A General Argument Against Evil - Part II

Originally posted by sonhouse
Logically impossible states are actually a key piece of the puzzle
of superposition of states in quantum theory. To be consistant with
what we already know about the universe you can say god could be
in a state of being alive and being dead at the same time which
is consistant with quantum theory, therefore your # 2 premise has
to be rethought.

You don't understand quantum mechanics. Superpositions of states do not involve the conjunction of two determinate yet inconsistent properties or states of affairs. Rather, these superpositions are of states that are intrinsically probabilistic (probabilistic in the metaphysical sense, not the epistemic sense). You cannot derive a contradiction from the superposition of states described as {50% spin-up & 50% spin-down}.

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., let's settle this dispute:

We have started with my definition of omnipotence as the first premise of a proposed reductio:

[b] Omnipotence (def.): An entity G is omnipotent if and only if G can do anything that is logically possible, where this is construed as the ability to bring about any logically possible, maximally specified state of affairs.[ ...[text shortened]... rs, or is it supposed to refer to a constituent of some maximally specific state of affairs?[/b]

First, please be clear in your notation. You are using an upper-case X in (2), and a lower-case x in both the subscript of M and in the description of M(x). Do these x's have the same referent, or are they being used differently?

x (lower-case) is a variable that can refer to any state of affairs. X is a particular state of affairs (actually, one of a set of states of affairs) that satisfies the property of being a fixed point of M.

Second, does the X in (2) refer to a maximally specific state of affairs, or is it supposed to refer to a constituent of some maximally specific state of affairs?

It is not clear to me what you mean by a maximally specific state of affairs.

Indeed, we first need clarity on what is meant by "state of affairs". Can one state of affairs be a subset of, or included in, another? Is maximality (or full specificity) a property of a state of affairs or a set of states of affairs?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
First, please be clear in your notation. You are using an upper-case X in (2), and a lower-case x in both the subscript of M and in the description of M(x). Do these x's have the same referent, or are they being used differently?

x (lower-case) is a variable that can refer to any state of affairs. X is a particular state of affairs (actual maximality (or full specificity) a property of a state of affairs or a set of states of affairs?[/b]

O.K., so your second premise is this:

(2) Suppose X is logically possible.

Where X is a particular state of affairs that is also a "fixed point" of the following relation:

M(x): A state of affairs such that God cannot cause a state of affairs x to obtain.

Now, if X is a fixed point of the relation M(x), then X must be among the set of states of affairs that would satisfy the variable x. So, we should be able to substitute 'X' for the variable 'x' in M. Now, look what you have by substituting 'X' for the variable 'x':

M(X): A state of affairs such that God cannot cause a logically possible state of affairs to obtain.

So, you have started from my definition of omnipotence, and then assumed in (2) that there exists a logically possible state of affairs ('X'😉 that (by substitution for the variable 'x' in the relation 'M'😉 cannot be brought about by an omnipotent being. All you have done in (2) is assume the existence of a logically possible state of affairs that cannot be brought about by an omnipotent being.

In effect, your argument goes like this:

First, you assume my definition of omnipotence.

You then reply "No, that can't be right, because I can suppose that there is a state of affairs that is both possible and that cannot be brought about by an omnipotent being. Given your definition and this assumption, I can derive a contradiction."

My rejoinder: "So what? Given any claim of yours, if I suppose something that explicitly contradicts your claim, I can derive a contradiction."

But just as my supposition would not show anything about the truth or falsity of your claim, so your supposition in (2) doesn't show anything about the truth or falsity of my definition of omnipotence. This is what we call "begging the question".

Maximally specific states of affairs are ways everything could be at a time, or possible totalities of facts, or mereological sums of all possible objects, properties and relations. The actual world, in its totality, is a maximally specific state of affairs. Each possible world, in its totality, is a maximally specific state of affairs.

A non-maximally specific state of affairs can be a part of another state of affairs.

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., so your second premise is this:

[b](2) Suppose X is logically possible.

Where X is a particular state of affairs that is also a "fixed point" of the following relation:

M(x): A state of affairs such that God cannot cause a state of affairs x to obtain.

Now, if X is a fixed point of the relation M(x), then X must be among the se ...[text shortened]... fairs.

A non-maximally specific state of affairs can be a part of another state of affairs.[/b]

This is a diagonalization argument - so it's not sufficient for me to just suppose that X exists. I need to show that X does, in fact, exist.

In an earlier post I outlined what a mathematical proof for the existence of X would look like. But we needn't do all that. I can just take the Nazi killing the baby example you provided. After all, the Nazi could have freely chosen not to kill the baby without any act of God's to cause that to come about. This is a logically possible state of affairs (God does exactly what He did in history; the Nazi chooses otherwise). But if you apply M to this state of affairs you ask the question "Which states of affairs satisfy the condition that God could not have caused this one to come about" - and it's obvious that this state of affairs satisfies it. Since the inaction of God is a pre-condition for this state, it follows that any action from this God cannot cause this state to attain.

