Originally posted by AThousandYoungDo you have an argument in support of the claim of that the possession of rights and, correlatively, the obtaining of moral obligations is entirely subjective? According to your view, it is a purely subjective matter whether, for instance, a child has the right not to skinned alive purely for fun. This entails that it is a purely subjective matter whether I have a moral obligation not to skin children alive purely for fun. I take this conclusion to be a reductio of your view, as I think it obvious that it is objectively wrong to skin children purely for fun. In essence, you are just advocating a boringly familiar form of skepticism about morality (one that seems particularly popular amongst children).
How can one argue that there are intrinsic 'rights'?! I don't get it. Whether someone is 'due' some kind of treatment or access to some state of being is entirely subjective.
Here's a question: In your own life, do you act and react as your view suggests? If, for instance, somebody held you down and raped you, would you think that the wrongness of this violation was entirely subjective, or would think that this violation was objectively wrong? I dare you to go to a battered women's shelter and let everybody there know that the abuse they suffered didn't constitute a violation of their rights; that they really had no rights, and that their abusers hadn't violated any objective moral obligations.
Originally posted by vistesdAs always, Stephen, excellent thinking, excellent writing. -Del
A fair question. However--
As the old logical saw goes, "It's damned hard to prove a negative." That's why the burden of proof in logical argument is generally held to be on the other side.
My assertion that there are no intrinsic rights in nature is based on the fact that there appears to be no empirical evidence of such (hence my overly casual ...[text shortened]... I repeat: it is not up to me to "prove the negative" empirically or analytically.
Originally posted by bbarrBbarr,
You claim that there are no intrinsic rights in nature, but you fail to give any argument for this claim. You merely relate some descriptions of the manners in which some creatures kill others. So what? Do you have an actual argument in support of this normative skepticism, or are you merely expressing your opinion on the matter? If you have an argument in su ...[text shortened]... if you have no such argument, then why should any of us care about your opinion on this matter?
I realized that in my last post I did not address your accusation (I do not mean that term in a derogatory sense at all) that my position is one of "normative skepticism."
First, I am not a skeptic in the strongest sense of the term: denying the possibility of any justification or knowledge (normative or otherwise). I doubt that anyone really is, as it seems to me an untenable position.
Second, I do not really take skepticism generally, even in it's weaker forms, as a philosophical stance so much as a philosophical tool. I try to apply it to my own opinions constantly, as a matter of self-integrity. (In a forum such as this, others get to apply it to me.) The form such skepticism takes for me is usually of the Humean-empirical kind.
Third, I'm not so much a "normative skeptic" as a naturalist-definist. As with most philosophical boxes, I am hesitant to place myself wholly therein. I to tend, however, to look for naturalist (including social/cultural/historical) souces for most normative concepts.
Fourth, with the above caveats, it is probably fair to say that I am taking a naturalist-definist and empircicist-skeptical position vis a vis that particular normative set called rights. Hence my use of terms such as covenant, conflict mediation, etc. I am not a pure empiricist, however, as I also admit logical/analytical arguments as epistemically valid.
Thanks for challenging me to define these philosophical tendencies more clearly, for myself as well as for you.
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Originally posted by vistesdYou assume that the justification for a moral claim must rest ultimately on an empirical base. But this is an absurd assumption. If you applied this assumption to any field of inquiry at all, even scientific disciplines, the result would be that no theory is ever justified. Here's the quick refutation: If all justification rests ultimately on experience (which is what the term 'empirical' actually means), then for any proposition P, no matter what our empirical evidence, we would still need a justificatory principle that liscensed the inference from our empirical evidence to the conclusion that P obtains. Now, what justifies this justificatory principle? Experience? If so, then we can run the argument at the meta-level, and ask which meta-justificatory principle liscenses the inference from our experience to the conclusion that our original justificatory principle is correct. Your epistemology is so impoverished (you don't even include a priori justification, for chrissakes!) that your view leads immediately to skepticism of the most viscious sort. So, it is hard for me to take any of your comments on ethics at all seriously, given that you don't even have the epistemological resources to show that, for instance, 1+1=2.
