Originally posted by KneverKnightorganism - a living thing that has (or can develop) the ability to act or function independently
First, is being a human organism sufficient for having rights?
bbar
Is a zygote a human organism?
human - homo: any living or extinct member of the family Hominidae
So, yes - a zygote is a human organism. This has been debated in the other thread.
Originally posted by lucifershammerNot quite. This thread is intended to house a debate between us concerning our respective views concerning personhood and rights possession. If this is merely a forum meant to explore my own views, then I have no real desire to participate. I am here to debate you, not just post the same ideas I have countless times before here at RHP on this very topic. I will ask you questions about your view and raise questions and objections. You will, presumably, do the same. If you intended this thread as a one-sided exploration of my views, then you are on your own and I'll go back to arguing in the main thread.
Sure. Read through the other thread. And keep postings about the definition of human beings to that thread. This thread is intended to discuss bbarr's philosophy of personhood and intrinsic rights.
Originally posted by bbarrI stand corrected - this is indeed an exploration of both views. However, in the interest of brevity, I must refer all people who wish to see the basis and definitions of my views to the other thread. In the same vein, I would request all posters to read through the other thread to check if their particular response has not been expressed and/or addressed in the other thread - I think it would be unproductive for me to repeat myself.
Not quite. This thread is intended to house a debate between us concerning our respective views concerning personhood and rights possession. If this is merely a forum meant to explore my own views, then I have no real desire to participate. ...[text shortened]... u are on your own and I'll go back to arguing in the main thread.
(bbarr) Now, I've already answered your questions. I'm waiting for the answers to mine.
Edit: There might be specific responses to my views that develop in comparison to the opposing set of views in the post that started this thread. Discussion on that topic would be relevant here.
What about the idea that people are able to determine for themselves what they will be, and what they will do?
It has always been so. And it is probably the single greatest reason why we evolved to be the dominant species on the planet.
The reasoning is as follows:
Person A has a fight with person B and goes to the Chief for a resolution to the argument. The Chief chooses B and A leaves. In a fit of pique.
Person A then goes and (choose) Dies;joins tribe x;forms tribe Y.
Anyway we look at it, our species benefits. Because of our stupid argumentative nature.
At our current (stunted) level of development, we are still trying to figure out this divergence of sperm. We call it "politics", but it ain't that dramatic. The statement that "There Is no more noble cause, than that man devote himself to politics" is stupid at best. Duplicitous at worst. Politics is only our current grovel to enslave our opponents.
Another couple hundred years. We will then be able to laugh at the good old times. And be free of government, in favor of intelligent choice.
Mayby. Maybe several thousand years. I hope.
Originally posted by lucifershammer
I've decided to move the discussion about bbar's philosophy of personhood and rights (and hence, the impact it has on the abortion debate) to a new thread.
First, the relevant portions from the "George Bush Phones in Support for March of Life" thread:
Originally posted by bbarr
[b]Why is it relevant when life begins, or when a fetus ...[text shortened]... ssary condition for enjoying these rights?
I'll wait for bbarr's response before I proceed.
Originally posted by lucifershammerFirst question - I assume that by "capacity" you mean the possession of the actual ability (to suffer, to be self-conscious etc.) rather than just the potential to possess that ability. Correct?
I'll wait for bbarr's response before I proceed.[/b]
I take possession of the capacity to X to require possession of the internal causal (in this case, neural) structures necessary for the manifestation of X. So, possession of the capacity to suffer, for instance, requires possession of the neural structures necessary for suffering to occur.
Second question - I assume that it is the conjunction of the three capacities that is the sufficient condition for personhood (and hence, rights) rather than each capacity in itself. Correct?
Yep.
Third question - I assume that by "rights" you mean the commonly understood human rights (life, liberty, equality under the law, pursuit of happiness). Correct?
I do not mean human rights, as I don't think that it is either necessary or sufficient for having a right that one be a human organism. I do mean things like the right to life, to equal consideration of interests, etc.
Fourth question - Do you believe that personhood is a necessary condition for enjoying these rights?
Yes, and I also think it is sufficient.
So, now on to my questions:
I asked whether being a human organism was necessary for having rights. You answered as follows:
If, by "rights", you mean human rights (life, liberty, equality); and by "having" you mean having in an intrinsic/Lockesian sense; then the answer is yes again. Certain classes of non-human creatures may have certain rights (e.g. non-food animals may have a right not to be treated cruelly), but whether these animal rights are intrinsic or extrinsic (i.e. awarded by humans), I don't have a clear view on. If I had to take a position, I would say they were extrinsic.