Yet it's obvious that it is attainable. So X does exist. It's not a supposition.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
This is a diagonalization argument - so it's not sufficient for me to just suppose that X exists. I need to show that X does, in fact, exist.

In an earlier post I outlined what a mathematical proof for the existence of X would look like. But we needn't do all that. I can just take the Nazi killing the baby example you provided. After all, the Naz ...[text shortened]... to attain.

Yet it's obvious that it is attainable. So X does exist. It's not a supposition.

I don't think you actually know what a diagonalization argument is.

Nevertheless, your "point" here about the Nazi is irrelevant for the following reasons:

(1) My definition of omnipotence is framed in terms of maximally specific states of affairs, and (X), the Nazi's freely choosing to kill the baby, is not a maximally specific state of affairs.

(2) You can only derive a contradiction from my definition if you suppose that the state of affairs (X) of the Nazi's freely choosing not to kill the baby is a constituent of a maximally specific state of affairs that also has as a constituent the state of affairs of God having brought about X.

But, since it is a contradiction to suppose both that X obtains and that God brought about X (because it is a precondition of choosing freely that one's choice not directly be brought about by the agency of another), there is no logically possible maximally specific state of affairs that can have both of these states of affairs as constituents.

So, your putative counterexample to my definition of omnipotence is, in fact, incoherent.

Originally posted by bbarr
I don't think you actually know what a diagonalization argument is.

Nevertheless, your "point" here about the Nazi is irrelevant for the following reasons:

(1) My definition of omnipotence is framed in terms of maximally specific states of affairs, and (X), the Nazi's freely choosing to kill the baby, is not a maximally specific state of affairs.
...[text shortened]... .

So, your putative counterexample to my definition of omnipotence is, in fact, incoherent.

I don't think you actually know what a diagonalization argument is.

Alright, why don't you educate me?

So, your putative counterexample to my definition of omnipotence is, in fact, incoherent.

Which is because the X you're talking about in your post (what you call my "putative counterexample" ) is not the X I was talking about.

X(bbarr) = (all other things prior to Nazi killing baby remains equal, Nazi freely chooses not to kill baby, God brought about X, subsequent events changed accordingly)

X(LH)† = (all other things prior to Nazi killing baby remains equal, Nazi freely chooses not to kill baby, God does not bring about X, subsequent events changed accordingly)

Read back over my post carefully - I am making the same argument you made in (2).

Now, look at X(LH). Is it logically possible? Of course. Can God cause it to obtain? Of course not - both of us have just argued that.

So, is it coherent to define God as a being who can cause any logically possible state of affairs to obtain? Clearly not.

There's my reductio.

---
† Since you insist on dealing only with maximally specific states of affairs.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I don't think you actually know what a diagonalization argument is.

Alright, why don't you educate me?

So, your putative counterexample to my definition of omnipotence is, in fact, incoherent.

Which is because the X you're talking about in your post (what you call my "putative counterexample" ) is not the X I was talkin reductio.

---
† Since you insist on dealing only with maximally specific states of affairs.

I'll educate you about diagonal arguments after we're done here (we can do it in a new thread, if you want, because they are irrelevant to this topic).

Again, please be clear concerning your notation. You wrote the following:

X(LH)† = (all other things prior to Nazi killing baby remains equal, Nazi freely chooses not to kill baby, God does not bring about X, subsequent events changed accordingly)]

Now, does the 'X' that appears on the right hand side of the identity symbol above refer to the Nazi's choice not to kill the baby, or does it refer to the maximally specific state of affairs X(LH)? In other words, is X(LH) self-referential?

NOTE: Do you think that all self-referential arguments are diagonal arguments?

Originally posted by bbarr
I'll educate you about diagonal arguments after we're done here (we can do it in a new thread, if you want, because they are irrelevant to this topic).

Again, please be clear concerning your notation. You wrote the following:

X(LH)† = (all other things prior to Nazi killing baby remains equal, Nazi freely chooses not to kill baby, [b]God does not brin ...[text shortened]... ential?

NOTE: Do you think that all self-referential arguments are diagonal arguments?[/b]

Now, does the 'X' that appears on the right hand side of the identity symbol above refer to the Nazi's choice not to kill the baby, or does it refer to the maximally specific state of affairs X(LH)? In other words, is X(LH) self-referential?

Does it make a difference?

Alright, if it makes you happy, use some other letter on the LHS (say, Y) and use X to refer only to the Nazi's choice†.

Do you think that all self-referential arguments are diagonal arguments?

No. But all diagonalisation arguments are, in one way or another, self-referential.

---
† Sounds like the title of a book. 🙂

Originally posted by lucifershammer
[b]Now, does the 'X' that appears on the right hand side of the identity symbol above refer to the Nazi's choice not to kill the baby, or does it refer to the maximally specific state of affairs X(LH)? In other words, is X(LH) self-referential?

