A General Argument Against Evil - Part II

Originally posted by howardgee
Here is what you wrote, and you do not define X at all!:

"To complete the argument:

Suppose X is logically impossible.
Then it is impossible that God cannot cause X to attain.
i.e. God can cause X to attain.
Hence, X is logically attainable.
Hence, X is logically possible.

You get a contradiction either way."

The reason you get a co ...[text shortened]... cious logic.
Please read my earlier post, and think hard, and TRY to understand your confusion.

Go back and read the second post on page 2; X is defined there.

You'd think that the words, "To complete the argument" clearly implies that I'm following up from a previous post.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Go back and read the second post on page 2; X is defined there.

You'd think that the words, "To [b]complete the argument" clearly implies that I'm following up from a previous post.[/b]

You wrote that:
"Consider the following state of affairs (call it X):
'God cannot cause X to attain.'"

Are you defining "X" to mean "God cannot cause X to attain."?

If so, then this is invalid as you are using "X" in the definition of "X".
Within any Predicate Calculus, a variable, "X" can mean anything, but only any ONE thing at a time!

You should have defined "X" to be 'God cannot cause Y to attain.'

Now go back and retry your argument.
You will find it reduces down to the essentials thus:

It is logically impossible that God cannot cause Y to attain.
Thus it is logically possible that God cannot cause Y to attain.

If you cannot see that this is spurious reasoning, then I will remind you "never to try philosophy after a full day of meetings at the office", or indeed at any point in time. ;-)

Originally posted by howardgee
You wrote that:
"Consider the following state of affairs (call it X):
'God cannot cause X to attain.'"

Are you defining "X" to mean "God cannot cause X to attain."?

If so, then this is invalid as you are using "X" i ...[text shortened]... meetings at the office", or indeed at any point in time. ;-)

Welcome to the party. Bbarr's already raised your objection (read over the thread) and, I believe, I have answered.

Are you defining "X" to mean "God cannot cause X to attain."?

Yes.

To be more precise, I am defining X to be a fixed point of the relation M where

M(x,y) when y is a state of affairs such that God cannot cause x to attain.

The concept of a fixed point for a mathematical relation/function is itself quite simple. e.g. If f(x) = x^2 for any real number x, then 0 and 1 are fixed points of f; i.e.

x = f(x) for x = 0,1

Here, I'm defining X to be a solution of

x = M(x) where M is a functional form of the relation described above.

If so, then this is invalid as you are using "X" in the definition of "X". Within any Predicate Calculus, a variable, "X" can mean anything, but only any ONE thing at a time!

Not necessarily. (I presume you meant any constant X can mean only one thing at a time).

For instance, I can define the number "2" in any number of ways:

- The smallest positive prime
- The smallest positive even number
- The successor of 1
- A positive solution of x^2 = 4
etc.

The entire basis of theorems such as Cantor's theorem on cardinality of sets and Godel's theorem of Incompleteness is that you can have self-referential constants in a sufficiently complex mathematical system (or, to be more precise, that certain classes of functions are guaranteed to have fixed points over certain classes of sets).

There is nothing wrong with the reasoning - the problem is with the logic itself.

Originally posted by bbarr
Note that my definition of omniscience doesn't presuppose the existence of such a set.

Actually, I believe it would.

At the very least, in defining a property of states of affairs ("A is logically possible" or "God can cause A to attain" ) you can define a set (the set of all logically possible states of affairs, or the set of all states that God can cause to attain).

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Since this argument has come up in some recent posts, I thought it might be worthwhile to take another look at it.

For anyone with the stomach for the whole discussion, you can find it here:

http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=21886

Some key corollaries of the argument can be seen in bbarr's posts on these pages:

http: ...[text shortened]... To sum up:

A theist can commit to the truth of (2) by rejecting either of (3) or (5.1/5.1'😉.

You missed something in your premise.

God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil He allows.

As humans we can never begin to understand God's ways. Otherwise he wouldn't be God. Just one example of many:

Exodus 14:4 "And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and he will pursue you. And I will be honored through Pharaoh, and through all his armies. And the Egyptians shall know that I am Jehovah."

Originally posted by Halitose
You missed something in your premise.

[b]God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil He allows.

As humans we can never begin to understand God's ways. Otherwise he wouldn't be God. Just one example of many:

Exodus 14:4 "And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and he will pursue you. And I will be honored through Pharaoh, and through all his armies. And the Egyptians shall know that I am Jehovah." [/b]

That's been covered before. Basically Bbarr's counter would go something like this:

1. An instance of evil is either necessary or unnecessary for the greater good.
2. If necessary, then the world could not have been better than it is.
3. If unnecessary, then God would've prevented it.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
That's been covered before. Basically Bbarr's counter would go something like this:

1. An instance of evil is either necessary or unnecessary for the greater good.
2. If necessary, then the world could not have been better than it is.
3. If unnecessary, then God would've prevented it.

If necessary, then the world could not have been better than it is

I need some more clarity on your second axiom. Better by who's standard? Ours or Gods? And what is the greater good: Comfortable living or the saving of souls?

If unnecessary, then God would've prevented it.