Now, I do think that rights are possessed intrinsically, but not in any Lockean sense, as Locke thought that rights in the state of nature were bestowed upon us by God, and rights outside of the state of nature were bestowed upon us by our contracting into a society. So, I'm not sure why you think that Locke thought that rights were intrinsic per se. I doubt you intended to contradict yourself here, so I will interpret you as claiming that rights are things humans have in and of themselves; that rights are not bestowed upon humans by other humans, nor can they be taken away. Is that a fair interpretation?
If so, then since you have claimed that it is necessary for having rights that a creature be a human, you are committed to the claim that Vulcans, if they existed, would not have rights. Do you accept this conclusion, or would you prefer to modify your claims concerning the necessity of being human for rights possession?
In response to my question concerning whether it was sufficient for rights possession that an entity be a human organism, you responded as follows:
If, by organism, you mean "a living thing that has (or can develop) the ability to act or function independently"; by human organism you mean an organism that belongs to the species homo sapiens; then the answer is yes (sic).
Are these three conditions (being living, having the ability or the potential ability to act or function independently, and belonging to the species homo sapiens) individually necessary and jointly sufficient for rights possession, on your view?
Also, when you use the term 'species' in your response above, are you utilizing the Biological Species Concept? If so, it would follow from what you have said so far that if speciation occured within the population of homo sapiens, the new species would not have rights (as they would not belong to the species homo sapiens). Would you care to revise your use of the term 'species' so that your view does not have this counterintuitive entailment?
Further, when you use the phrase 'act or function independently', are you intending to express something similar to the traditional notion of autonomy?
EDIT: I am moving this weekend to a new flat, and my access to a computer will be hit-and-miss for the next week or so. Worst case scenario, it may take me a couple days to respond to a post of yours.
Bennett
There are no "intrinsic" rights in nature. Living beings come into existence, they live and they die. A hawk plucks a rabbit from a field; I'm caught in a rockslide in the mountains and am killed--natural, if not random events. There is in nature no "right to life" for any creature, no right to a continuing existence at any point during that existence. And existentially, any other rights would be derivative.
If one assumes a "God," then, depending on one's conception of that God, one can postulate any number of rights divinely bestowed or ordained. One could also propose that certain of those rights operate through nature, I suppose.
Outside that, rights are determined culturally and socially, through conditioning, covenant or conflict, or mediation of conflict.
There may be certain intrinsic, natural imperatives (if one can use that word); e.g., to survive (Schopenhauer's "Will to Life"😉 and to thrive (what Nietzsche essentially meant by his "Will to Power"😉. These imperatives may lead to conflict among individuals pursuing them, and in conscious beings, even within the individual. In situations of conflict, people often appeal to some concept of either intrinsic (natural) or extrinsic (transcendental or divine) rights. They may also appeal to rights historically determined by the culture (e.g., either statutory or common law, or custom).
In any event, if one is going to talk about rights, one needs to address the question of the source of such rights. Again, there seems to me to be no empirical evidence whatsoever of any naturally occurring innate or intrinsic rights. Rights, ethics, morality are human-made.
There seems to have been some discussion here about what it means to be "person." The closest I can come to that question (and it's pretty minimal) is Ortga y Gasset's statement that a human being is the only creature that needs to create himself/herself in the very process of living. What I create and continue to create is my "person." That is both an existential and a dynamic definition. Heidegger might add something to the effect that a person is one who creates himself/herself "authentically" (or Sartre would say "in good faith"😉 by recognizing and acknowledging and living out that very fact. To live well--to thrive--surely means at least to do so authentically.
There appear a number of smiley faces in the text of my comments above. They are not intended; it seems to have something to do with end-parentheses...
Originally posted by vistesdIt's this combination - ; ) - semicolon followed by end parenthesis.
There are no "intrinsic" rights in nature. Living beings come into existence, they live and they die. A hawk plucks a rabbit from a field; I'm caught in a rockslide in the mountains and am killed--natural, if not random events. There is in nature no "right to life" for any creature, no right to a continuing existence at any point during that existen ...[text shortened]... omments above. They are not intended; it seems to have something to do with end-parentheses...
Originally posted by vistesdYou claim that there are no intrinsic rights in nature, but you fail to give any argument for this claim. You merely relate some descriptions of the manners in which some creatures kill others. So what? Do you have an actual argument in support of this normative skepticism, or are you merely expressing your opinion on the matter? If you have an argument in support of your skepticism, then please present it, if you have no such argument, then why should any of us care about your opinion on this matter?
