Originally posted by TheSkipperIs suffering some sort of barometer with which to measure goodness
For the sake of argument...What say you Bennett if I were to dissagree with 3 or 4. Couldn't God, being omnipotent, choose to limit her/his omnipotence and/or omnipresence, thus choosing not to know or do something about suffering? Perhaps this is a silly question but you may find it more interesting that bickering with good 'ol Ivan. 😉
TheSkipper
and that which is evil?
Kelly
Originally posted by TheSkipperSuppose God chose to limit his omnipotence. Such a limit would either be revocable or irrevocable, correct?. If the former, then God is still omnipotent, by definition. If the latter, then God is no longer omnipotent and couldn't become so again. I doubt many theists would want to endorse this latter claim. But, regardless of this, why would God choose to limit his power? Would he do so because he didn't want the ability to intercede when evil arose? If so, does this track any plausible notion of 'moral'. Suppose you see a child drowning in a lake, and so you shoot yourself in the kneecaps so that you can't help the child. Is this action of yours one we would call 'moral'?
For the sake of argument...What say you Bennett if I were to dissagree with 3 or 4. Couldn't God, being omnipotent, choose to limit her/his omnipotence and/or omnipresence, thus choosing not to know or do something about suffering? Perhaps this is a silly question but you may find it more interesting that bickering with good 'ol Ivan. 😉
TheSkipper
Originally posted by ColettiNo, it does not. As I have taken pains to point out, you may interpret 'greater good' in a manner consistent with your committment to Divine Command theory (if this is your ethical theory), and it does not affect the argument in the slightest.
Doesn't your argument require the "good" entail what is "good for humanity"? Then greater good then is strictly humanitarian. You could say that greater good is whatever makes the world a better place for mankind.
Your God then must be man-centered? No?
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Originally posted by bbarrThen perhaps you can show what prevents me from saying that all that you might describe as evil is in accord to God's determinate will, therefore no unnecessary evils can occurred. Since God is characterized as being omniscient and omnipotent - all actions and outcomes must either occur by God's direct intervention or his permission - his determinate will. To speak of necessary is to assume it could be otherwise, which contradicts the meaning of omniscient and omnipotent. It's the "can God create a rock that God can't lift" argument.
No, it does not. As I have taken pains to point out, you may interpret 'greater good' in a manner consistent with your committment to Divine Command theory (if this is your ethical theory), and it does not affect the argument in the slightest.
Evil can be defined with reference to God's prescriptive will for man. "Thou shall not kill" - not "killing is evil". Evil is what God says is evil for man, and that is in reference to man's actions and intents. Only man can commit sin, because only man can violate God's prescriptive will. It would be nonsense to say God can sin against God.
I don't think your argument hold together when you define good and evil as intents and actions with respect to God prescriptive will. It has nothing to do with the happiness, or comfort, or pleasure, or the health of man.
Within the framework of God's will, nothing can be called unnecessary by definition. Anything unnecessary would not exist. Therefore, there unnecessary suffering is non-existent.
(2) is false. God exists.
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Originally posted by ColettiNothing at all prevents you from saying that all moral and natural evil is in accord with God's will. Where in the argument did I claim otherwise? If you reject premise (2), then you are claiming that there are no unnecessary evils in the world. You are claiming that all evil is logically necessary to bring about the greater good.
Then perhaps you can show what prevents me from saying that all that you might describe as evil is in accord to God's determinate will, therefore no unnecessary evils can occurred. Since God is characterized as being omniscient and omnipo ...[text shortened]... unnecessary suffering is non-existent. (2) is false. God exists.
Since you have claimed that "evil is what God says is evil for man", it is clear that you subscribe to a Divine Command theory. That is fine, and perfectly consistent with my argument.
So, what specific claim of mine in the orginal argument or the defense of (2) are you taking issue with? Please point out, in the original argument or the defense of (2), the actual claim or inference I made that you think is false.
I didn't go to the trouble of presenting this argument rigorously just so I could then face vague objections that make no reference to the actual content of the arguments I have presented. If you can't be troubled to quote that actual content of my post that you take issue with, then I can't be troubled to take the time to try and read your mind or construct out of what you post a relevant objection to my argument.