A fair question. However--
As the old logical saw goes, "It's damned hard to prove a negative." That's why the burden of proof in logical argument is generally held to be on the other side.
My assertion that there are no intrin ...[text shortened]... to "prove the negative" empirically or analytically.
Further, you seem to think that rights are entities. Nobody has claimed this. To possess a right isn't to have in your possession an entity (as in: is that a right in your pocket or are you just happy to see me?). To have a right is merely to be such that agents are obligated to treat you or refrain from treating you in various ways. To have a right to life, for instance, is just to be such that agents are obligated not to kill you (or to act so as to preserve your life, depending on the strength of the obligation). Your assumption that rights are entities is a function of the fact that you have been confused by the surface structure of claims concerning rights 'possession'. You have been bewitched by a manner of speaking, as it were. If you find talking about the possession of rights confusing or obscure, then think of this conversation as being about what we are morally obligated to do or refrain from doing. Nothing at all hinges on phrasing the debate in this way, it just happens to be very efficient to talk about rights.
Edit: I've just seen your post above. If you want to start a conversation on the metaphysical status of obligations or the criteria by which ethical theories are assessed, that would be fine.
Originally posted by bbarrAnd so the debate degenerates into "(you don't even include a priori justification, for chrissakes!)" and (as in: is that a right in your pocket or are you just happy to see me?).
You assume that the justification for a moral claim must rest ultimately on an empirical base. But this is an absurd assumption. If you applied this assumption to any field of inquiry at all, even scientific disciplines, the result would be that no theory is ever justified. Here's the quick refutation: If all justification rests ultimately on experience ( ...[text shortened]... tus of obligations or the criteria by which ethical theories are assessed, that would be fine.
Originally posted by DelmerI understand that you may not like the manner in which I phrase objections. In my defense, let it be known that I am under a contractual obligation to argue this way. Please refer all complaints to my esteemed clan leader, No1Marauder.
And so the debate degenerates into "(you don't even include a priori justification, for chrissakes!)" and (as in: is that a right in your pocket or are you just happy to see me?).
In Ifyoucan'tstandtheheatship,
Bbarr
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Originally posted by vistesdSo we are clear, I also use skepticism as a philosophical tool, and I agree that it is invaluable. But skepticism comes in different flavors, and wholesale skepticism of the Humean variety is rarely useful. For instance, you claim that when it comes to the normative, you look around for socio-cultural or historical explanations (a lot like Foucault, in that regard). But Humean skepticism includes skepticism about causation, the a priori, induction, the self, and so on. I doubt that under the burden of such a radical skepticism, you would be able to explain much of anything about the normative. After all, how can you construct causal explanations about the origin of normative concepts without having a fairly robust notion of causation, or without utilizing inductive inference. Further, I'm not sure why you think that historical explanations of the origin of normative concepts is relevant to discussions concerning what we ought morally to do. It is one thing to determine how a concept originated. It is another thing to determine whether a concept is actually instantiated in the world, or whether a concept applies to a particular case. If we are interested in whether this thing before us is chair, why should we be concerned with how the concept 'chair' orginated? If we know the content of the concept 'chair', if we know how to apply that concept, then we have at our disposal the tools sufficient for determining whether this thing before us is actually a chair. In short, by conflating the descriptive project of explaining the origin of normative concepts with the normative project of determining how those concepts ought to be applied, you are engaging in a version of the genetic fallacy.
Bbarr,
I realized that in my last post I did not address your accusation (I do not mean that term in a derogatory sense at all) that my position is one of "normative skepticism."
First, I am not a skeptic in the strongest sense of t ...[text shortened]... losophical tendencies more clearly, for myself as well as for you.
Originally posted by bbarrPardon me, folks, but, as one frisky doe said to another, "Let's turn around. I just saw a buck get passed."
I understand that you may not like the manner in which I phrase objections. In my defense, let it be known that I am under a contractual obligation to argue this way. Please refer all complaints to my esteemed clan leader, No1Marauder.
