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Originally posted by bbarr"The question here isn't complicated. I'm merely asking for an explanation of your putatively free choice to respond to my post. I'm asking because it is entailed by your conception of freedom that your choice didn't have causal antecedents sufficient to bring it about and that it was possible for you to have chosen otherwise. Here is a thought experiment that will hopefully motivate my question:
The question here isn't complicated. I'm merely asking for an explanation of your putatively free choice to respond to my post. I'm asking because it is entailed by your conception of freedom that your choice didn't have causal antecedents sufficient to bring it about and that it was possible for you to have chosen otherwise. Here is a thought experiment th ost (first one on this page) for a clear diagnosis of your continuing misapprehension.
Suppose you freely choose to P at time T1. Suppose, subsequently, at T2, God "rewinds" the universe such that at T3 the complete state of the universe is identical in every respect to how it was at T0, just prior to your choice [Except, of course, for some relational properties]. Now, it is an entailment of your conception of freedom that it would be possible for you to choose differently at T4 than how you chose at T1. That is, even though you would have the exact same physical and psychological states at T3 as you did at T0, according to you it would be possible for you to choose differently the "second time around". Now, think about what this means. This means that all your beliefs, desires, deliberations, awareness of reasons, etc. would be exactly the same at T3 as they were at T0. There would be absolutely no phenomenological difference between the course of your deliberations from T0 to your choice at T1 and the subsequent course of your deliberations from T3 to your choice at T4. Yet, despite this, you think it would be possible for you not to choose to P at T4. So, in line with this entailment of your view, suppose that at T4 you choose not to P. Then, there must be some explanation for why you chose differently at T4 then at T1 that makes no reference to either your physical or psychological states (since your physical and psychological states immediately prior to both choices were identical).
My question here is this: Given the above scenario, what could possibly explain your different choice at T4." BARR
First of all , does not Heisenbergs uncertainty principle imply that if the universe was repeated exaclty then quantum indeterminacy would also have to be repeated. But if this happened how could we say with certainty that things would turn out the same?
However, this is not the point. What you have basically said is that we are governed by physical, psychological states etc and if these states are repeated then the choice will be repeated. However , it's precisely because I do not believe that we are totally governed by these forces of the natural world that a different choice at T4 becomes possible. You are basically saying (in a complicated way) that free will is impossible because we live in a totally deterministic universe.
So to break out of that one would need something to exist that wasn't determined by anything else at all in oerder to make any free choice possible. This is where the concept of the uncaused cause comes in. Because God IS such an entity then he is able to offer a form of non determined freedom to us (for want of a better word) In other words himself. He is free in a nondetermined way because he is uncaused and supreme and if he shares that quality with us we can do a poor impression (our free will)
This is why I say that free will is really impossible without a supernatural influence. Nature is deterministic , but the supernatural? There is the argument of indeterminacy and randomness as well but it also may be possible that one day we will be able to predict movements of quantum particles. In any case random choices are not the same as the choiceful meaningful (and moral) ones that God intended for us.
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Originally posted by knightmeisterYikes, you are so deeply confused. Let me try this again:
Further, there are cases where it is only a constellation of causes that are jointly sufficient to bring about some effect, where in the absence of any one of the causes the others don't even raise the probability of the effect occuring. Lighting the fuse doesn't raise the probability of the bomd detonating unless the fuse is connected to the bomb, and he said. How is he guaranteeing the absence of one of the causes. Can he predict the future?
The example I brought up was meant to illustrate what I took to be a simple and untendentious point, namely (as has been reiterated here by no fewer than four people) that there exist individually insufficient but jointly sufficient casual forces. That is, there are innumerable cases where it is only a constellation of causes that together bring about some particular effect.
Recall that Freaky claimed that there exists some relation of dependence between causes and their effects. One interpretation of this claim is trivial. On this interpretation, Freaky is merely claiming that effects are causally dependent on their causes. But there is another, non-trivial interpretation of Freaky's claim that is false. On this interpretation, types of causes are individually sufficient to bring about their effects (ceteris paribus), and that this is an analytic claim. The bomb example is meant merely to illustrate that we often ascribe to effects joint causes that are individually insufficient to bring about that effect. To put the point in another way, sometimes we say of an effect that it was caused by both this and that, where this wouldn't have been sufficient to elicit the effect on its own and neither would have that.
