Have a look at this , it's very interesting. If anything it's not supportive of theism , but it does question whether we really have free will.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/science/02free.html?pagewanted=2&ei=5088&en=7d7a58876163384d&ex=1325394000&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss[/b]
Originally posted by knightmeister
Do you not see that the worm is also making rudimentary choices? You see those choices as driven by the worms instinct. The worm is not free because it is not in the driving seat , instinct is.
A worm does not make choices. In order to make a choice, you must be able to discern between
more desirable and less desirable states of affairs (where more desirable ones coincide more fully
with your interests). A worm doesn't choose because it doesn't have interests because interests
require consciousness.
You think that the fact you make choices proves you have free will , but it doesn't. All animals of various forms make choices of varying complexity , computers make very complex choices as well.
I think some animals
do have free will in as much as their choices reflect their desire to make
favorable events obtain. A key difference between higher animals like us and lower animals like,
say apes, is that we are much less short sighted.
Computers do
not make choices because computers do not have interests.
So choice alone does not prove you have free will. You need to show not just that we make choices but that those choices are not determined to always be that choice.
You then talk about self awareness. So if I am aware that I am making a choice then that somehow means that that choice cannot be determined? how so?
No. A sense of self is required because that is the basis upon which choices are made. The self
comprises interests, desires, motivations, dreams, and whatever else. Rational choices reflect the
striving to make events obtain that optimize these interests, desires, &c. A worm doesn't have
interests or dreams , &c, because a worm has no concept of self.
One can easily imagine an entity having self awareness and making choices but still being determined in the same way a worm is. It would just be a self aware choice making entity that , if you had enough information on , could have all it's actions predicted (apart from a random element).
I've now explained a few times now why this is not the case. In order to show that a worm and
a human make choices identically, you have to demonstrate why interests have no value in choice-
making.
Why do you think that simply because someone can predict what you will do means you don't have
free will? Let's say you really, really like strawberry cheesecake and really, really dislike Chunky
Monkey ice cream. Let's say I'm a friend of yours, and I know this about you. If we are at a
restaurant together, and the waiter says 'We have strawberry cheesecake dessert, or Chunky Monkey
ice cream, which would you like?,' is your choice not free? Is it less free because I could predict with
100% accuracy that you would pick the cheesecake?
I don't know about you, but I have a few very, very close friends who know me intimately.
Very often, they will tell me that they knew in advance exactly how I would react to certain information
or events. Often these events are very specific and complicated, and the reactions that I have are
peculiar and idiosyncratic. Does this mean that I am somehow less free?
Nemesio