-Removed-unnecessarily: not required for some greater good ie if the 'bad thing' didn't happen it would result in less harm overall, and there is no alternative action that could result in a better outcome.
And I agree with other posters that it is, in fact, an excellent argument for the non-existence of an omnimax God. I also don't see any counter argument being given other than 'I don't like the conclusion'.
I first came across this problem when reading the Narnia books as a child. There is this mysterious character Aslan that has a habit of showing up and showing off his enormous powers, but not being there at other times - when he presumably could have been. So the question is, if he is so powerful, where is he the rest of the time? No explanations are given as I have found out later in life is typical of C.S. Lewis.
-Removed-Thank you for the apology...no worries. I was trying to clarify, but I also apologize if I failed to help you in that regard.
However, no, the argument as stated does not simply collapse to the one line summary you provided. What you have done here (Freaky and sonship tried at various times in this thread the same approach, too) amounts to nothing more than setting up a straw man. Your summary misrepresents the original argument and fails to capture salient and material aspects of the original argument. This approach is fallacious and without merit.
If one is presented with some logical argument that one does not agree with, then there are obvious, well-established, and well-respected routes to take in counter-arguing. First, one can present reasons that purport to show that the logical structure of the argument is invalid in some way (for example, argue that the step from (8) to (9) is not inductively sound). Second, one can present reasons that purport to show that a specific premise, or multiple premises, is false or otherwise not reasonable in some way (basically, just pick a specific premise and make a clear case against it). Third, one can dismiss the argument on the grounds that definitions therein do not appropriately apply relevantly or consistently in some way (this is essentially what Zahlanzi has done in this thread, by saying that the definition of 'God' does not apply to his theistic conception and so, although the argument may be a problem for someone, it is no problem for him). All these approaches are perfectly acceptable and instances of applying them are characteristically deserving of attention, since they all speak to those ingredients an argument needs to succeed.
All these avenues are open to you and Freaky and sonship and others. And if the argument is really as bad as, say, Freaky makes it sound in his very vocal disgust, then it really should be an easy task to simply latch on to one of these avenues and make a cogent case against the argument. So, there's really no excuse to be so intellectually lazy as to collapse the argument down to a one-line straw man.
-Removed-Why would that follow? Do you agree with any argument that supports your theism? If so, then shame on you.
So you don't think I've provided any other position other than "I don't like the conclusion"
More or less, yes.
and you feel that your example of Narnia and Aslan is sufficient evidence supporting the premise in the OP?
No. I thought it was an interesting tidbit to throw into the conversation. It wasn't intended as evidence for the argument.
Edit: by the way, I note that you felt it necessary to explain to me (a mere theist) what unnecessarily means, but you did not define "unnecessarily" within the context and confines of this thread as my post requested.
I tried to define it specifically in the context and confines of this thread as your post requested. If I failed, could you point out in what way I failed?
-Removed-I have not read the whole thread, however I have read the OP, and the post by BigDoggProblem to which you replied.
I think I did a good job of defining it within the context of the OP and that post.
In this context "necessity" or the lack of it, is allegedly irrelevant because as LJ and GF point out it is either not permitted or not relevant to consider all outcomes of all possible "pluses and minuses" (as GF put it) of all the right or wrong making characteristics of actions.
I think you are mistaken here. Necessity or lack of it, is relevant and is key to the argument. It is however not relevant to consider all possible outcomes of all possible actions.
Whether something (I.e a wrong making characteristic of some sort - animals burning in the forrest) is "necessary" or "unnecessary" is exactly what this thread is about. Or partly, anyway.
I agree.
I still don't see what was wrong with my definition.
-Removed-
it is impossible to consider all the right and/or wrong making characteristics within a holistic multi-permutation of outcomes, I.e. Unless the observer has all the outcomes in view he cannot make a logical judgement about an event further upstream in the cascade....without all the facts relating to the cascade of causality of a particular characteristic downstream (e.g. death, suffering, life saving cure), it is impossible to make a judgement on a characteristic further upstream.
First, you still seem to be treating it as though discourse concerning rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics of some morally relevant action proceeds exclusively and exhaustively through considerations of the outcomes of (relevant consequences of) that action. As I mentioned, this seems to be a thoroughly consequentialist view (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ ) of right- and wrongmaking, and there's no good reason I see for adopting this view. Although I think consideration of consequences is morally relevant, it is not so to the exclusion of other considerations.