Now the probability stuff (please, Herr Doctor, correct me if anything I say here is incorrect):
As has been implicit in this conversation, there is a distinction between what may be called 'actual probability' and 'epistemic probability'. Actual probability is simply the probability that something will occur. Epistemic probability is a measure of our evidence that something will occur, or an expression of ideally rational confidence that something will occur. When I flip this quarter, it may be that the state of the universe just prior to the coin flip entails that the coin will turn up heads. That is, the actual probability of the coin turning up heads may be p=1. But, alas, the causal forces that go into determing how the coin turns up are generally beyond my limited cognitive powers. So, the best evidence I have at my disposal only justifies me in thinking that the coin is as likely to turn up tails as heads. That is, the epistemic probability of the coin turning up heads is p=.5. Now, given extra information about the coin, for instance, it may be that the epistemic probability that the coin will turn up heads exceeds p=.5. If I find out the coin is weighted, for instance, the epistemic probability will be revised. This is why people keep saying in this thread that the sort of probabiility we're interersted in is a measure (in some sense) of the information we have at our disposal.
The bomb example, again, was merely meant to illustrate that there can be individually insufficient but jointly sufficient sets of causes. But, still, it is simply not an entailment of the bomb example as given that lighting an unconnected fuse or connecting an unlit fuse would increase the probability of the bomb exploding. Other things being equal, having a lit and connected fuse raises the probability of the bomb exploding. I think we agree on that. But all that I claimed in the example was that having merely one these conditions met wouldn't raise the probability of the bomb exploding. Of course, if you expand the example or revise it by adding information like "but maybe the wind will connect the fuse", or "maybe the heat from the lit fuse will agitate the air and make the bomb explode", then we would have to assess the probability of those further things happening. But nothing in the example as given gives us any reason to think that these further things will happen. Similarly, one could claim that perhaps having the lit fuse will decrease the probability of the bomb exploding, since there may be somebody who will douse the bomb with water if anybody lights the fuse! For every hypothetical case you can come up with that will increase the probability of the bomb exploding given that merely one of the conditions (lit fuse or connected fuse) is met, there is another hypothetical case where having either of these conditions met will decrease the probability of the bomb exploding, and there is nothing in the example as written that allows us to determine the probability of any of these hypothetical cases obtaining! That is, there is we don't have the information required to determine whether having merely one the conditions met alters the epistemic probability of the bomb exploding. That is, there is no effect on the epistemic probability of the bomb exploding since epistemic probability is simply a measure of the evidence we have at our disposal.
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Originally posted by knightmeisterYou are so profoundly confused that it's sincerely hard to know where to
Note here how you use both FUTURE tense and PRESENT tense. You cannot do this with probability because probability is about PREDICTION !! GARGH. WHY DOES NO-ONE GET THIS???? It's too obvious probably)
begin.
Probability is indeed about prediction, about something that is going to
happen at some point in the future. This statistic is derived from the
examination of the present state of the system and the results that can
develop from it. Thus, it requires the use of two tenses.
For example, consider:
1) The probability that the result will be heads when I flip a fair coin;
2) The probability that my lottery ticket will hit when I play the
numbers 5, 13, 19, and 27;
3) The probability that I will get hit by a car when I stand in the
middle of the highway; and so on.
Second of all, the 'present' tense you identify is actually more of an
implicit subjunctive; that is, it is postulating 'If I were to do X, then
how often will Y result.'
These are necessary formulations for probability because, as you say,
they entail prediction. You can't possibly say, if I flip a coin what is the
chance that it is heads, because you can't predict a present state (it's
already there); either the coin is already flipped and landed (it's either
already heads or already tails) or it hasn't been flipped and you are talking
about a future event. And it seems awfully cumbersome to try to say,
'Given that I will flipping the coin, what are the chances that it will be heads.'
Certainly, you aren't advocating that sort of grammatical mire.
Probability is about the likelihood that, given a present state, a future
state will or will not obtain.
(Hoping against hope...) I hope that you now understand this and can
finally revisit the preceding posts and strive to understand them.
Originally posted by knightmeister
This is what he said. How is he guaranteeing the absence of one of the causes. Can he predict the future?
That's what 'unless' means, as you've been told multiple times. Let's
consider my four scenarios.
The question at hand is whether E (explosion) will obtain.
1) Bomb with unlit and unconnected fuse.
The only way E is if a) it spontaneously explodes because of poor
workmanship or b) the fuse suddenly connects and c) suddenly lights,
and ~b or ~c.
2) Bomb with lit but unconnected fuse.
The only way E is if a, or b and ~c and ~b.