In Ifyoucan'tstandtheheatship,
Bbarr
Originally posted by bbarrJust read your last post. Thanks. I'll take some time to respond for two reasons: 1) I really have to do some study and re-study as we go because I readily admit that I don't have your academic base at my tongue-tip, so to speak. (Though if I'm as empistelogically impoverished as you think, I suspect I have good company.) 2) I would rather do it in one chunk rather than piecemeal posts as much as possible.
So we are clear, I also use skepticism as a philosophical tool, and I agree that it is invaluable. But skepticism comes in different flavors, and wholesale skepticism of the Humean variety is rarely useful. For instance, you claim that when it comes to the normative, you look around for socio-cultural or historical explanations (a lot like Foucault, in that ...[text shortened]... ng how those concepts ought to be applied, you are engaging in a version of the genetic fallacy.
Questions for clarification, though: 1) with regard to your comment about a moral claim resting "ultimately on an empirical base" -- I did not take you to mean "exclusively" on an empirical base, but that moral claims can presumably rest solely on a non-empirical (and yes, I understand the general empirical = experential equation) base. 2) With your move from ethics to arithmetic, you went to an area of "abstracta" (trying to avoid here the question of abstract entities) that I think few would argue is subject to apriori analytical principles. Are we moving toward some sort of synthetic-versus-analytic impasse?
BTW, I took your "entity in your pocket" comment as a humorous way of making a point, and nothing more.
Originally posted by vistesdI am too close to philosophy as a discipline to know when I am using jargon rather that writing plainly. So, if I use any terms that don't make sense, or seem used in a non-standard way, please let me know.
Just read your last post. Thanks. I'll take some time to respond for two reasons: 1) I really have to do some study and re-study as we go because I readily admit that I don't have your academic base at my tongue-tip, so to speak. (Though if I'm as empistelogically impoverished as you think, I suspect I have good company.) 2) I would rather do it in o ...[text shortened]... ok your "entity in your pocket" comment as a humorous way of making a point, and nothing more.
Ultimately, I think that morality has to rest upon some non-empirical base. For any putative moral foundation, if that foundation contains empirical claims, then we can always ask 'Why are these claims relevant?" If these claims are claims about human nature (e.g., 'humans tend to desire these things', or 'humans experience pain under these conditions', or...) then we can ask "Why are claims about human nature relevant to determining what we ought to do, or how we ought to live?" If it seems obvious to you that considerations of human nature are relevant to the foundations of morality, then you have assumed something substantial about morality (e.g., that morality is concerned with desire fulfillment, or that morality is concerned with the prevention or alleviation of suffering). It is these assumptions that are doing the work; these assumptions determine which empirical claims you will think relevant to the business of justifying morality. But notice, these empirical claims are not foundational. They are relevant only in virtue of some prior commitment to a general claim about morality itself, and that general claim will be a priori.
BTW, I am probably just a little prone to anger right now. Arguing about abortion does that to me. You seem like a nice fellow, so I am sorry if my comments earlier struck you as bitchy.
Originally posted by bbarrStill digesting things, but your last post was very helpful. If we are talking about human nature only, and not nature as a whole, that brings us closer at least. Let me read through everything you said in the last three posts as a whole. I am a student by avocation rather than vocation, and have spent the last couple of years on Western philosophy, after spending several years on comparative religion. My degrees (a couple of decades ago) were in economics. Am now retired. My studies are somewhat eclectic due to my refusal to plug myself back into academia. Please use the technical terms, that's not a put off. The difficulty is partly in the fact that not all philosophers use the terms in exactly the same way, and they seem to be sometimes used in a technical sense, and sometimes in a more general sense. The analytical philosopers seem to be much more concerned about that than others. If I don't understand the term, or can't find it's definition vis a vis philosophical discourse, or I'm not sure exactly how you're using, I'll ask. When I am being unclear (or too casual, as I was in my first post), please call me on it.
I am too close to philosophy as a discipline to know when I am using jargon rather that writing plainly. So, if I use any terms that don't make sense, or seem used in a non-standard way, please let me know.
Ultimately, I think that morality has to rest upon some non-empirical base. For any putative moral foundation, if that foundation contains empirical c ...[text shortened]... to me. You seem like a nice fellow, so I am sorry if my comments earlier struck you as bitchy.