My rebuttal to this is that God has given man (or woman) free will, it is by our own blundering that we cause unnecessary evil. What forces God to clean up our mess?

edit: I hope this is not covered ground as well.. 😕

Originally posted by Halitose
I need some more clarity on your second axiom. [b]Better by who's standard? Ours or Gods? And what is the greater good: Comfortable living or the saving of souls?[/b]

http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=21886&page=12

My rebuttal to this is that God has given man (or woman) free will, it is by our own blundering that we cause unnecessary evil. What forces God to clean up our mess?

The problem is that God has intervened directly in human history; he is not merely an inventor who made a machine and let it run on its own steam. Therefore, God has certain standards by which he decides when to intervene and when not to.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Originally posted by Halitose
[b]I need some more clarity on your second axiom. [b]Better by who's standard? Ours or Gods? And what is the greater good: Comfortable living or the saving of souls?[/b]

http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=21886&page=12

My rebuttal to this is that God has given man (or woman) fre ...[text shortened]... eam. Therefore, God has certain standards by which he decides when to intervene and when not to.

http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=21886&page=12

@$#$! I need to read through all that! This is gonna take a while.
😴

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Originally posted by Halitose
[b]I need some more clarity on your second axiom. [b]Better by who's standard? Ours or Gods? And what is the greater good: Comfortable living or the saving of souls?[/b]

http://www.redhot ...[text shortened]... n standards by which he decides when to intervene and when not to.[/b]

The problem is that God has intervened directly in human history; he is not merely an inventor who made a machine and let it run on its own steam. Therefore, God has certain standards by which he decides when to intervene and when not to.


Who is to say that the criteria for his intervention is "unnecessary suffering"?

Still working on Bbarr's rebuttal. 🙄

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Welcome to the party. Bbarr's already raised your objection (read over the thread) and, I believe, I have answered.

[b]Are you defining "X" to mean "God cannot cause X to attain."?

Yes.

To be more precise, I am defining X to be a fixed point of the relation M where

M(x,y) when y is a state of affairs such that God cannot cause x t ...[text shortened]... s of sets).

There is nothing wrong with the reasoning - the problem is with the logic itself.[/b]

What poppy cock!!!

Defining 2 as 1 + 1, or 3 - 1 is of course simply defining the same thing in different ways.

This is completely different from your defining X as:
"God cannot cause X to attain."

This is because X can be substituted into the definition to give
"God cannot cause God cannot cause X to attain to attain"

but given that X = "God cannot cause X to attain."
then this becomes:
"God cannot cause God cannot cause God cannot cause X to attain to attain to attain"

and this then becomes:
"God cannot cause God cannot cause God cannot cause God cannot cause X to attain to attain to attain to attain"

and so on to infinity.

Clearly this is preposterous, since the definition of X can never be resolved!
This is clearly going to be the problem with any definition whereby the definition of X contains X itself.

Originally posted by howardgee
What poppy cock!!!

Defining 2 as 1 + 1, or 3 - 1 is of course simply defining the same thing in different ways.

This is completely different from your defining X as:
"God cannot cause X to attain."

This is because X can be substituted into the definition to give
"God cannot cause God cannot cause X to attain to attain"

but given that ...[text shortened]... arly going to be the problem with any definition whereby the definition of X contains X itself.

Ever heard of recursion?

In any case, as I clarified, it doesn't matter how you define X as long as it's a fixed point of M.

Originally posted by howardgee
Defining 2 as 1 + 1, or 3 - 1 is of course simply defining the same thing in different ways.

Of course. I never disagreed. 🙂

The really interesting bit is if you were to define 2 as:

"This positive number is half its own square".

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I suppose the second step would be:

2. Suppose X is logically possible.

where X is a fixed point of the relation

M(x) = A state of affairs such that God cannot cause a state of affairs x to attain.

LH

EDIT: The alternative line would be

2'. Suppose X were logically impossible.

O.K., let's settle this dispute:

We have started with my definition of omnipotence as the first premise of a proposed reductio:

Omnipotence (def.): An entity G is omnipotent if and only if G can do anything that is logically possible, where this is construed as the ability to bring about any logically possible, maximally specified state of affairs.

Your second premise is this:

(2) Suppose X is logically possible.

Now, you characterize X as a "fixed point" of the relation M(x):

M(x): A state of affairs such that God cannot cause a state of affairs x to obtain.

First, please be clear in your notation. You are using an upper-case X in (2), and a lower-case x in both the subscript of M and in the description of M(x). Do these x's have the same referent, or are they being used differently?

Second, does the X in (2) refer to a maximally specific state of affairs, or is it supposed to refer to a constituent of some maximally specific state of affairs?

Originally posted by bbarr
Logically impossible states of affairs are irrelevant to this whole argument. If there are no logically possible fully specified states of affairs that do not contain as constituents the suffering found in S, then it follows trivially that S is logically necessary (contrary to 2). If there is at least one logically possible fully specified state of affairs S ...[text shortened]... ).

These are the only available options, your obfuscations to the contrary notwithstanding.

Logically impossible states are actually a key piece of the puzzle
of superposition of states in quantum theory. To be consistant with
what we already know about the universe you can say god could be
in a state of being alive and being dead at the same time which
is consistant with quantum theory, therefore your # 2 premise has
to be rethought.