3) Bomb with unlit but connected fuse.
The only way E is if a, or c and ~b and ~c.
4) Bomb with lit and connected fuse.
E unless it d) it has bad workmanship, or ~b, or ~c.
(I am using ~b to mean suddenly becomes unconnected and ~c to mean
suddenly becomes unlit, not as would be proper 'does not suddenly
become unconnected/lit.' I figured that this would be clearer; upon
reflection, it might actually be more confusing, so if bbarr wants to jump
in and write this correctly, I defer entirely.)
Implicitly, we can assume that both a and d are small (poor workmanship
in either case), which makes the bomb's likelihood of exploding greater
at 4 than at 1. I should hope that we can agree so far.
So what could possibly make you think that either 2 or 3 is more likely
to E than 1? Consider 2 with 1: What makes you think that b, and ~b
or ~c is greater than b and c?
In order for you to argue that E is more likely in case 2 than case 1,
then you have to have a reason for thinking that the probability of
b, and ~b or ~c is greater than b and c.
So, perhaps you can elucidate.
Nemesio
P.S., Bbarr, please correct any flawed usage of symbology as you see fit.
P.P.S., DrS, please correct any flawed expression of probability as you see fit.
I apologize for any errors because of my own ignorance.
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Originally posted by NemesioThis is conceptually inaccurate.
Probability is indeed about prediction, about something that is going to
happen at some point in the future.
Probability is about the likelihood that, given a present state, a future
state will or will not obtain.
Let me present a few examples to illustrate. I offer these as meaningful probabilistic questions about past events:
Is it more likely than not that Jesus rose from the dead?
Is it more likely than not that he bodily rose into the sky and on into heaven?
Is it more likely than not that God gave Moses the Ten Commandments?
Is it more likely than not that the coin I flipped yesterday but never looked at landed heads?
And here are some meaningful probabilistic questions about the present:
Is Dr. S more likely than not the same person as Cribs?
Is it more likely than not snowing in Nigeria today?
Is knightmeister's IQ more likely than not below 100?
(You'lll note that I have phrased these all using "more likely than not", which is equivalent to asking whether the probability is greater than .5. However there is nothing special about that threshold except that it is linguistically convenient. Each example is just as meaningful if I'm instead inquiring whether the probability is greater than .9, or less than .2, or equal to .7)
Recall that probability is a measure of information. Often, we do typically apply probabilistic methods when analyzing future events. But this is a consequence of the fact that we more frequently lack complete information about future events than we do about past or present events. However, just as we lack complete information about whether it will rain next week in our home town, I, at least, lack complete information about whether it is currently snowing in Nigeria, and so the question, to me, is a probabilistic one. (And trivially, it would be to a Nigerian with complete information as well, with the probability under his information being 1 or 0).
The application of probabilistic methods is not essentially about looking forward from the present time into the future. It's about looking beyond a given set of certainties into uncertainty. It's just coincidental that the past and present contain more certainties than the future does.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI got tunnel vision when answering his question. I accept the correction.
The application of probabilistic methods is not essentially about looking forward from the present time into the future. It's about looking beyond a given set of certainties into uncertainty. It's just coincidental that the past and present contain more certainties than the future does.
Thank you,
Nemesio
Originally posted by knightmeisterFirst of all , does not Heisenbergs uncertainty principle imply that if the universe was repeated exaclty then quantum indeterminacy would also have to be repeated. But if this happened how could we say with certainty that things would turn out the same?
"The question here isn't complicated. I'm merely asking for an explanation of your putatively free choice to respond to my post. I'm asking because it is entailed by your conception of freedom that your choice didn't have causal antecedents sufficient to bring it about and that it was possible for you to have chosen otherwise. Here is a thought experim ...[text shortened]... not the same as the choiceful meaningful (and moral) ones that God intended for us.
No, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle entails no such thing, it merely specifies limits on our ability to jointly accurately measure pairs of conjugate properties (e.g., position and momentum). The example is hypothetical. If, hypothetically, things did go the same up till the point just prior to your choosing differently at T4, then what would your explanation be for this difference?
What you have basically said is that we are governed by physical, psychological states etc and if these states are repeated then the choice will be repeated.
Although I believe this, I said no such thing in the post above. I’m asking you, since you disagree with this, to explain how you could freely choose differently at T4 given your identical physical and psychological states at T0 and T3 respectively.
