Long-standing precedent of the United States Supreme Court holds that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody and control of their children. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents." 321 U.S. at 166. Subsequent cases applying this principle have explained that this constitutional liberty derives from the presumption that "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children." Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the importance of this interest in the case of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), ruling that a Washington State statute allowing “any person” to petition for visitation was unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringed on the rights of parents.
In the seminal case of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Supreme Court upheld the principle that an unwed father could not be presumed to be an unfit parent, but was entitled to a hearing pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case thus marks the connection between the substantive rights of parents and the procedural requirements necessary to protect those rights.