at that. As far as processing real world information, yes, it's fairly reliable because one needs to know what the threats are and where they are. As far as beliefs about the world, no, it need not be reliable, but that can be turned against Plantinga's argument very ea ...[text shortened]... ce the theologian has no laboratory, we can largely discount the things they come up with.
No, that's not a fair or accurate assessment. Yes, P's argument is rather horrible, but it's not an example of argumentum ad consequentiam. P doesn't even argue here that naturalism is false, let alone that it is false because he otherwise doesn't fancy the implications.
But, yes, I agree it's a terrible argument (for other reasons).