Originally posted by bbarrI agree it would be 'wrong' for a morally perfect person to choose B. But why are they choosing at all?
Both of your contentions are false.
The choice of a lesser evil is not 'included in this definition'. The definition entails that a morally perfect person will choose the lesser evil [b]only when the lesser evil is the least evil of any available alternatives.
Here's an example:
Suppose there are three options available:
A: Very Evil
B: ...[text shortened]... the God of Abraham is free. Nothing in any of my definitions is incompatible with this claim. [/b]
The problem I have with your argument is that the whole thing presupposes God chooses everything, before it happens. My theology tends towards the view that God often (or maybe even always) takes things that ARE happening and works them for good. Just because he is omnipotent, why should he be always using that power? Can he not observe first and THEN shape?
Or are you going to tell me that 'not choosing' is also a choice?
And finally, while I'm catching up with all of this...
For similar reasons to my previous post, I have a problem classifying suffering as either "necessary" or "unnecessary".
One argument is that much suffering simply IS. It happens as a consequence of actions, it's not a separate entity in and of itself. It's a reaction to something that has happened. Unless you believe in a clockwork universe, which I don't, then God does not choose everything that happens. Events happen, one possible consequence is suffering.
I suspect all suffering is potentially USEFUL, rather than necessary.
Sorry, I don't think I'm expressing this very clearly, but the essence of what I'm trying to say is that I suspect there is a confusion here about cause and effect.
Originally posted by orfeoI don't think Bennett's argument "presupposes God chooses everything, before it happens."
I agree it would be 'wrong' for a morally perfect person to choose B. But why are they choosing at all?
The problem I have with your argument is that the whole thing presupposes God chooses everything, before it happens. My theology tends towards the view that God often (or maybe even always) takes things that ARE happening and works them for good. Jus ...[text shortened]... rve first and THEN shape?
Or are you going to tell me that 'not choosing' is also a choice?
Suppose God observes a Tsunami wave on its way to engulf several thousand innocent children. Suppose God did not "choose" this, but just "let it happen". (Note: As creator of the universe, he is still distantly responsible for allowing such a circumstance to come to pass. But let's let this pass, for the sake of argument.)
He clearly observes the Tsunami wave, being omnipotent. How should he now "SHAPE" the world, in your words, being omnipotent and omnibenevolent, given that, by extension, he should be both able and willing to prevent from occurring any suffering that is not logically necessary to bring about a greater good?
Originally posted by orfeoThe question is whether all suffering--ever discrete suffering event--is ACTUALLY, not potentially, useful, and whether the goodness of its utility is sufficient to counterbalance the badness of its experience.
And finally, while I'm catching up with all of this...
For similar reasons to my previous post, I have a problem classifying suffering as either "necessary" or "unnecessary".
One argument is that much suffering simply IS. It happens as a consequence of actions, it's not a separate entity in and of itself. It's a reaction to something that has hap ...[text shortened]... e of what I'm trying to say is that I suspect there is a confusion here about cause and effect.
For example, how "useful" is the suffering of a particular, unknown innocent child engulfed, and painfully and drowned, by a Tsunami wave?
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeCan these things be MEASURED?
The question is whether all suffering--ever discrete suffering event--is ACTUALLY, not potentially, useful, and whether the goodness of its utility is sufficient to counterbalance the badness of its experience.
For example, how "useful" is the suffering of a particular, unknown innocent child engulfed, and painfully and drowned, by a Tsunami wave?
I don't know if they can. Certainly not by me. And exactly how far down the timeframe of cause and effect are you prepared to look?
I'm not trying to duck the argument. I just think that it's very difficult to quantify these things. And that's yet another expression of my difficulties with the original propositions. It presupposes that the degree of evil is measurable. To use Christian concepts (I know, I know, bbarr original premises do NOT require reference to a particular religion) I would challenge the notion that there are degrees of sin. Murderers do not get any MORE excluded from heaven than people who were rude to their mother.
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Originally posted by PawnokeyholeIf something is POTENTIALLY useful then it means that you may not see the use at the moment, but in future you might see the use and find out that it was ACTUALLY useful.
The question is whether all suffering--ever discrete suffering event--is ACTUALLY, not potentially, useful, and whether the goodness of its utility is sufficient to counterbalance the badness of its experience.
For example, how "useful" is the suffering of a particular, unknown innocent child engulfed, and painfully and drowned, by a Tsunami wave?
