Originally posted by vistesdFirst, under (4), I think, as a technicality, the phrase “they ought to flay Floyd” would have to be replaced with something like “it is permissible for them to flay Floyd,” since D has been determined to be a sufficient, but not a necessary, reason to A in this example. This seems to be example-specific, in that the whole thing could surely be recast in terms that would allow the “ought.”
Bbar,
You should save that somewhere so you don't "lose" it again and have to redo it! Part of its elegance is that the whole thing rests on a single axiom: that of S being fully-reflective. A couple of small comments--
First, u ...[text shortened]... . The example of non-violence training also comes to mind.
Thank you for the comments, I appreciate people taking the time to actually read this argument. Concerning (4), you are right that when S endorses the hypothetical imperative P as a general rule of conduct for those in situations relevantly similar to S’s, S thereby is committed to the claim that in situations like S’s the antecedent of the conditional expressed by P provides a sufficient but not a necessary condition for acting as the consequent of the conditional expressed by P recommends. In effect, by endorsing P, S endorses the claim that the situation he is in provides reasons good enough to justify acting in the relevant way. Now, your comment indicates that you think that when S endorses the general hypothetical imperative P, he endorses the mere permissibility, under his circumstances, of acting in the relevant way, not that everyone in S’s exact circumstances ought act in the relevant way. The problem with this analysis is that if S did endorse the mere permissibility of acting in the relevant way, he would seem thereby to be committed to claim that somebody could be in exactly the same circumstances he is in and not endorse acting in the relevant way. But how could this be? How could two fully rational and fully reflective agents in exactly the same circumstances end up endorsing different actions? What would explain the difference in endorsement. By hypothesis it couldn’t be some discrepancy in cognitive functioning. Neither could it be a difference in temperament or character, as these psychological differences would qualify as differences in circumstances. Perhaps it could be the case that there were two courses of action each of which was equally supported by the reasons available to S. But if this was the case, then how could S have endorsed one over the other? Since S would be aware of the fact that he could only take one of the available courses of action, he would have to determine some strategy by which to decide. But then this strategy (e.g., flipping a coin) would have had to occur prior to the endorsement of the relevant action, and hence would be included in the antecedent of the conditional expressed by P.
Second,, it seems to me that certain exceptional cases where S does not engage in full reflection before acting in a given circumstance, such as a “survival response” (fight, flee or freeze) to an immediate threat, can also be subsumed under this model. [The survival-response situation being an example of a case where there is not enough time to fully reflect.] In such a case, S can reflect on his actions ex post facto (and as a fully-reflective being, would be expected to) in a manner similar to that in the model, in order to determine whether or not his response-behavior was really appropriate to the situation, and by extension, like-situations. In this way, one does not simply, or totally, “surrender” his identity as fully-reflective agent vis-à-vis instances of “purely instinctual” behavior. In fact, such reflection (perhaps only after it is reinforced by being “practiced” many times, perhaps not) may lead S to “short-circuit” the “instinctual” response in cases where his reflection upon previous like-cases has led him to the conclusion that he cannot endorse that response to that situation. Robert Ornstein, the brain-researcher, made a similar point in his "The Origins of Consciousness," his point being, if I remember correctly, that reasoning is neurologically a slower process than such things as the survival response. Ornstein speculated that, like other processes, that time could be decreased with continual practice, but probably not to the point of being as “quick” as conditioned or “instinctual” response. The example of non-violence training also comes to mind.
Normally, when we say that a case is ‘subsumed’ under a model, we mean that the model adequately explains the case. I don’t think this is what you are saying. Anyway, I’m not presenting a model that aims at explaining action and agency. The argument was meant to show that agency itself requires of us that we value our own nature as rational and reflective agents (our humanity, in Kant’s lingo), and that we must also value other rational and reflective agents. So, I’m not sure why considerations of the sort you bring up are relevant to argument. Is there an objection here that I’m missing?
