A General Argument from Evil.

Let's review Coletti, because you are accusing me of taking things out of context.

DoctorScribbles was questioning how it was just and fair that God can kill with impunity
but the Judeo-Christian people were obligated not to kill. It is a legitimate question,
but one which has several theological answers. You provided one when you said:

I think the problem is simply solved by understanding that the commandments were made by God to man. And it helps to know that God is talking about unwarranted killing, murder, because God does not contradict himself.

All that God does is by definition good. So for God to break his commandment is silly - God does not make the rules for himself, he makes them for us.

Had you ended your post there, I never would have commented, because it is a
legitimate argument (I don't find it compelling, but that is another matter).

However, you continued, and this is the source of my theological discontent. You wrote:

It may help to adjust your perspective. Contrast your position to Gods. Imagine God, the creator of the universe, even noticing you. To expect God to even give you a moment's thought is the height of arrogance. That God should not snuff us all out like the annoying insects that we are is a wonder. What can mankind show for itself that it should deserve God to even glance our way? What have we to show for ourselves, to gain favor from the Almighty God and Creator?

Enter 'Reform Theology.' DoctorScibbles made no such claims that the acts of people
are worthy or that they are made important by them in the sight of God, much less that
by actions we can command respect. This notion entered the fray by your hand,
from your mind. It is objectionable on the grounds that I wrote. Sentence by
sentence, starting at the third one:

1) God does indeed notice His Creation, the bearers of His Image;
2) Christians can expect that thinks about them, for He loves them by assurance of His Word.
It is not arrogant to assume that God will fulfill His promise;
3) It is not a 'wonder' that God does not snuff out His Creation, for He loves it to the depths
of His essence. His Creation is, by virture of bearing His Image and by virtue of being objects
of His Perfect Love, not an 'annoying insect;' and,
4/5) No one made any claims about being worthy of God's attention until your post. So, you
were creating this mighty strawman that didn't exist until your post brought it to the fore.

Let's continue. You wrote:

Anyone who criticizes God's actions is evidencing the pride and total depravity that is man's true nature. To paraphrase the apostle Paul, all the good deeds of man are nothing more than [b]a pile of crap. Now, scribbles, you are a little flea, amongst billions of fleas, holding up you personal pile of crap, and saying to God, "see, I am worthy or your respect." [/b]

This paragraph was what, understandably, let me to conclude that you were suggesting
a limited or non-existent worth for humankind. Point by point:

1) Pride and total depravity are not 'man's true nature,' as I discussed. Being made in
God's most perfect image, our essential (or 'true'😉 nature is not one of depravity, but
one of perfection. It is through sin that humankind stains itself and ought to strive to
wash itself clean in the Blood of the Lamb;
2) St Paul indeed told his brethren to be on watch for the sin of pride, to avoid being
a Pharisee who revels in his actions. St Paul also said:

Therefore, from the day we heard this, we do not cease praying for you and asking
that you may be filled with the knowledge of his will through all spiritual wisdom and
understanding to live in a manner worthy of the Lord, so as to be fully pleasing,
in every good work bearing fruit and growing the knowledge of God, stregthened with
every power, in accord with his glorious might, for all endurance and patience, with joy
giving thanks to the Father, who has made you fit to share in the inheritance of the
holy ones in light. Colossians 1:9-12

Also, confer with 2 Thessalonians 1:3-12.

Christians should be rejoicing that they are worthy, but not be prideful. They ought not
to believe that they are worthy by their actions, but nonetheless strive to make themselves
worthy, not because they can, but because they ought. As such, there ought to be an
emphasis on deeds, not because of the awards they confer (they confer none), but because
it is a duty. They are not 'piles of crap' in the sight of God; they are humble offerings,
representations of True Christian duty.

3) DoctorScibbles made no such claims of being worthy or that God should notice him. That
you thought he said this is the product of your fertile imagination.

But that's OK scribs. We all have our moments of self delusion. I am a flea too, with my pile of crap, often wishing it was worthy. I may think I understand God’s mind a little better than you do. But if I begin to see myself as top flea with the biggest pile of crap, well, it’s not saying much. It's hard to maintain a proper perspective.

