08 May '07 09:08>1 edit
Originally posted by dottewell"A compatibilist account of this might be that you, as a devout Christian, choose to tell your wife because you don't want to lie to her and, while you can see the benefits of keeping quiet, in the end you judge it best (morally, practically, whatever) to have everything out in the open.
A compatibilist account of this might be that you, as a devout Christian, choose to tell your wife because you don't want to lie to her and, while you can see the benefits of keeping quiet, in the end you judge it best (morally, practically, whatever) to have everything out in the open.
Note that the compatibilist is entitled to almost all the same deci coherently explain choice and action? How can even god know we are going to x? And so on.
Note that the compatibilist is entitled to almost all the same decision-making paraphenalia as you - he can speak of the mind, he can speak of competing reasons (some practical, some physical, some moral).
The only difference is that, in your words, to the compatibilist it is something "internal" that "tips the balance"; to you it is some queer product or action of your immortal soul. The compatibilist can coherently describe this "balance-tipping" element as, in this case, a compelling moral reason; what can you meaningfully say about it, other than this? What is this free something, and how do you think it relates to our reasoning process, our physical desires, our moral motivations? In what sense is it free? If it is the case that our actions can be free in the sense that no possible physical, mental or moral explanation would ever necessitate that we do x, how can we coherently explain choice and action? How can even god know we are going to x? And so on." DOTTY
......The difference in the compatibilist view is that whatever reasoning becomes the most compelling for me it is that reasoning that neccesitates my choice. In this sense although the reasons are competing , there can only be one winner because it will compel or neccesitate that decision. This is because there is nothing in me that is above or beyond nature to enable me to not be compelled by nature's programming.
In the free will version I make the choice for the same reason but that reason is not sufficient to compel me to make that choice. It's a choice I have to make of my own free will. This can only happen if there is something within me that is free of nature and can resist it's programming. This element is the power of God's spirit that is available to men and dwells within us also , enabling the possibility of freedom from programming and determinism.
In the first version I am ultimately nothing but a complicated slave to programming. In the second version I have made a reasoned decision that is not arbitrary but there is nothing in the reason itself that FORCES me to make that decision.
This is where compatabilism breaks down for me . To me every action and choice must be forced ultimately by nature because the cause necesitates the decision. This is true of complex reasoning processes or instinctual movements by a worm . All are happening for reasons that are sufficient to compel or force that decision. And if nature is all that there is that's all it ever can be. The compatabilist idea that some actions are forced externally and some are reasoned internally (and therefore free) is not one that makes sense if you really boil it down properly.
So both look the same but they are not. In free will we can be ultimately held responsible for our actions because we can't say that any cause was sufficient to compel us or make our choice inevitable . In compatibilism one is not able to say this , we can only say that the reason was sufficient to cause us to do it , and what that ultimately means is that the cause necesitates the effect, which means we could not have done otherwise. As you know , it is irrational to hold someone responsible for their actions if what they did was inevitable from their birth.
In my view compatabilism is just determinism masquerading as free will.