By the way, I mean something fairly specific by rationality and reflectivity. Specifically, I mean something very idealized. Here is the gist:
First, I think rational persons are reflective, and a fully reflective person would be one that:
1. For any mental state M, if S has M, S is aware of M. So, S knows what he believes, desires, endorses, etc. We'll call this quality 'mental transparency'.
2. For any mental state M, if S has M and M entails some proposition P, then S believes P. So, S believes all the entailments of his beliefs, desires, endorsements, etc. We'll call this quality 'consistency'.
3. For any proposition P, if S entertains P and P entails Q, then S believes that P entails Q. We'll call this quality 'inferential infallibility'.
But while being reflective is necessary for being rational, and being fully reflective is necessary for being fully rational, I don’t think being fully reflective is sufficient for being fully rational. In addition, the following conditions need be met:
1. When a fully rational person judges that a belief is warranted, he comes to have this belief. Similarly, when a fully rational person judges that an action is warranted, he will thereby form the intention to so act.
2. When a fully rational person judges that a belief is unwarranted, he will jettison that belief. Similarly, when a fully rational person judges that an action is unwarranted, he will fail to form the intention to so act.
3. A fully rational person is able to infallibly judge the extent to which the evidence available to him confers warrant on a belief.
Originally posted by bbarrBennett,
[b]First, under (4), I think, as a technicality, the phrase “they ought to flay Floyd” would have to be replaced with something like “it is permissible for them to flay Floyd,” since D has been determined to be a sufficient, but not a necessa ...[text shortened]... which the evidence available to him confers warrant on a belief.
Thanks for your detailed response, which, like the other one, I have printed out for future reference.
With regard to the first question, I may not be understanding your use of the term "endorsement." It seems to me there would be a difference thus: If I endorse R as a sufficient [a "good"] reason for performing a certain action A, and endorse the principle that any fully reflective and rational agent would also have to endorse R as a sufficient reason for A, then given R, I could not criticize anyone else for A under like circumstances. However, unless it can be shown that there are no reasons, R', under which a fully reflective, rational agent (S or another) might choose to not perform A, even given R, then I find it difficult to see how it can be argued that the person must perform A (given, of course, the whole rest of the model). You did not admit any such R' in your argument, but you did not note that either; you merely said that S needed to determine if D was "a good reason" for A.
I'm not sure that this is purely circumstantial: there may be a cluster of Rs and R's that apply across similar circumstances; indeed, I suspect there most often are. So, if I see that someone else has not chosen A under circumstances in which I would have, I cannot conclude that he is not a fully reflective, rational person (or that he has not acted as such in this case); he may have identified some R' that I did not, or he may have a tendency to weight R and R' differently than I do even in like circumstances. This might be harder to argue with respect to clear "moral" issues (e.g., is it immoral not to perform A?), but values are another matter (in the sense that it might there might not be any moral issues involved in how I value certain actions--you may be able to argue for some uniform set of moral values, but not for all values).
In sum, I see no reason why two (fully reflective, rational) people would be compelled to follow the same course of action in like circumstances, unless there is a compelling, and not just a "good," reason. I understand, of course, that your point had to do with the logical necessity of valuing the same personhood in another as in myself, and was not about the acts themselves. I just thought that you overreached a bit along the way with that "ought."
Again, I think this is example-specific. If the example were recast, say, in terms of A being the prevention of a child being raped, then I think the endorsement could make the leap from "may" to "ought." Or if you had cast the argument negatively, in terms of "not flaying Floyd," but the argument would not have been as "striking" had you done that.
With regard to the second question: No, there are no objections here at all. It was really a digression, my point being that I don't think such cases could be used to object to the argument, and that the argument could handle them without simply dismissing such cases as irrelevant. Well, thay really may be irrelevant to the argument at hand, but not, I think to the model (or framework) in which it is presented. In a more formal debate forum, I think you might have to handle it, but it could be done so--well, handily, and then dispensed.