Again, that you or any of God's Creation -- which He loves with that Perfect love which can
come only from God -- is a 'flea' is poor theology. That your works are 'piles of crap' is
poor theology. These are all products of a self-deprecating theology which has no basis in
Christian theology. They derive from St Paul's (right) admonitions to avoid pride -- pride
through being better, smarter, more active, more holy, or doing more works. Humility is
indeed a healthy Christian virture. But, that Christians are 'fleas' with 'piles of crap' is a
blatant insult to the height of God's Creation. By describing oneself as a 'flea' with 'piles
of crap,' you are making a comparative statement with God (and, to boot, you place the
angels below us; what are they, ticks?). You are making a statement about worth.
Christians ought to (rightly) believe that they are not 'fleas,' just humble servants working
as hard as they can to do Godly justice in their imperfect way on earth.

I hope that this longer, clearer post expresses more fully my objections to your statements
in the context of Christian belief. It has never been my intent to misrepresent you, but,
as you can see above, your statements are either unclear (if you agree with my objections)
or theologically untenable (if you maintain your claims).

I do not know why you feel this great need to be insulting. I should hope that you can avoid
this blantantly unChristian behavior in the future discussion of this issue.

Nemesio

Originally posted by Nemesio
...
Christians ought to (rightly) believe that they are not 'fleas,'...

Originally posted by Paul Dirac
Just a side note... In my churchgoing youth, the lyric of 'Amazing Grace' starting being sung as "such a wretch as I" as an alternative to the orignal wording "such a worm as I."

Originally posted by Paul Dirac
Just a side note... In my churchgoing youth, the lyric of 'Amazing Grace' starting being sung as "such a wretch as I" as an alternative to the orignal wording "such a worm as I."

Originally posted by Coletti
But any unworthy person who thinks they have infinite worth might take offense.

Originally posted by Coletti
😉

Worm, flea, roach, amoeba, dung heap, - it's all a matter of a proper perspective. 😀 But any unworthy person who thinks they have infinite worth might take offense.

Come on bbarr!!! We need to get back on topic. Nemo and I have hijack this thread long enough. I suppose others are tired of it. Can't blame them. How close are you to posting your defense of premise (2)? Looking forwarded to it.

"It all depends on definitions and most definitions only use words to describe the object of definition. Words are inherently more or less vague. Therefore definitions using words are inherently more or less vague. Reasoning based on definitions using words is therefore vague. Conclusions reached using vague reasoning must be necessarily vague. Therefore reasoning based on definitions using words suffers more or less from the Falacy of Vagueness or Ambiguity and must therefore be looked upon with a wagonload of scepticism."

Philosophers, or philosophers to be, trying to reason in a way described above, must therefore be looked upon with a wagonload of scientific scepticism and professional suspicion.



Bbarr, your reaction a while ago to the above reasoning was very funny, but may I hope you are going to adress its validity in a more professional way ?

Originally posted by ivanhoe

"It all depends on definitions and most definitions only use words to describe the object of definition. Words are inherently more or less vague. Therefore definitions using words are inherently more or less vague. Reasoning based on definitions using words is therefore vague. Conclusions reached using vague reasoning must be necessarily vague. Therefore ...[text shortened]... s very funny, but may I hope you are going to adress its validity in a more professional way ?

Originally posted by ivanhoe

"It all depends on definitions and most definitions only use words to describe the object of definition. Words are inherently more or less vague. Therefore definitions using words are inherently more or less vague. Reasoning based on definitions using words is therefore vague. Conclusions reached using vague reasoning must be necessarily vague. Therefore ...[text shortened]... s very funny, but may I hope you are going to adress its validity in a more professional way ?

Originally posted by Coletti
Stop it ivanhoe. Let the man think. We can go after his definitions after he post's his work on premise (2).

I wonder if we are contributing to a doctoral thesis? Do we get any biblio-credit? 😉

cont.

It is good to keep in mind just what is meant by 'logically necessary' herein. To say that A is logically necessary for B is to claim that had A not been the case, it would have logically impossible for B to be the case. That is, to claim that A is logically necessary for B is to be committed to the claim that a logical contradiction follows from the conjunction of the claims “It is not the case that A” and “It is the case that B”.

To say that A is logically necessary for B is not to claim that A is merely causally responsible for bringing about B. This is important, so I will say it again: logical necessity is not the same as causal efficacy. Here's an example:

Suppose I fall victim to a ravaging disease in virtue of which I suffer physical pain that is both constant and excruciating. Suppose that this pain is causes me to seek comfort in scripture, and I am thereby led to sincerely embrace Jesus Christ as both God and Savior. Now, this situation is one wherein the suffering I experience causes something that all Christian theists will agree is a very good thing. It does not follow from this example that the suffering I experienced was logically necessary for bringing about my conversion. It would only follow that the suffering was logically necessary if it was logically impossible that my conversion be brought about by anything other than this suffering. In other words, in order for this suffering to be logically necessary for my conversion, it has to also be the case that I could not possibly have been converted by experiencing slightly less suffering, or by honest reflection on the available evidence, or by having God himself appear to me and tell me about the sacrifice of his only begotten Son, or…

