Absolute experience

Originally posted by Starrman
Only if the series of events reduced the dubitability of their occuring cause. If each subsequent event does not, then number is not a consideration in their proof.

Could you explain, please?

Over the weekend, I happened to see Final Destination 3. The premise of the movie is ingenious - a teenager gets a premonition of a roller coaster crashing and killing all its passengers, including herself. Overcome by panic, she gets off the ride and gets several of her friends to get off the ride as well. Naturally, the ride crashes. A few weeks later, the kids who got off the ride start dying in freak accidents, and in the order in which they would've died had they been on the ride.

Now, if this were a real-life event, would you conclude that the series of events "reduced the dubitability" of concluding that a malevolent force was at work here?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
First, the event may be "common place" for me, but not for you. The likelihood of it's occurrence can vary widely depending on where one is. What's more, that will also affect your evaluation of the likelihood of something like that happening.

Second, what constitutes "demonstrable evidence"? If I told you that I saw a red bus yesterday, how can I ...[text shortened]... ay?

I didn't understand the second paragraph - could you restate the question, please?

You disagree that red busses are common place? Okay maybe they are painted different colours in different countries, but surely you agree that many people see red busses every day.

The existence of busses, that they can be coloured red and that people observe them is not in doubt. These factors considered, unless I have reason to believe that you are lying, it is common sensible to believe you. The existence of god and thus all events involving him is in question.

You originally posted: However, with religious experiences, I observe that this "common sense" way of looking at things is inverted.

I was asking if you consider it okay for events involving god to be of an inverse nature to the common sense view and how you justify this if you do.

Originally posted by Nordlys
Because it's something you haven't observed (you have only observed the prayer and the recovery, not the connection between them), and there are other possible causes. It's like when parents say that the vaccines made their children autistic, to take a non-spiritual example. The fact that two events coincide, or one of them happens right after the other one, doesn't tell us whether one of them caused the other one. It's just one possibility.

Big fan of Hume?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Could you explain, please?

Over the weekend, I happened to see Final Destination 3. The premise of the movie is ingenious - a teenager gets a premonition of a roller coaster crashing and killing all its passengers, including herself. Overcome by panic, she gets off the ride and gets several of her friends to get off the ride as well. Natural ...[text shortened]... of events "reduced the dubitability" of concluding that a malevolent force was at work here?

From your post I think you understand me, but to elucidate; an increase in events can only help if it is not their number that is important but the weight of evidence. If they do not improve the likelyhood of the event's explanation but rather decrease it (or perhaps have no real effect), then mere weight of numbers is no movement towards proof.

If I had been one of the kids in the event then yes, probably I would begin to think there was something afoot. I would not leave out the possibility that one of our group was responsible for the deaths though.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Big fan of Hume?

I am afraid my philosophical knowledge is too limited to even know whether I would be a fan of him. I vaguely remember learning something about him and his views a long time ago, that's all.

Originally posted by Starrman
You disagree that red busses are common place? Okay maybe they are painted different colours in different countries, but surely you agree that many people see red busses every day.

The existence of busses, that they can be coloured red and that people observe them is not in doubt. These factors considered, unless I have reason to believe that you are l ...[text shortened]... ng god to be of an inverse nature to the common sense view and how you justify this if you do.

Let me rephrase this another way - if I say that I saw a red bus yesterday, is your default position to start with my statement being true and then look for reasons why it might be false; or do you start with my statement being false and then look for reasons why it might be true?

My position is that, with most personal experiences, the first is true. However, with religious experiences, many people start with the second position. And that, I argue, is not "common sensical".

Originally posted by Nordlys
I am afraid my philosophical knowledge is too limited to even know whether I would be a fan of him. I vaguely remember learning something about him and his views a long time ago, that's all.

Essentially, Hume argued there was no such thing as real cause and effect. We simply observe a correspondence between events.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Essentially, Hume argued there was no such thing as real cause and effect. We simply observe a correspondence between events.

Okay. In that case, I wouldn't quite agree with him. I do believe in cause and effect. But I also believe that many, if not all humans have a tendency to jump to conclusions about cause and effect which may not always be true. They see two things happening and automatically assume that one is the cause of the other. They are often not even aware of doing this, but believe it's a simple observation.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Let me rephrase this another way - if I say that I saw a red bus yesterday, is your default position to start with my statement being true and then look for reasons why it might be false; or do you start with my statement being false and then look for reasons why it might be true?

My position is that, with most personal experiences, the first is tr ...[text shortened]... nces, many people start with the second position. And that, I argue, is not "common sensical".

If I tell you that a unicorn lives in my toilet, do you begin by believing me?

If I tell you that I have been sodomized by aliens from Gomorricon, do you begin by believing me?

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
If I tell you that a unicorn lives in my toilet, do you begin by believing me?

Of course. I will end up not believing you - but because I marshall sufficient evidence against your assertion.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Of course. I will end up not believing you - but because I marshall sufficient evidence against your assertion.

What if you are unable to gather such evidence?

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
What if you are unable to gather such evidence?

Then I would believe you.

How is a scientific theory tested?

Bayes has no need for legal presumption.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
My example is intended to point out that the normative state for us to evaluate each other's experiences is to believe them - not doubt them. If I tell you that I saw a red bus yesterday, you would normally believe me [b]unless you had prior reason to think otherwise.

However, with religious experiences, I observe that this "common sense" way of looking at things is inverted.[/b]

Normative evaluations of the beliefs and assertions of others are highly dependent on the content of the belief and the context of assertion. What reason is there for thinking that the same normative evaluative standards ought apply to each of the following claims?

1) I am experiencing joy.

2) I am experiencing joy brought about by brain state X.

3) I am experiencing joy brought about by elves.

4) I am experiencing joy brought about by God.

Our normal standards of evaluation are such that we do not doubt the phenomenological reports of introspection. But assertions 2 through 4 above go beyond phenomenological reports, and attribute certain causes to the phenomenology. Further, our standards of normative evaluation differ depending on the sort of cause that the experiencer attributes to his experience. We are prepared to grant 2, particularly when we have reason to believe that the experiencer is familiar with the brain. We are not prepared to grant 3, in any normal circumstance. Yet, you want us to grant claims like 4. Well, that requires showing why, in the general case claims like 4 are more reasonable than claims like 3, and that in turn will require providing evidence, not merely pointing out that people tend to grant claims like 1.

Originally posted by Starrman
The notion of gender relies on the presence of particular chromosomes, the fact that I have one X and one Y chromosome and not two X chromosomes makes me male. The fact that I am male cannot be demonstrated as having any other basis.

Why the reluctance and why the need for a clarification on the nature of gender?

You ONLY have one X and one Y chromosome? I'm worried about that - unless, of course, you mean one per cell (excepting, of course, your little swimmers).