Does it make a difference?

Alright, if it makes you happy, use some other letter on the LHS (s ...[text shortened]... ents are, in one way or another, self-referential.

---
† Sounds like the title of a book. 🙂[/b]

O.K, so now you are claiming that the following maximally specific state of affairs constitutes a counterexample to my definition of omnipotence:

X(LH)† = (all other things prior to Nazi killing baby remains equal, Nazi freely chooses not to kill baby, where God does not bring about the Nazi's free choice, subsequent events changed accordingly)].

Now, God's bringing about X(LH) does not entail a contradiction when conjoined with my definition of omnipotence. God can bring about the maximally specific state of affairs X(LH) simply by refraining from influencing the choice of the Nazi.

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K, so now you are claiming that the following maximally specific state of affairs constitutes a counterexample to my definition of omnipotence:

X(LH)† = (all other things prior to Nazi killing baby remains equal, Nazi freely chooses not to kill baby, where God does not bring about the Nazi's free choice, subsequent events changed accordingly)].

Now, G ...[text shortened]... ly specific state of affairs X(LH) simply by refraining from influencing the choice of the Nazi.

But God cannot guarantee the obtaining of X(LH). Consider the following state of affairs:

Z = (all other things prior to Nazi killing baby remains equal, Nazi freely chooses to kill baby, where God does not bring about the Nazi's free choice, subsequent events changed accordingly)

By refraining from influencing the choice of the Nazi, God cannot necessarily cause X(LH) to obtain - depending on the Nazi's choice, Z may obtain instead of X(LH). An omnipotent God (by your definition) should be able to cause a particular logically possible state of affairs to necessarily obtain.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
But God cannot [b]guarantee the obtaining of X(LH). Consider the following state of affairs:

Z = (all other things prior to Nazi killing baby remains equal, Nazi freely chooses to kill baby, where God does not bring about the Nazi's free choice, subsequent events changed accordingly)

By refraining from influencing the choice of the N ...[text shortened]... should be able to cause a particular logically possible state of affairs to necessarily obtain.[/b]

Well, you should know what my response to this line of objection will be. Your objection is predicated upon an incoherent libertarian notion of freedom of the will. That is, you assume the conjunction of the following to be possible:

(1) In the actual world, events progress from T(0) to T(C) [the time of the choice], whereupon the Nazi chooses to kill the baby.
(2) In some possible but non-actual world, events progress from T(0) to T(C) in a manner identical to that of the actual world, yet at T(C), the Nazi freely chooses not to kill the baby.

But, if the totality of events just prior to the Nazi’s choice do not suffice to determine what the Nazi’s choice will be, then the Nazi’s choice itself is causally undetermined. Causally undetermined events are metaphysically random. Metaphysically random events are not under the control of agents, and hence cannot be chosen by agents. So, the Nazi cannot choose not to kill the baby in any possible world with a history identical to that of the actual world.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, you should know what my response to this line of objection will be. Your objection is predicated upon an incoherent libertarian notion of freedom of the will. That is, you assume the conjunction of the following to be possible:

(1) In the actual world, events progress from T(0) to T(C) [the time of the choice], whereupon the Nazi chooses to kill the ...[text shortened]... not to kill the baby in any possible world with a history identical to that of the actual world.

Your objection is predicated upon an incoherent libertarian notion of freedom of the will.

What would a coherent libertarian notion of free will be like?

But, if the totality of events just prior to the Nazi’s choice do not suffice to determine what the Nazi’s choice will be, then the Nazi’s choice itself is causally undetermined. Causally undetermined events are metaphysically random. Metaphysically random events are not under the control of agents, and hence cannot be chosen by agents.

If this is true, then what sense does it make to speak of "free will" (and therefore "ethics"😉? It seems to me that you are arguing that the world is either deterministic or random.

Correct me if I'm wrong here.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Your objection is predicated upon an incoherent libertarian notion of freedom of the will.

What would a coherent libertarian notion of free will be like?

But, if the totality of events just prior to the Nazi’s choice do not suffice to determine what the Nazi’s choice will be, then the Nazi’s choice itself is causally undetermined. Ca are arguing that the world is either deterministic or random.

Correct me if I'm wrong here.

I have found no coherent libertarian account of free will, and I have no idea what one would look like. If every libertarian account is committed to the claim that, all else being identical, one at least sometimes has the capacity to have chosen some act other than the act one in fact did choose, then every libertarian account is incoherent.

We can construe free will in a compatibilist sense, rather than a libertarian sense, and utilize this notion in ethics. Of course, our practicies of attributing unqualified blame to those who act wrongly will need to be modified, but compatibilist notions of free will do not vitiate ethical discourse.

I'm not arguing that the world is either deterministic or random. Some events in the world may be completely determined by prior causes, some may be random.