09 Sep 10
Neo: Are you saying that I must choose whether Trinity lives or dies?
Oracle: You have already made that choice. Now you must understand it.
The Matrix Reloaded
In a deterministic universe, an act of premeditated murder or saving a person from drowning is no more and no less an event in the system than an apple falling to the ground under gravity. Is there any point to assigning moral status to the former but not the latter? Why ethics in a deterministic universe?
09 Sep 10
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerAre you excluding compatibilism from the outset?Neo: Are you saying that I must choose whether Trinity lives or dies?
Oracle: You have already made that choice. Now you must understand it.
The Matrix Reloaded
In a deterministic universe, an act of premeditated murder or saving a person from drowning is no more and no less an event in the system than an apple falling to ...[text shortened]... assigning moral status to the former but not the latter? Why ethics in a deterministic universe?
My first thought would be that determinism doesn't imply you would do the same thing in different worlds. If moral responsibility entails any consequences, then the world with or without it would be a different world. So the assignment or not of moral responsibility does affect the outcome.
09 Sep 10
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaI don't think compatibilism actually adds anything to the question. Let's say I feed a hungry child and my actions are compatible with my desires. So what? Both my act and my desires are no less pre-determined than an apple falling to the ground and making a soft "thud". Why ascribe moral status to one and not the other? What makes one event "good" but not the other? Isn't the line between events ascribed a moral status and those that aren't arbitrary?
Are you excluding compatibilism from the outset?
My first thought would be that determinism doesn't imply you would do the same thing in different worlds. If moral responsibility entails any consequences, then the world with or without it would be a different world. So the assignment or not of moral responsibility does affect the outcome.
EDIT: A utilitarian could get around this by describing events that increase net happiness (say) of beings capable of happiness as "good"; in which case an apple falling could in fact be "good" and have a moral status. I'd have to think about such a response more but I think the question of a special status for beings capable of happiness such that events that affect them have a morality comes up.
(A meta-philosophical question would be the point of the discipline of ethics in itself.)
If we live in a deterministic universe, then all events within this universe are completely specified by the initial conditions of the universe. There simply cannot be another universe (even conceptually) that is identical to ours up to a point T-deltaT before the "moral" event - so there's no question of "possible worlds" where event E doesn't occur.
09 Sep 10
I don't think this discussion was meant to be a "this is our reality" discussion. I think it was meant to be a "let's discus ethics in the Matrix reality".
I would think that ethics in a non-deterministic universe would be a different thread. This thread was meant to discuss ethics under the condition of a deterministic universe.
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by lucifershammerBecause the universe is deterministic and it determined humans would value ethics.Neo: Are you saying that I must choose whether Trinity lives or dies?
Oracle: You have already made that choice. Now you must understand it.
The Matrix Reloaded
In a deterministic universe, an act of premeditated murder or saving a person from drowning is no more and no less an event in the system than an apple falling to ...[text shortened]... assigning moral status to the former but not the latter? Why ethics in a deterministic universe?
09 Sep 10
Originally posted by lucifershammerI am unsure why you think there is any tension between our modes of ethical evaluation and assessment and the possibility that our universe is deterministic. Consider these questions you ask above:
I don't think compatibilism actually adds anything to the question. Let's say I feed a hungry child and my actions are compatible with my desires. So what? Both my act and my desires are no less pre-determined than an apple falling to the ground and making a soft "thud". Why ascribe moral status to one and not the other? What makes one event "good" bu ...[text shortened]... nt - so there's no question of "possible worlds" where event E doesn't occur.
"Why ascribe moral status to one and not the other? What makes one event "good" but not the other? Isn't the line between events ascribed a moral status and those that aren't arbitrary?"
These questions can and have been fruitfully asked in moral philosophy independently of worries about determinism. Is there anything about determinism in particular that makes these questions more pressing? I'd figure that the supposed tension between determinism and freedom informs your questions, but then you claim that compatibilism doesn't really add anything to the debate. So, I'm confused. Can you clarify?