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Originally posted by bbarr
Nothing at all prevents you from saying that all moral and natural evil is in accord with God's will. Where in the argument did I claim otherwise? If you reject premise (2), then you are claiming that there are no unnecessary evils in the ...[text shortened]... ruct out of what you post a relevant objection to my argument.
2) There has occurred at least one event E such that E brought about unnecessary suffering; suffering not logically necessary for the bringing about of greater good.
Within the framework of God's will, nothing can be called unnecessary by definition. Anything unnecessary would not exist. Therefore, unnecessary suffering is non-existent.
10) Premises (2) through (5) are true.
11) Hence, premise (1) is false; God does not exist.
(2) is false. (11) is false and (1) is true - God exists.
Originally posted by Coletti[b]2) There has occurred at least one event E such that E brought about unnecessary suffering; suffering not logically necessary for the bringing about of greater good.
Within the framework of God's will, nothing can be called unnecessary by definition. Anything unnecessary would not exist. Therefore, unnecessary suffering is non-e ...[text shortened]... s false; God does not exist.
[/quote]
(2) is false. (11) is false - God exists.
[/b]I completely agree that if God exists, then premise (2) must be false. However, I think that (2) is true, and hence that God does not exist. So, this is why I went to the trouble of writing pages of arguments in defense of premise (2). So far, you haven't given any arguments against my defense of premise (2). So, do you have any arguments against my defense of premise (2), or not?
Look, I completely agree that there is no logical contradiction between the claims that God exists and evil exists, because all evil could be necessary. The so-called 'logical problem of evil' is flawed, as I have pointed out multiple times in this thread. My defense of premise (2) involves trying to show that it is implausible that all evil is necessary, and that the theist has no good explanations to offer as to what justifies the existence of certain evils.
Now, do you have any arguments against my defense, or don't you? If you are content to claim merely that I haven't deductively proven that premise (2) is true, then O.K. That wasn't even my intention in this argument, so I have no problem granting that. In short, if your contention is that I haven't deductively proven that premise (2) is true, then your contention is completely irrelevant to the content of this thread (except that it is an illustration of an error that may help to inform others in the audience).
Originally posted by bbarrIf (2) can be disarmed by defining good and evil in terms of God's prescriptive will, then any defense of (2) is also a matter of definition.
I completely agree that if God exists, then premise (2) must be false. However, I think that (2) is true, and hence that God does not exist. So, this is why I went to the trouble of writing pages of arguments in defense of premise (2). So far, you haven't given any arguments against my defense of premise (2). So, do you have any arguments against my defen ...[text shortened]... (except that it is an illustration of an error that may help to inform others in the audience).
I'll try to address your defense of (2) in detail. I was hoping to convince you the easy way. Guess I'm being lazy. You did do an excellent job in taking down some of the common logical inconsistencies many theist hold - such as free will. (Actually, I think free-will works against an accounting for evil - but it's counter intuitive to say the least.)
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Originally posted by bbarrA few preliminary points:
[b]A General Argument from Evil:
God (def.): An entity that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
Omnipotent (def.): An entity G is omnipotent if and only if G can do anything that is logically possible.
Omniscient (d ...[text shortened]... ate in your response which premise you think is false any why.[/b][/b]
1. Nice argument. Both the original argument and the elaboration on premise (2) that followed.
2. IMO, most confirmed theists who can understand your arguments would've thought of the theodicy problem before. Those you'd expect not to realise what they believe in (paraphrasing your words) would probably not understand the argument.
That said, I'm withdrawing my objection to premise (2) for instances of moral evil. Instead, I am objecting to your definition of Morally Perfect - specificially the portion in bold below:
Morally Perfect (def): An entity G is morally perfect if and only if for any two acts, events, [or] states of affairs A and B, if A is morally preferable to B then G prefers that A occur or obtain rather than B, and G acts accordingly.
Further, I would propose to define "State of Affair" as:
State of Affair (def): Any logically possible configuration of acts or events for the Universe
Why is this important?