Now, the theist who rejects premise (2) cannot merely claim that each instance of suffering is causally efficacious in bringing about some good or other. For instance, they cannot merely claim that some instance of suffering, as a matter of fact, brought about some good. They are committed to the much stronger claim that the good brought about by the instance of suffering in question could not have possibly been brought about in any way that involved even slightly less suffering without there being some tradeoff in goods such that the world would be thereby less good, and hence less morally preferable to God. Think carefully about this stronger claim. It entails that given some instance of suffering, the good brought about thereby could not possibly have been brought about, even by the direct intercession of an entity (God) that is both omnipotent and omniscient, without the world thereby being worse. In short, the theist is committed to the claim that every instance of suffering is such that God finds it morally preferable that that suffering occur.

This claim faces two serious objections:

CFW (Conflict with free will): Suppose S tortures, rapes and murders his neighbor. Many theists will claim that since S has free will, he could have chosen to do otherwise. But if the theist rejects premise (2), then it follows that S's torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor was logically necessary for the greater good. Hence, it follows that God finds it morally preferable that S torture, rape and murder his neighbor (else God would have prevented it because he is morally perfect). Hence, God would prevent it from being the case that S not torture, rape and murder his neighbor. Hence, it is logically impossible that S could choose to refrain from torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor. Hence, S cannot choose to refrain from torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor. Hence, S's torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor is the only logically possible option available to S. Hence, in regards to his torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor, S's will is not free.

NOTE: CFW presumes that the sort of freedom of the will that the majority of theists endorse is of the libertarian sort. Those who endorse a compatibilist view of free will are not faced with this consequence of rejecting premise (2). Of course, endorsing a compatibilist version of free will has its own costs (e.g., being committed to the claim that one can be morally responsible for acts that one could not have done otherwise than). I direct interested readers to the “Human Free Will” thread in the Debates forum for an extended discussion of these and related matters.

NPG (No Plausible Goods): There are no plausible goods logically necessitated by the diversity and severity of suffering evident in the actual world. Consider the three basic sorts of goods commonly presented by theists to explain the presence of suffering in the world:

I)Freedom of the Will
II)Virtue or Moral Uprightness
III)Salvation

Let's take these by turn:

Free will is often cited by theists in their explanations of evil. Free will, it is claimed, is itself a substantial good and logically necessary for the presence of other goods (e.g., love, kindness, etc. which are plausibly of more value if chosen freely). But along with having free will comes the capacity to choose between being virtuous and being vicious. So, the moral evil in the world is explained by humans' being free, and the goodness of free will and that which it allows is sufficient to justify the moral evil in the world, that is, to explain why God finds it morally preferable that there be free will even though this brings about things like murder, rape, theft, deception, and so on. It is often claimed that if God were to prevent these sorts of moral evil, then humans would not have free wills.

But this is surely mistaken. First, there is no reason to think that we have free will if God exists and premise (2) is false (see CFW, above). Second, it is not contradictory to suppose that God could have created human beings with slightly more benevolent characters, and thereby be less predisposed towards violence. After all, my sister has a substantially more benevolent character than I, but nobody would suggest that this entails that her will is not free. Third, preventing someone from harming another is not a violation of their free will, but merely the prevention of the successful pursuit of that which they will. For instance, if I come across an attempted rape in progress, and I stop the aggressor, I am not thereby preventing him from willing that he rape, nor am I preventing him from attempting to act in accord with his will. I am merely preventing him from being successful in his pursuit, but this is consistent with his will being free. Being prevented from X-ing by the actions of another agent is equivalent to being prevented from X-ing by virtue of natural laws, as far as the will of the actor is concerned. The actor may freely will that he X (say, that he rape, or levitate), and then fail despite his free choice. But if I can prevent a rapist from being successful at raping without thereby violating the freedom of his will, then God can do the same. Hence, God could have intervened in at least one case of moral evil without violating the freedom of our wills. Hence, explanations of evil the rely on the freedom of the will fail.

Note: As if this weren't bad enough, most Christian theists are committed to the claim that God has intervened to prevent instances of moral evil, as even a cursory examination of the bible will make clear.

cont.