I fear I am distracting you from the issues at hand in this debate, however, and I don't want to do that. My goal is to learn, and sometimes I learn best through "argument," but this is not the place for that. I will continue to follow this debate, but if I have questions or comments (since they are most likely to be about logical and philosophical points, rather than the substance of the issue), I'll drop you a private message.
Again, thanks for the detailed response; it's very helpful.
Stephen
Bbarr -
I'm in italicized bold, you're in regular bold.
There is are two relevant emotions...
By this I am referring to the experience of 'conscience'. There is a gut feeling that something is morally wrong, and another than something is morally right. Do you disagree? Some people, like you and I, use reason to examine moral situations. Doing so gives a feeling of moral completeness; it feels as though this is the most satisfactory and morally correct way to examine moral situations. This process satisfies the inner feelings of conscience. Do you understand what I mean?
If morality is not based on and defined by the experience of conscience, I don't know what defines it. I have a hard time getting a good feel for what you mean by morality. What criteria do you use to label something wrong or right? I do my best to estimate how much suffering and happiness/pleasure result from an action, and then use this estimation to make my moral judgements. The premise I go by is that suffering is evil and wrong; happiness and pleasure are good and right. The reasons for this are because I value happiness and pleasure and the lack of suffering; the increasing of the one and the lessening of the other give me that pleasurable inner feeling that my conscience is satisfied. If the two are combined, then I make an estimation of which of the two has the greater magnitude. This is how I look at morality. I don't understand how you do it at all.
You have still said nothing that indicates that moral judgments are nothing over and above the occurrence of a feeling. This subjectivism on your part is completely unargued for, and I still see no reason to accept it.
I suppose I use Occam's Razor. What is morality? Why does the concept exist? I feel the concept can be completely explained without need for some sort of "true reality" of "absolute morals", whatever that means; there is no need or basis for moral judgements to have 'objective existence' in order to explain them. What does it mean for there to be absolute morals? Where are they? What makes them absolute? What defines them as morals?
You seem to argue that rights are moral obligations, which are important because you value the well being of people, and because you value 'virtue', whatever that is. Are you defining rights as obligations that, if not followed, will result in decreased well being for people? What is well being? I will assume you mean that suffering is minimized and happiness and pleasure maximized when you talk about 'well being'. Correct me if I am wrong.
I do not think that someone striking me is wrong because of, or in virtue of, or nothing over and above some emotional response on my part. I have the emotional response because I believe that folk ought not go around striking each other.
Why not? Because you value peoples' well being I gather. What does that mean? It means you get certain sensations, emotions, or experiences when peoples' well being is improved or lessened, right? You feel good when well being is increased, and you feel bad when it's decreased. That's what it means to value something, right?
Alas. Well, if you don’t think that rape is objectively wrong, then I can’t help you. Hopefully some day you will believe otherwise.
I'll throw out a hypothetical situation. It's a bit of an extreme situation, since rape is almost always wrong in my view, and it takes extreme situations to make it conceivably not wrong to me. Let me ask you if the rape in this situation is wrong or not:
There's a king of a country in medeival Europe. He is a beloved King, and the people prosper under his rule. He is married to a manipulative girl who uses access to sex as a tool to control the King. However, she's a girl who gets turned on by strong, dominant men. The King has been with her a long time and feels he knows how she thinks, and he is correct about this.
Now, if he does not produce a legitimate son, born in wedlock, a power hungry and evil group will seize power after the King dies, and the people will suffer. If the King has a son, he will be able to teach the son how to be a good King too.
The wife gives a token, passionless protest whenever the King comes on to her. If he persists, she will submit to his advances without taking back her protest, and she will enjoy his being assertive and dominant; this is 'manliness' to her and she finds it extremely erotic. She won't respect him otherwise.
So, the King has sex with her even though she protests. This is technically rape; however, it's not evil or wrong.
Originally posted by bbarrChildren are taught what is wrong and right by their parents and teachers (in an ideal world!), hence they are developing moral agents. Indeed this is proven by the legal system which incarcerates them in juvenile detention centres for wrong doings (see the Jamie Bulger case for an outrageous example of punishing kids more severely than adults!).