Suppose a moral agent M chooses to commit act A. Further, let ~A (not A) be morally preferable to A. I can write this using the '>' operator as:
~A > A ...(1)
God can prevent A from happening, but only by Himself committing another act B. Hence, B is a sufficient condition for A; or:
B => ~A ...(2a)
or
~B <= A ...(2b)
Also, suppose ~B is morally preferable to B.
~B > B ...(3)
Under your original definition of Morally Perfect (MP), God is obliged to commit B to cause ~A from happening (i.e. to prevent A) in (1). However, by the same definition, God is also obliged to commit ~B in (3). Your definition forces a logical falsehood.
If I remove the portions in bold from your definition, God is no longer obliged to act on (1) or (3) alone. Instead, God is only required to act on the relative moral preferability of the three states of affairs (A,~B), (~A,~B) and (~A,B). Of course, (A,B) is not possible because of (2a)/(2b). Suppose this relative ordering is:
(~A,~B) > (A,~B) > (~A,B) ...(4)
Under the revised definition of MP, God allows A to happen even though ~A is preferable to A.
Under the revised definition Premise 5 in your original argument no longer holds - hence I reject Premise 5 in conjunction with your definition of MP.
Originally posted by bbarrThat's a devasting piece of argumentation. What it amounts to is unpacking the implications of seriously ascribing to God the traditional trio of maximally flattering attributes, namely, omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence. Simultaneously ascribed, they impose upon God a heavy responsibility towards his creation that he does not appear to have empirically fulfilled. For a determined traditional theist, the argumentation illustrates just how much faith he or she must have.
In summary, rejection of premise (2) commits the theist to the claim that this is the best of all possible worlds, and that every instance of suffering, no matter how horrendous, is logically necessary (not just causally responsible) for the greater good. But this entails that libertarian freedom of the will is impossible. Further, when pressed concerning ...[text shortened]... y all the moral and natural evil in the world, the theist's three most plausible answers fail.
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Originally posted by lucifershammerErrata:
A few preliminary points:
1. Nice argument. Both the original argument and the elaboration on premise (2) that followed.
2. IMO, most confirmed theists who can understand your arguments would've thought of the theodicy problem b ...[text shortened]... ence I reject Premise 5 in conjunction with your definition of MP.
1. The definition for "State of Affair" should read Any logically possible configuration of acts or events for the Universe as a whole. The last three words were omitted.
2. God can prevent A ... sufficient condition for A should read God can prevent A ... sufficient condition for ~A. The last term should've been its negation.
Originally posted by lucifershammerYour objection is valid.
Errata:
1. The definition for "State of Affair" should read Any logically possible configuration of acts or events for the Universe [b]as a whole. The last three words were omitted.
2. God can prevent A ... sufficient condition for A should read God can prevent A ... sufficient condition for ~A. The last term should've been its negation.[/b]
According to Bennett's argument, if an innocent child were in agonizing pain (A), God should prefer that the innocent child would only be in mild pain (B, and therefore ~A), as B is morally preferable to A, and therefore God should act "accordingly" to bring about B. However, if an innocent child were in mild pain, then God should also prefer that the child should be altogether free of pain(C, and therefore ~B), and therefore act "accordingly" to being about C. This would lead God both to prefer B and ~B simultaneously, and get him in a right muddle.
However, the objection seems formal rather than substantive. Surely Bennett's argument could be easily restated so that God would prefer, given any well-defined class of options, that option among the entire class which lead to all nasty options logically unnecessary for bringing about a greater good to be avoided.
I think Bennet probably had in mind the idea that God would be surveying all possible choices, perhaps in temporal sequence, and that whenever he found any option B less nasty than another option A, where neither option was logically necessary to bring about some greater good, he would always choose option B, being both able to do (given his omniscience and omnipotence) and willing to do so (given his omnibenevolence).
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesThe commandment says "YOU shall not kill" (or murder). I don't recall God ever promising that HE wouldn't do it.
The Christian God can and does sin.
Consider the flood and the sixth commandment.
Now, if you say that when God breaks his own commandments, He's not really sinning because He's God, then sinning is something that is logically impossible for God, and thus his inability to sin does not take away his omnipotence as defined in the first post. You can't have it both ways.