Take your example of the unknown innocent child that was engulfed and innocently and painfully drowned by a Tsunami wave... This may be the way you see it (NOT ACTUALLY USEFUL). Now think of it in this way. You and me as people don't know what the future entails. That same child may have experienced much worse pain later on it its life, which maybe at that time may have been worse for it and maybe the people around it. Thus, at the moment it may not see ACTUALLY useful, but if we could see the future then maybe it was ACTUALLY useful.
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Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI believe the objection is substantive enough, and Bennett probably knew this:
However, the objection seems formal rather than substantive. Surely Bennett's argument could be easily restated so that God would prefer, given any well-defined class of options, that option among the entire class which lead to all na ...[text shortened]... ally unnecessary for bringing about a greater good to be avoided.
Interestingly, nobody who responded to the original argument rejected premise (5), that God, in virtue of being morally perfect, would want to prevent any suffering logically unnecessary for the greater good. So, I will presume henceforth that theists are, by and large, committed to the following principle:
BUS (Badness of unnecessary suffering): God takes it to be morally preferable that creatures do not unnecessarily suffer, and acts accordingly.
Note that BUS is simply a restatement of premise (5).
In the revised MP definition, the theist need no longer reject premise (2) and rejects instead the italicised portion of BUS (effectively rejecting BUS). In the example I gave, let A be an act of rape and B be an act of divine intervention (say, a bolt of lightning to strike the rapist dead). Since the state of affair (~A,~B) is morally preferable to (A,~B), the theist is free to say that the suffering caused by A was unnecessary for the greater good but, since (A,~B) is morally preferable to (~A,B), God could not have prevented it without causing greater evil in the universe.
Bennett continues:
If any theists are now tempted to demur, and reject BUS (and, hence, premise (5)), I would ask them to think about what they will thereby be committing themselves to. If BUS is rejected, then the theist will be committed to the following claim:
COG (Callousness of God): Given two possible states of affairs, A and B, if A involves more suffering than B, and A and B are equivalent in regards to the goodness they instantiate and/or bring about, God does not take the extra suffering involved in A to weigh in favor of B.
Under the revised MP definition, the theist is no longer committed to defending COG if he rejects BUS because the theist is free to believe that God does intervene in instances where He can, at the very least, maintain the same level of moral preferability (which I will take as equivalent to "goodness" ) but decrease the amount of suffering.
Originally posted by no1marauderI read one in which the man was not only his own father but his own wife and mother as well as the bartender to whom he is pouring his heart out. It's called "All You Zombies" I think.
Is it logically possible for God to incarnate into His Son Jesus Christ ?
I don't see how; you can't be your own father except in one of those old sci-fi magazines where a guy was abused by his father, so he built a one way time machine to go back to the past, killed his father but then wound up getting married and having a son and realizing that he WAS his father in that timeline! Did you ever read that story, Ivanhoe?
Originally posted by AThousandYoungIt is Robert A. Heinlein's "All You Zombies" originally published in the Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction, March 1959.
I read one in which the man was not only his own father but his own wife and mother as well as the bartender to whom he is pouring his heart out. It's called "All You Zombies" I think.
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Originally posted by lucifershammerNice argument, Lucifershammer.
A few preliminary points:
1. Nice argument. Both the original argument and the elaboration on premise (2) that followed.
2. IMO, most confirmed theists who can understand your arguments would've thought of the theodicy problem b ...[text shortened]... ence I reject Premise 5 in conjunction with your definition of MP.
What you have pointed out is that a fully specified state of affairs may have constituents that differ as to their moral preferability. So, a fully specified state of affairs S may have, as constituents, an act A and an act B, where A is morally preferable to ~A but B is not morally preferable to ~B. This is obviously correct, and I am in your debt for pointing it out. In our normal moral evaluations, we often have to weigh competing considerations.
Luckily, I can modify my definition of moral perfection so that it is consistent with your insight, while preserving the structure of my argument.
So:
Morally Perfect (def): An entity G is morally perfect if and only if for two states of affairs A and B, where A and B are specified as fully as G’s cognitive faculties allow, if A is morally preferable to B then G prefers that A obtain rather than B, and G acts accordingly.
With this definition in place, your suppositions do not lead to a contradiction, as God may perfectly well take ~A to be morally preferable to A, and ~B to be morally preferable to B, without thereby being committed to both B and ~B. He will not be committed to B and ~B because, on your suppositions, his evaluations of ~A and ~B are in isolation from each other. If the proper object of moral preferability are states of affairs specified as fully as one’s cognitive faculties allow (which, for God, will be fully specified states of affairs due to his omniscience), then given your suppositions, God will have to choose between the following:
State of Affairs 1: B and ~A and….