Your two criteria entail that young children and the profoundly developmentally disabled do not have rights. Are you prepared to accept this entailment? If you respond that although these folk don't have rights, we have duties towards them ...[text shortened]... sport, and 2) a child has the right not to be killed for sport?
Severely mentally handicapped people are also locked up in Phsychiatric hospitals if they commit felonies. We do not say; "oh they did not know any better because of their disability, let's let them off scott free". Thus they are treated as moral agents.
Both are therefore deemed capable of recognising the rights of others.
Both are also capable of asking for their right to life to be removed. Of course we would not fulfill their wishes on the ground that they are too young and too "mad" (respectively) to uphold their decision. (Although a crippled child in constant medically diagnosed agony with no relief may be considered for euthanasia).
Thus your objections are fallacious.
I am still trying to get a grasp of all of the arguments that are occuring in this discussions, so I will try my best to add a productive post, however, I can not guarantee it.
Since rape seems to be used quite a bit in this discussion, can we look at it another way? Everybody seems to be looking at it from the perspective of the individual being raped. I think AThousandYoung got pretty close. In gist I want to ask if Physiology can override "rational" thought, and does making "irrational" decisions cause one to lose their "rights?"
Now from the perspective of the "rapist":
(I now want to have sex) Previous experiences of sex caused a hypersecretion of the "good" neurotransmitters, therefore making sex extremely pleasurable, if not addictive.
(does wanting to have sex give me a good reason to have sex?) Survival of the species says so. So, are we still in the realm of "rational" thought?
(Yes, my wanting to have sex is a good reason to have sex, so it’s a good rule that if someone (like me) wants to have sex (in circumstances just like this) they ought to have sex) Still "rational?"
(I endorse being the type of person who thinks wanting to have sex provides a good reason for having sex) Still "rational?"
(I endorse being, fundamentally, a reflective or autonomous person) So, now we can look at this from different viewpoints. What if the mere thought of sex causes a hypersecretion of neurotransmitters causing him to "lose" his mind. Should he be held responsible for his actions? This is physiological dysfunction, he can't do anything about. It would be like telling someone with Cystic Fibrosis to clear your lungs. Can all of this happen and still allow the person to be reflective?
Now from the female side.
(I want to go home) This seems pretty rational.
(Does wanting to go home give me a good reason to go home?) Sure.
(Yes, my wanting to go home is a good reason to go home, so it’s a good rule that if someone (like me) wants to go home (in circumstances just like this) they ought to go home) OK, what if their idea of going home is at 2am by themselves? Is this a rational thought? Furthermore, are they being reflective? As far as I know, it is engrained in todays youth not to walk by yourself in the dark. Therefore, if they decide to walk home by themselves when people in the same circumstances would not, have they given up their rights?
I am sorry if I mutilated bbar's argument, but I just want to get a better understanding of what "rights" are and how important "rational thought is to this rights. Furthermore, I like to set myself in the "real" world every once in a while and want to know how basic physiology affects how one thinks, or influences how one thinks and how you account for it.
Thank you
Originally posted by gkpeterI really hope you're not using jargon to say that a girl deserves to be raped if she walks alone at 2am, and that it's not the rapist's fault if he can't control his lust.
I am still trying to get a grasp of all of the arguments that are occuring in this discussions, so I will try my best to add a productive post, however, I can not guarantee it.
Since rape seems to be used quite a bit in this discussion, can we look at it another way? Everybody seems to be looking at it from the perspective of the individual being raped. ...[text shortened]... gy affects how one thinks, or influences how one thinks and how you account for it.
Thank you
That argument is repulsive and I resent you suggesting my perspective is close to it.