Second, you are claiming that if one does not know "all the facts relating to the cascade of causality of a particular characteristic downstream...it is impossible to make a judgement on a characteristic further upstream". I still think there is some notional confusion here. What you are saying, I think, is that one cannot know if something counts as, say, a wrongmaking characteristic of an action if one does not have exhaustive knowledge of all the consequences that may issue from the action by virtue of having that specific characteristic. But this just confuses and conflates a wrongmaking characteristic with combinations of rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics. The point of a "wrongmaking characteristic" is that it counts negatively toward the moral status of an action prima facie, or "at first appearance". It is NOT something that confers moral wrongness on the action ultima facie or "all things considered". The all things exhaustively considered moral status of the action is only determined by the net balance of all right- and wrongmaking characteristics.
Let me give you an example to clarify what I mean here. Let's suppose S does something to another person, T, with the explicit intention to both benefit himself/herself and cause T harm. This is surely a morally deficient intention on the part of S: the intention is not only selfish but also involves deliberate harm to another person. It's clear, prima facie, that the property of having such an intention is a wrongmaking characteristic of that action, is it not? But, according to you that is not clear because I have not given any information yet regarding exhaustive knowledge of the consequences that actually ensued from the action by virtue of having that property. So, suppose that, in fact, S was wrong about what his or her action would achieve and the actual outcome ended up being that both S and T were benefitted by the action. Now according to you, then, we can only categorize the intentional property described once we have this further information about the outcomes; and then, I guess, we have to what...? Label it a rightmaking characteristic? That's just absurd, and you're confusing prima facie and ultima facie judgment of the moral status of the action. It's not clear in such a case that the outcome owes specifically to the intention described; perhaps it owes instead to S's inability to successfully bring the object of the intention about. But even if you assume that this outcome is part of the causal "cascade" owing predominantly to this intentional property of the action, the correct analysis of this case is that, as I already mentioned, the property of having that intention was a wrongmaking characteristic of the action. The property of resulting in the actual all-around good outcome described is by contrast presumably a rightmaking characteristic. The all things considered moral status of the action is then determined by the net balance of these (supposing they exhaust the relevant rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics in this case); and determination of that may depend on what type of account the reader brings to the table; whether you think it is weightier to have a malicious intention or to have a good outcome. Does this make sense?
Furthermore, I do not understand how you think these considerations affect the argument. Are these objections intended to be against a specific premise of the argument? If so, which one? Or are you trying to show that something absurd results when we apply such a "rightmaking" and "wrongmaking" accounting scheme to determining moral status (like, you think it results in our not being able to reach any conclusions about moral status because we will not have exhaustive access to the relevant considerations)? I am just trying to figure out what you are trying to argue against here.
EDIT: Sorry, this was once again a wordy example. However, for what it is worth, I am not just trying to bamboozle you.
Originally posted by LemonJelloI don't know that I've seen so many words used to say so little before.
[quote]it is impossible to consider all the right and/or wrong making characteristics within a holistic multi-permutation of outcomes, I.e. Unless the observer has all the outcomes in view he cannot make a logical judgement about an event further upstream in the cascade....without all the facts relating to the cascade of causality of a particular characte ...[text shortened]... ce again a wordy example. However, for what it is worth, I am not just trying to bamboozle you.
If you can't state your case simply and with few words, you have a colossal problem on your hands.
Originally posted by FreakyKBHHeh, in the other thread, my reply is too short for you.
I don't know that I've seen so many words used to say so little before.
If you can't state your case simply and with few words, you have a colossal problem on your hands.
Are you just one of those people who's never satisfied?
Originally posted by LemonJelloLemonJello
[quote]it is impossible to consider all the right and/or wrong making characteristics within a holistic multi-permutation of outcomes, I.e. Unless the observer has all the outcomes in view he cannot make a logical judgement about an event further upstream in the cascade....without all the facts relating to the cascade of causality of a particular characte ...[text shortened]... ce again a wordy example. However, for what it is worth, I am not just trying to bamboozle you.
EDIT: Sorry, this was once again a wordy example. However, for what it is worth, I am not just trying to bamboozle you.
13. "The beginning of the words of his mouth is foolishness: and the end of his talk is mischievous madness. 14. A fool also is full of words: a man cannot tell what shall be and what shall be after him, who can tell him?" Ecclesiastes 10:13-14
Originally posted by Grampy BobbyBig talk from the guy who ran away from this thread because the argument's conclusion was 'too dreary.'
LemonJello
[b]EDIT: Sorry, this was once again a wordy example. However, for what it is worth, I am not just trying to bamboozle you.
13. "The beginning of the words of his mouth is foolishness: and the end of his talk is mischievous madness. 14. A fool also is full of words: a man cannot tell what shall be and what shall be after him, who can tell him?" Ecclesiastes 10:13-14[/b]