State of Affairs 2: ~B and the possibility of A and…
Since, according to the revised definition, the objects of moral preferability are these fully specified states of affairs (1 vs 2), rather then their individual constituents (A vs ~A, B vs. ~B), no contradiction arises, because the supposition that a constituent of a fully specified state of affairs may be morally preferable to a constituent of some other fully specified state of affairs does not entail that a morally perfect entity will endeavor to bring it about that the former obtain. It is only the overall evaluation of all the specified constituents of states of affairs that will determine how a morally perfect entity acts.
This should strike you as intuitive. I may find it morally preferable that my friend not get in a physical altercation with another person at the pub. I may also find it morally preferable that I not have to forcibly intervene by dragging my friend out of the pub by his collar. However, the situation may be such that the only way to prevent the physical altercation in question is to drag my friend out by the collar. Now, what ought I do? I must weight these competing considerations of moral preferability by evaluating the relative moral preferability of the following fully specified (within the limitations of my cognitive powers) states of affairs:
State of Affairs 1: No physical coercion on my part, physical altercation between my friend and another, and….
State of Affairs 2: Physical coercion on my part, no physical altercation between my friend and another, and….
In short, when there are competing considerations of this sort, I will need to make an all things considered moral evaluation, where such an evaluation will weigh the constituents of the alternative possible states of affairs, but not attribute to these constituents the property of moral preferability tout court. The property of moral preferability tout court (you can think of this as overall moral preferability), will only be properly attributable to the fully specified states of affairs themselves.
The rest of my argument proceeds as before, with no modification necessary. The theist is still faced with all the problems I mentioned attendant to the rejection of 5. Specifically, the rejection of 5 still commits the theist to COG.
Thanks again.
bbarr,
I think it would be great if you posted your argument on http://www.christianlogic.com/forums/index.html . There's some very knowledge people there who could give you some valuable feedback. Not all of the regulars are Christians, but as you can imagine, logic is the focus of the site. And you'll get less fodder to sift through.
There's a current thread on evil and God already being discussed, but your argument would get more feedback as a new one. Also, I'd like to see more intelligent non-Christan's on the site.
http://www.christianlogic.com/forums/topic643.html
Originally posted by orfeoSo, what premise of the original argument are you rejecting?
I agree it would be 'wrong' for a morally perfect person to choose B. But why are they choosing at all?
The problem I have with your argument is that the whole thing presupposes God chooses everything, before it happens. My theology tends towards the view that God often (or maybe even always) takes things that ARE happening and works them for good. Jus ...[text shortened]... rve first and THEN shape?
Or are you going to tell me that 'not choosing' is also a choice?
Originally posted by orfeoI agree that suffering IS, in that suffering exists. What I want to know from you and your theist contemporaries, is whether all suffering that exists is logically necessary for the greater good (as you understand 'greater good'😉. Either it is so necessary or it is not. This is a logical truth, so one or the other must be the case. If it is so necessary, then you are rejecting premise (2). If it is not so necessary, then given your theism you will reject (5) (I'm presuming you don't want to give up any of God's traditional properties). So, which is it? Do you want to jettison (2) or (5)?
And finally, while I'm catching up with all of this...
For similar reasons to my previous post, I have a problem classifying suffering as either "necessary" or "unnecessary".
One argument is that much suffering simply IS. It happens as a consequence of actions, it's not a separate entity in and of itself. It's a reaction to something that has hap ...[text shortened]... of what I'm trying to say is that I suspect there is a confusion here about cause and effect.is
Originally posted by orfeoNothing in my argument requires that suffering or moral preferability be measurable by us. All the argument requires is that God have the ability to determine amongst alternative possible states of affairs which is morally preferable. Do you deny that God can do this? If so, then how does this not commit you to either rejecting God's omniscience or endorsing an epistemic version of moral skepticism?
Can these things be MEASURED?
I don't know if they can. Certainly not by me. And exactly how far down the timeframe of cause and effect are you prepared to look?
I'm not trying to duck the argument. I just think that it's very difficult to quantify these things. And that's yet another expression of my difficulties with the original propositions. ...[text shortened]... . Murderers do not get any MORE excluded from heaven than people who were rude to their mother.