Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., but you began this thread with a particular question concerning the point of moral discourse in a deterministic universe. A plausible answer is that it serves a causal role by influencing people's evaluative attitudes, deliberations, and actions. Suppose I act cruelly, and am told 'You ought not have acted cruelly'. I can take this a metaphysical impo ...[text shortened]... e causes outside of me. But moral discourse is compatible with is, as I argue above.
Something valuable is lost in the recasting.
Sure, the implications of moral exhortations may (or may not) be taken up by deliberative agents in the absence of free will.
However, those agents would not be metaphysically responsible for whether they take up those implications or not if either determinism or haphazardism were true. This is because those agents either wouldn't be able to act otherwise, or wouldn't be authors of their own acts, respectively. They would just be expressing a part of implacable universe unfolding itself, either inevitably or capriciously.
So, in response too exhortations, they would be like dumb animals being admonished or praised: it might affect how they behave later, but they still wouldn't be responsible for it. They would just be doing what they do, in response to inducements and threats. Sure, human beings would think about things explicitly in addition: but those thoughts would be just as determined as animals' implicit conditioned responses.
So, moral exhortation would still exert useful effects. And there are certainly alternative meanings to "should have" and "could have" that are viable. But none of the would mean people were not fundamentally automatons trapped in a causal web, and that morality was anything other than a perverse puppet show.
Having said this, I find myself wholly unable to characterize free will coherently, as an alternative to determinism or haphazardism. This may either mean that it really is incoherent, or that my mind can't grasp it. I hope the latter possibility is true. But I wouldn't blame you if you weren't convinced, as I have provided no reason to convince you, or indeed myself.
Also, you may are psychologically satisfied by some version of compatibilism, that doesn't entail imponderable counter-causal action. Good for you. But I am not. Bad for me.