There are no "intrinsic" rights in nature. Living beings come into existence, they live and they die. A hawk plucks a rabbit from a field; I'm caught in a rockslide in the mountains and am killed--natural, if not random events. There is in nature no "right to life" for any creature, no right to a continuing existence at any point during that existen ...[text shortened]... omments above. They are not intended; it seems to have something to do with end-parentheses...
Originally posted by bbarrHow can one argue that there are intrinsic 'rights'?! I don't get it. Whether someone is 'due' some kind of treatment or access to some state of being is entirely subjective.
You claim that there are no intrinsic rights in nature, but you fail to give any argument for this claim. You merely relate some descriptions of the manners in which some creatures kill others. So what? Do you have an actual argument in support of this normative skepticism, or are you merely expressing your opinion on the matter? If you have an argument in su ...[text shortened]... if you have no such argument, then why should any of us care about your opinion on this matter?
Originally posted by bbarrA fair question. However--
You claim that there are no intrinsic rights in nature, but you fail to give any argument for this claim. You merely relate some descriptions of the manners in which some creatures kill others. So what? Do you have an actual argument in support of this normative skepticism, or are you merely expressing your opinion on the matter? If you have an argument in su ...[text shortened]... if you have no such argument, then why should any of us care about your opinion on this matter?
As the old logical saw goes, "It's damned hard to prove a negative." That's why the burden of proof in logical argument is generally held to be on the other side.
My assertion that there are no intrinsic rights in nature is based on the fact that there appears to be no empirical evidence of such (hence my overly casual examples of "accidents of nature," so to speak). If one were to assert that "naddy-nons" exist as part of nature, and no one has found any empirical evidence of any such thing, then the burden of proof is on the one asserting their existence to 1) clearly define what a naddy-non is, and 2) to provide evidence for the claim of their existence. The burden of proof lies with the one making the claim for something for which no empricial evidence is, well, in evidence. Otherwise, you can make up anything--like naddy-nons--assert their existence, then stand back and demand proofs (logical or empirical) that they don't. [Tangential but relevant to all this is Hume's discussion of evidence for miracles versus the whole empirical body of knowledge about the processes of nature.]
Replacing "naddy-nons" with the concept of "rights," if you are going to assert that rights exist in fact (and not just conceptually, whether as a descriptive or as an explanatory concept) then you are on the hook to offer the evidence. If you claim that such rights are intrinsic to nature, then you have to show evidence of that; if you claim they come from some trascendant or divine realm, then you have to show evidence for that (logical or empirical), and so on. Since the concept of rights clearly appears in human discourse (and so far as we know, only there)--and since there is a long human history of claiming, codifying, enforcing various rights, etc.--there is plenty of evidence that human beings are concerned with rights. I am aware of no empirical evidence from any discipline that would support any notion of rights in nature beyond the human segment (except of course for religion, which I am excluding only because that raises a whole host of epistemological issues--valid ones). Surely you are not asserting the existence of rights as an "a priori synthetic proposition?" Kant is the only major philsopher that comes to my mind who might have done that; most philsophers seem to reject the notion.
Of course, one could construct a logical inference along the following lines: 1) human beings exist as part of nature, and 2) human beings have a concept called "rights," therefore rights exist (intrinsically) in nature. This would be a deductively invalid inference however, since human beings also have automobiles and, say the concept of unicorns. But it seems ludicrous to assert that automobiles are therefore intrinsic to nature (I will leave the unicorns to someone else).
If one is a Platonist, then might might argue for the "ideal" of autombile, of which any physical automoble is simply an example with all its properties and accidents. [Note: This would be an a priori analytical proposition, not an a posteriori synthetic one.] However, a Humean empiricist might reply, "I have the perception of the automobile--indeed a perception of such 'substance' (form) that it enables me drive one--and the notion of a pre-existing idea (or ideal) of automobile in nature is superfluous and unnecessary"--and at that point simply apply Occam's Razor to lop it off.
The idealist and the empiricist have difficulty actually debating because they are worlds apart at their epistemological base.
If a prior thread outlines the epistemological assumptions of this discussion, please point me in that direction. (That might help to shorten posts such as this one, or help prevent consfusion that srises from attempts to cover a lot of ground with some brevity.) Otherwise, I repeat: it is not up to me to "prove the negative" empirically or analytically.