I suspect the dilemma I currently find myself in is similar to Russell, who said something to the effect (this is very rough) that although he firmly believed that moral values were human artifacts, with no higher court of appeal, that just didn't somehow seem satisfactory in the end.
I get bitchy too. Usually a sign of frustration; happens to me most often when I think the other person "is just NOT getting my point!" They seem to get frustrated when that causes me to repeat it again and again from every conceivable angle (at least that's what my wife says). Don't worry about it.
Bennet,
Just spent the afternoon reading stuff on Kant, a priori synthetic principles, categorical imperative, etc. Am too ignorant on Kant, have to delve more. I find the notion of the categorical imperative appealing on one level, but it leaves me, frankly, suspicious (and I'm not referring to Nietzsche's--wrong, I think--accusation tha Kant was trying to sneak God in through the back door). You're right about skepticism coming in many flavors: for example, I've never found Hume's arguments against causation compelling, and I find Nietzsche's (that cause and effect relations are just too multivariant and complex to figure out) a bit like saying that since behavior in the quantum world is so vastly different than what we perceive/experience in everyday existence (as well as being subject to uncertainty) that we shouldn't pay attention to that experience. That's a quick analogy, anyway.
I agree that the discussion becomes more efficient when rights questions are recast as questions of obligation. I think that is similar (though not the same) to what I was trying to do by talking about natural imperatives. Though again, I was coming from an empirical/naturalist angle. I realize that I have not addressed reason per se at all, assuming that one must reason from an empirical base, and not that reason may be "transcendental" in some way--again, I'm going to have to go over and over Kant a bit more.
I think that the issues I would most like to explore (the limits of empiricism, metaphysical foundations for ethics, etc.) are not directly in line with this thread. So, if you are willing, I will grapple with Kant a bit more (not prepared to dismiss him), empiricism, "justified true beliefs," etc., and perhaps we can either start a new thread or continue the discussion in another venue.
BTW, I followed your arguments concerning abortion and find that I agree with on all points. The question is whether I have a sufficient philosophical base for that agreement. 🙂
Regards,
Stephen
Bbarr -
Do you have an argument in support of the claim of that the possession of rights and, correlatively, the obtaining of moral obligations is entirely subjective?
I don't think I need one. It's pretty obvious that it's subjective whether or not someone is due something. There's that famous polygamist who thinks he's due welfare because it was sent by God. What objective criteria do we use to say someone is due something? There is none.
think it obvious that it is objectively wrong to skin children purely for fun.
No, it's not obvious. What is obvious is that the subjective opinions of most humans will agree that this is wrong. It still requires people to make the judgement that it's wrong. What is 'wrongness' if it's not a judgement made based on an emotion?
If, for instance, somebody held you down and raped you, would you think that the wrongness of this violation was entirely subjective, or would think that this violation was objectively wrong?
By my subjective standards, I would say it was probably wrong. It would be subjective because the way I define wrongness is subjective. Other people have different subjective definitions. Most of their definitions would agree that such an act is wrong. Some people have their own philosophies in which such an act might not be wrong.
I dare you to go to a battered women's shelter and let everybody there know that the abuse they suffered didn't constitute a violation of their rights; that they really had no rights, and that their abusers hadn't violated any objective moral obligations.
Why would I do that? What does that have to do with this debate? You're trying to use a shocking example that appeals to the heartstrings and makes me look like a bad guy. This is a cheap trick which does not really address my perspective.
By the way, I don't believe no one has rights. I just claim that whether or not people have rights and what those rights are is a judgement, just as it's not objectively true that some things are pretty.
Originally posted by vistesdWhat he said.
A fair question. However--
As the old logical saw goes, "It's damned hard to prove a negative." That's why the burden of proof in logical argument is generally held to be on the other side.
My assertion that there are no intrinsic rights in nature is based on the fact that there appears to be no empirical evidence of such (hence my overly casual ...[text shortened]... I repeat: it is not up to me to "prove the negative" empirically or analytically.