Theists also often claim that the suffering brought about by moral and natural evil is necessary in order for there to be occasions for virtues such as compassion, generosity, and so on (so-called “second-order goods&rdquo😉. However, such an explanation for evil can only be partial, as these second-order goods will not be able to explain the presence in the world of the variety of second-order evils (e.g., callousness, cruelty, miserliness, jealousy, etc.). Perhaps the theist could posit some third-order good (perhaps being saved, or being fit for the bestowal of grace) to explain these second-order evils. But, of course, there will be third-order evils as well (being damned, unfit for grace), and it is doubtful that the theist will find any higher-order good without an evil analogue. Since no infinite regress of symmetrical higher-order goods and evils will suffice to explain and justify those evils, this response to the problem of evil fails. Further, even if this objection could be overcome, it still is radically implausible that these second-order goods could justify instances of moral or natural evil where the victims are unknown and undiscovered. For instance, there were victims of the recent tsunami (not to mention the historical Chinese flood which killed roughly three million people) that will never be known because either they were not known well enough at the time to be remembered by survivors, or because those who would have remembered them were also victims. Such victims cannot serve as the objects of virtuous states like compassion, of generosity, or even sympathy in any real sense (although we may experience sympathy for 'all the victims', but we would experience this anyway had one unknown victim not been killled, correct?). Hence, their suffering and death cannot be justified by virtue of these second-order goods. The theist may respond that such victims may themselves have an opportunity to manifest some second-order good by virtue of their own suffering, but this overlooks three obvious objections. First, some suffering is of such intensity that victims are completely consumed by it. Second, infants and young children will not, in general, have the emotional or even the conceptual resources necessary for manifesting these second order goods. Third, the suffering of animals (via forest fire, for example) often both leaves no trace (the bodies are consumed or hidden), thus providing no opportunity for anybody to manifest a second-order good, and brings about no manifestation of second-order goods among the victims themselves ('cause they lack the intellectual hardware).

Finally, theists often claim that the suffering experienced in the world is more than made up for by the joy experienced during the afterlife. First, such a response seems to misconstrue the argument, as the problem facing the theist is not to show that suffering gets made up for by future joy, but to show that suffering is logically necessary to bring about the greater good. After all, if God gets to decide who goes to heaven, then it will be logically possible that God could decide, for any person at all, that that person goes to heaven. But if this is logically possible, then whatever suffering they endured was not logically necessary for their salvation, because regardless of what suffering they had endured, God could choose to save them. Second, unless animals also go to heaven, such a response will be unable to deal with the prevalence of animal suffering. Further, this response would only apply to those who, as a matter of fact, get saved, but presumably the suffering of those who will not be saved is also of concern to God ('cause he loves us all). Hence, this response fails.

So, the three major sorts of good theists commonly employ in their explanations of moral and natural evil all fail. But then what candidate goods are left? Without an account of these justificatory goods, the theist's explanation for moral and natural evil amounts to nothing more than “something(s) or other is(are) such that it(they) is(are) both good and logically necessitated by moral and natural evil”. But, of course, this is not an explanation, but a mere promissory note.

In summary, rejection of premise (2) commits the theist to the claim that this is the best of all possible worlds, and that every instance of suffering, no matter how horrendous, is logically necessary (not just causally responsible) for the greater good. But this entails that libertarian freedom of the will is impossible. Further, when pressed concerning just what the greater good is that is necessitated by all the moral and natural evil in the world, the theist's three most plausible answers fail.

O.K., that's what I have so far. I'm going to take a couple days break from this debate and work on my dissertation. Hopefully, by the time I return some sort of general pattern of objection has arisen, so that I can address your forthcoming criticisms wholesale.

Bennett

Originally posted by bbarr
Ivanhoe,

My comment, while meant to be humorous, was also a serious response to your argument. You are correct that words are vague, in that we cannot give necessary and sufficient conditions for when something is properly called a 'cha ...[text shortened]... tical conclusions so radical that your own argument is undermined.

Originally posted by ivanhoe
Bbarr: " It is as if you argued thus: We have no reason to believe that the rules of inference, when applied correctly, take us from true premises to true conclusions, hence, we have no reason to believe our conclusions follow from our pr ...[text shortened]... our reasoning and conclusions are not credible in any way.

Originally posted by bbarr

So, the three major sorts of good theists commonly employ in their explanations of moral and natural evil all fail. But then what candidate goods are left? Without an account of these justificatory goods, the theist's explanation for moral and natural evil amounts to nothing more than “something(s) or other is(are) such that it(they) is(are) both good and ...[text shortened]... and natural evil”. But, of course, this is not an explanation, but a mere promissory note.