Although I hesitate to post in such an abstract philosophical discussion, I do wish to clarify Lockean principles and their relationship to a limited government. The centerpiece of Locke's theory is that men join into a "social contract" with others forsaking the absolute freedom we possess in the "state of nature". This "social contract" limits our freedom do to others as we will, but it also other limits individuals or groups of individuals to do to us as they please. The concept of "natural" or "fundamental" rights are that the basic freedoms that man would have in an abstract state of nature are retained in society; rights such as life, conscience, familial, etc. Otherwise, he would be considerable worse off by entering the "social contract" as he would sacrifice his most basic of freedoms.
For most of history, of course, the State did not recognize any basic rights in the individual; the State (King, monarch, dictator, etc.) essentially "owned" everybody in the society and had virtually unlimited power over them. The revolution in thought that occurred in the 17th and 18th centuries that individuals have basic rights that must be protected spelled the eventual doom of monarchial governments. However, there is no assurance that a republic or democracy will protect the rights of minorities instrinic to that system of government either. Indeed, it is perhaps more likely that an unfetted democracy would repress depised minorities than a monarch.
The Founders of the US accepted Lockean principles and the concept of "natural rights" of men hook, line and sinker; the writings of Jefferson, Madison, Paine, etc. etc. etc. are throughly steeped in these ideas. The system they devised was for a limited government which would be checked by internal controls (seperation of governmental powers into both different branches the central government AND division of other powers between the central and local governments) AND by the recognization of the retaining of certain rights to individuals.It is often stated that they "gave" us the rights in the Bill of Rights, but they would have vehemently disagreed with this characterization; the rights enumerated there were merely being explicitly recognized as preexisting rights, not being created. Indeed, the Ninth Amendment specifically declares that just because a right isn't mentioned in the document doesn't mean that it isn't among those retained by the people. Thus, it is obvious that our system of government is based on the idea of a collection of "fundamental rights" being retained by the people that the government has no legitimate power to invade.
Of course, the Framers were men of their times and many of them did not see the hypocrisy of their ideals is comparision with some harsh reality (notably slavery). They did leave us, however, with the philosophical and legal tools to have the system evolve into the recognization of basic rights that prejudice and ignorance in the past would have refused to recognize. I think that this is the way they intended; they do not make a laundry list of "rights" and say you only have Rights x,y and z - they left us the Lockean principles of "fundamental rights" and expected that we would do better than they did in creating a just society.
I personally think that there is little room for argument that criminal laws against abortion are a severe restriction on a woman's basic right to decide whether to procreate or not. I see the argument that a fetus has basic fundamental rights from conception as a religiously based argument that if enacted into the criminal law violates the rights of conscience of individuals to believe differently and act differently to such a disputed asssertion. Therefore, I think there's little room for argument that Roe v. Wade was decided correctly IF you accept that the nation is based on Lockean principles (and the evidence of that is simply overwhelming).
Originally posted by AThousandYoungYes, I knew you may take it that way. But I did not mean for you to take it that way. I am just saying that you talked about both sides and say they there may be some "weird" reasons that "rape" may not be "wrong"
That argument is repulsive and I resent you suggesting my perspective is close to it.[/b]
I absolutely think rape is wrong, however, who says "extreme" cases of lust are able to be overcome? When a rate presses a lever and it activates the "pleasure" center in the rat's brain, they will press the lever until they are dead, meaning they will not eat or drink. Now for humans, it may mean they will do whatever it takes to get that sense, there performing acts that to most of us if extremely wrong.
I am making a point and I asking can physiology override rational thought.
Sorry if I offended, I am trying to bring another field into the discussion.
Sorry about the errors in this, I will fix them.
Yes, I knew you may take it that way. But I did not mean for you to take it that way. I am just saying that you talked about both sides and say they there may be some "weird" reasons that "rape" may not be "wrong"
I absolutely think rape is wrong, however, who says "extreme" cases of lust are able to be overcome or even controlled? When a rat presses a lever and it activates the "pleasure" center in the rat's brain, they will press the lever until they are dead, meaning they will not eat or drink. Now for humans, it may mean they will do whatever it takes to get that sense or feeling, therefore performing acts that to most of us are extremely wrong.