However , it's precisely because I do not believe that we are totally governed by these forces of the natural world that a different choice at T4 becomes possible. You are basically saying (in a complicated way) that free will is impossible because we live in a totally deterministic universe.
I know you do not believe we are governed by our physical and psychological states, which is why I’m asking you to explain how you could freely choose differently in the example above. I am certainly not saying that free will is impossible because we live in a deterministic universe, and nothing I wrote above entails this. I certainly don’t think the universe is deterministic, since there are metaphysically random quantum events. I also think that even if the world were deterministic that this would be compatible with having a free will, since being free to choose that P does not entail having the capacity to have not chosen that P.
So to break out of that one would need something to exist that wasn't determined by anything else at all in oerder to make any free choice possible. This is where the concept of the uncaused cause comes in. Because God IS such an entity then he is able to offer a form of non determined freedom to us (for want of a better word) In other words himself. He is free in a nondetermined way because he is uncaused and supreme and if he shares that quality with us we can do a poor impression (our free will)
Well, now your are contradicting yourself again. You claimed above that your free choice to respond to my post was caused by you. Then you claimed that your free choice to respond to my post wasn’t caused at all, but was merely you choosing. Now you are claiming that your free choices are caused after all, but caused by an uncaused cause. So, your newly revised claim contradicts your previous claim that free choices are not causally determined.
Regardless of this frantic oscillation between positions (which should indicate to you the ultimate incoherence of your view), let us go on from here with your most recent claim: Your free choice to respond to my post was caused by some property of yours, which either is God or a manifestation of God in you.
Now, in the example given, your physical and psychological states leading up to and just prior to your respective choices at T1 and T4 were identical. So, from your own first-person point of view, all your deliberations, beliefs, desires, weighing of reasons, etc. were identical just prior to T1 and T4. Now, since you did choose differently, there must be some explanation for why you chose differently, else the implication will be that your choices simply have no explanation; that is, your choices will ultimately be arbitrary.
It is no help to say “I simply chose differently the second time around”, or that “God in me allows me to choose differently the second time around”, for these responses merely reiterate the very thing I’m asking to be explained! On what basis could the choice at T4 differ? It can’t differ because you had different beliefs the second time around. It can’t differ because some reason seemed more pressing or relevant to you the second time around. It certainly can’t differ because the outcome of your deliberations was different the second time around. All these potential factors were, according the example, identical at T0 and T3. So, again, what explains the different choice at T4? What could explain it in a way that doesn’t ultimately leave your choices seemingly without reason and thus arbitrary?
Originally posted by knightmeisterIt's troubling to me that your post starts with 'So...' as if what follows is meant to reflect the point I was attempting to make. The point I was trying to make is that I don't consider your objections to the bomb example all that interesting or relevant. I think bbarr's claims in response to Freaky are accurate, and I also think his bomb example (presented just as it is) is apt.
So barr's argument was right but his analogy was naff?
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Originally posted by knightmeisterYes there is some meaningful information. A madman walks up and connects the fuse (remember virg tech) or a spark jumps from the fuse to the bomb or someone makes a mistake and forgot to disconnect the fuse etc etc.
If we consider the probability that the bomb goes off given that some unconnected or freestanding (and in that sense unrelated) fuse has been lit; there is simply no meaningful information that allows me to distinguish that probability from the probability that the bomb goes off given that the same unconnected or freestanding (unrelated) fuse has not b ...[text shortened]... hole point of probability , that nothing can be said to be impossible , only very very unlikely.
Please point out where in the bomb example this information is made available. As I stated before, the example does not provide information that enables one to distinguish between the probability that the bomb goes off given that the unconnected fuse is lit and the probability that the bomb goes off given that the same unconnected fuse is not lit. You are just throwing out some wild conjectures that are not based on any available information; and if we're going to start doing that; then I wonder why you only privilege certain types of wild conjectures. Certainly we can also come up with hypothetical circumstances in which the lighting of the unconnected fuse would, on the contrary, assuage our concerns of detonation.
Originally posted by knightmeisterI don't understand how any of that addresses bbarr's question (concerning a possible explanation for your behavior at time T4).
"The question here isn't complicated. I'm merely asking for an explanation of your putatively free choice to respond to my post. I'm asking because it is entailed by your conception of freedom that your choice didn't have causal antecedents sufficient to bring it about and that it was possible for you to have chosen otherwise. Here is a thought experim ...[text shortened]... not the same as the choiceful meaningful (and moral) ones that God intended for us.
You just sort of state that God grants us "non determined freedom", but I have no idea what you mean.
