Originally posted by twhitehead
Probably 4b.
I am basically saying that the Rabbi is claiming we can say nothing about God, yet the very word must have meaning and thus be saying something about God.
Ah. I think it is closer to 4a. The difference is that one (4b) relates to “the signification of a
word”, while the other (4a) relates to “the essential nature of a
thing”. That is, 4b refers to the “signified” (meaning) of the sign/signifier “g-o-d”, while 4a refers to the “referent” (the actual—existent or nonexistent—thing that the signified refers to). This distinction also shows up in 3: “The action of defining, or stating
exactly—
—what a
thing is, or
—what a
word means.”
I don’t think Rav Kook intends to say that theological “signs” have no useful signified, but that the signifieds—especially singular signified—can be taken to state exactly or precisely the essential nature of the referent, or “
exactly what the referent (thing: god) is”. He could as well have something like definition 1 in mind—especially in a context of process theology, as opposed to substance theology. And kabbalistic theology* has at least a large stream of such theology.
Now, of course, I am interpreting Rav Kook in ways that I agree with. But I think there are four (non-mutually-exclusive) issues at play:
(1) The inability of any sign/signified to adequately define, bound or limit the referent itself (in this case—not all referents).
(2) At least some of that stems from an underlying process theology, in which G*d as a process (YHVH as a verb) is always becoming, never complete. (This goes also to the possibility of definition 1 in the OED.)
(3) Rav Kook’s exception to a conceptual idolatry based sign-concepts is itself couched (deliberately I suspect) in metaphorical terms: “sparkling flashes”. This exception is intended to allow for language—metaphorically, allusively, etc.—as long as its limits are recognized.
(4) The polysemous nature of classical (Torah) Hebrew. This does go to the signified—indeed, even to determining the sign/signifier, especially from a Torah scroll (no conventional vowels, little in the way of word-breaks, etc.). You are right, of course, in that one must decide on (a) the sign/signifier, and (b) a particular signified, for a word or phrase or sentence to have any meaning at all. The difficulty with the Hebrew is in “defining” a singular signified (meaning), to the exclusion of others (even when context—and what kind of context?—is considered), let alone dogmatizing a singular meaning.
I agree that for a word to have meaning, it must express a coherent signified. But that is, again tautological (since I could just as well say that for a word to have meaning it must express a meaningful meaning). But, in terms of the four issues I outlined above, what I have called “conceptual idolatry” relates to insisting on one “right meaning” among, perhaps many, possibilities (even taking context into account); insisting that that meaning (signified) exactly (or even adequately) delimits the referent in question (G*d); and foreclosing G*d’s (YHVH’s) ability to become “whatever I will be” under a process theology.
Although I had some knowledge of the background and context for Rav Kook’s statement—not only in terms of some of his writing, but rabbinical hermeneutics—I erred, I think, in simply dumping Rav Kook’s quote out here. Your critique was cogent—and once again you have forced me to do a lot of work. 🙂 That is a good thing.
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* Traditional kabbalah might be something of an “open range”; but I am not referring to any kind of new age “magical” kabbalah here, but the main source of Jewish nondualism.
BTW, it is not me that thumbed-down your post here, and I don't know why anyone would.
Who is the bigger blasphemer?
05 Apr '15 21:19
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