I am making a point and I am asking can physiology override rational thought.
Sorry if I offended, I am trying to bring another field into the discussion.
Originally posted by gkpeterThe same point (question) can be raised about any physiolgically determined addiction, such as alcoholism. I'm not saying that it abrogates responsibility (no AA person, for example, would say that), but that it means the problem is not one, in such cases, of just rationally confronting the behavior as immoral. The addict may reach the same conclusion, and yet still be unable to stop the behavior simply as a result of reaching that conclusion. If the root cause is physiological, then that is where the problem has to be addressed (at least, that is, if you define the problem as one of eradicating the addiction--and thereby the associated behavior--and not simply one of removing the addict, say by imprisonment, and thereby removing the behavior from society--which might also be a rational, if short-term solution, at least for society if not for the addict).
Sorry about the errors in this, I will fix them.
Yes, I knew you may take it that way. But I did not mean for you to take it that way. I am just saying that you talked about both sides and say they there may be some "weird" reasons tha ...[text shortened]... fended, I am trying to bring another field into the discussion.
Once again, I am sorry if I offended people, but let me give you an indication of where I am going. Afterall, this is a debate forum, not a forum for deciding if one is for or against certain things.
OK, this thread is to address abortion and human rights, is this correct?
One of the criteria for "rights" was the concept of rational thought, whether it be the ability, or perhaps making a rational thought. However, we must not forget our tool for making those thoughts, the brain. Can we make thoughts without the brain? If the answer is "no", then we must address the brain and how it works at some level, it can not be ignored.
In my previous, offensive post, I gave a scenerio where a man had a rational thought, but the brain/body had a dysfunction and did not allow the man to "control" his urge. The fact remains that he had a rational thought. For the most part, people would agree that he had no right to rape the woman. But according to definitions, he has personhood and "rights".
From the other stand point, she made an irrational thought but still maintained her "rights".
Therefore, if we get to decide what is rational or not. Or if we get to decide if certain cases warrant rights or not, why is rational thought a criteria for "rights?"
Originally posted by vistesdBennett,
Bennett,
Thanks for your detailed response, which, like the other one, I have printed out for future reference.
With regard to the first question, I may not be understanding your use of the term "endorsement." It seems to me the ...[text shortened]... thanks for the detailed response; it's very helpful.
Stephen
Was re-reading your response to my comments about "may" and "ought." Been thinking about this most of the day. First, if it is specified that there is only one reason, R, for performing an action (say, as a limiting assumption for the purpose of focussing the argument), then I am (thus far) stymied, and may have to give you the "ought." Second, with regard to psychological differences qualifying as circumstantial differences: in general if "circumstances" is, in fact, defined as including inner (psychological) as well as external states (and, again, given a single R) then, again, I think I might have to agree with you. (See how stubborn I am!)
Stephen
Gkpeter -
One of the criteria for "rights" was the concept of rational thought, whether it be the ability, or perhaps making a rational thought.
The capacity for rational thought is part of Bbarr's definition of what a person is, which is something with rights, again according to Bbarr's arbritrary definition.
Whether or not a being actually has rational thoughts has no relevance to Bbarr's argument, I don't think. The capacity to have them is what matters to him. Also, what the rights are was not described (at least in the first post), except the right to life. Certainly the right to rape is not one of the rights anyone is suggesting anyone has.
Your questions are coming from a misunderstanding of Bbarr's argument I believe.
Please note, I don't use his definitions myself.
Originally posted by no1marauderI didn't know that about your 9th Amendment, seems very clever to add a codicil like that to cover things not thought of at the time but meant in the spirit of the document. Gets a rec for educational value.
Although I hesitate to post in such an abstract philosophical discussion, I do wish to clarify Lockean principles and their relationship to a limited government. The centerpiece of Locke's theory is that men join into a "social contract" with others forsaking the absolute freedom we possess in the "state of nature". This "social contract" l ...[text shortened]... hat the nation is based on Lockean principles (and the evidence of that is simply overwhelming).