Originally posted by knightmeisterDo you agree that the possibility for a different choice taking place on a rerun of events fits the definition of "random"? Do you therefore agree that you believe that "free choices" are effectively random choices?
However, this is not the point. What you have basically said is that we are governed by physical, psychological states etc and if these states are repeated then the choice will be repeated. However , it's precisely because I do not believe that we are totally governed by these forces of the natural world that a different choice at T4 becomes possible. ...[text shortened]... plicated way) that free will is impossible because we live in a totally deterministic universe.
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Originally posted by LemonJelloYou are just throwing out some wild conjectures that are not based on any available information;LEMON
[b]Yes there is some meaningful information. A madman walks up and connects the fuse (remember virg tech) or a spark jumps from the fuse to the bomb or someone makes a mistake and forgot to disconnect the fuse etc etc.
Please point out where in the bomb example this information is made available. As I stated before, the example does not provide i he lighting of the unconnected fuse would, on the contrary, assuage our concerns of detonation.[/b]
No I am not because it stands to reason that one is able to imagine some unlikely scenarios where lighting the fuse contributes towards a potential explosion. Whilst it is much harder to imagine scenarios where lighting the fuse prevents explosion. Why? Because we have all heard about accidents concerning explosives and flames , wild gusts of wind , madmen and incredibly unlucky accidents involving bizarre sequences of events. The simple fact is that they can and sometimes do happen. We don't tend to hear about many (if any) where someone lighting something actually saved the day.
In my puny uneducated mind I find it much harder to associate the lighting of the fuse with a scenario that prevents detonation and much easier to imagine a scenario that lighting the fuse plays a part in a bizarre accident. These scenarios are not likely but that is hardly the point.
We don't have ALL the information but we do have SOME of it . The information we do have suggests an association between fuses , lighting them and detonation but does not suggest an association between lighting fuses and prevntion of detonation.
Let me ask you this , if I were to arrange it so that you would be able to live this scenario on a daily repeating basis (ala groundhog day) and then say that you were going to live it for a 100 trillion years. Which scenario would make you most uneasy? Fuse unlit or lit? Can you really rule out that one day a lit fuse might be your downfall? What would the chances be that lighting the fuse stopped the bomb detonating?
Originally posted by LemonJelloCertainly we can also come up with hypothetical circumstances in which the lighting of the unconnected fuse would, on the contrary, assuage our concerns of detonation.LEMON
[b]Yes there is some meaningful information. A madman walks up and connects the fuse (remember virg tech) or a spark jumps from the fuse to the bomb or someone makes a mistake and forgot to disconnect the fuse etc etc.
Please point out where in the bomb example this information is made available. As I stated before, the example does not provide i ...[text shortened]... he lighting of the unconnected fuse would, on the contrary, assuage our concerns of detonation.[/b]
Yes we can , but it's harder to imagine and I would argue that these circumstances are less likely than the other circumstances. The degree of likelihood is not relevant.
Originally posted by knightmeisterOK, let's go toe to toe. You imagine a case, and then I'll imagine one, and then you imagine one, and then I imagine one. Whoever runs out first loses.
Certainly we can also come up with hypothetical circumstances in which the lighting of the unconnected fuse would, on the contrary, assuage our concerns of detonation.LEMON
Yes we can , but it's harder to imagine and I would argue that these circumstances are less likely than the other circumstances. The degree of likelihood is not relevant.
You can go first if you like.
Originally posted by LemonJelloThis implies that you may think I have a point afterall. I would say that the analogy is flawed because it's impossible to eliminate the possibility of the fuse becoming connected AND it's also possible to say that lighting fuses is more likely to create detonations than it is to prevent them. Therefore , the statement that the probability is not raised is false. He should have said it was not raised by very much at all.
It's troubling to me that your post starts with 'So...' as if what follows is meant to reflect the point I was attempting to make. The point I was trying to make is that I don't consider your objections to the bomb example all that interesting or relevant. I think bbarr's claims in response to Freaky are accurate, and I also think his bomb example (presented just as it is) is apt.
It also refutes his original argument because it shows that events happen because of a causally linked chain of circumstances. Like ingredients in a recipe we need all of them. If we introduce an ingredient and can't rule out the other ingredients being present (however unlikely that may be) then we have logically increased the probability.
If barr had said that playing cards next to the bomb would not raise the probability of detonation then I would be forced to agree because playing of cards is not a known ingredient. Lighting fuses is.