Originally posted by LemonJello
I'm going to try enter this discussion slowly. I don't find the Eskimo argument very convincing (as it relates to the Cosmological Argument [CA]) for a couple reasons:
1. Yes, it is true that we cannot separate the universe "itself" from the entities which comprise the universe. But the CA, I think, does not require otherwise. It only requires that ...[text shortened]... ories of each individual Eskimo constitute an adequate explanation of the resultant group.
It only requires that we be able to reasonably talk about the universe itself as a set -- a set of entities; and that we be able to speak about sets as being necessary or contingent.
Maybe you can flesh this out for me a bit. For example, should the universe be considered as the set of all sets, or not? Does it make sense to speak of the universe-set itself as an effect needing a cause? Is it necessary to “reach outside” the universe in order to be able to talk about it as a set, as opposed to simply talking about its elements and their relationships? (I would think that’s not really possible.) I’m not strong on set theory, so maybe I am missing something.
Also, with regard to the “analogy problem,” can the universe-set be simply treated like other sets within the universe?
The Hume-ian argument (that to explain a set it is sufficient to explain each and every member of the set) may or may not be correct.
Well, Russell’s argument here, in his debate with Father Copleston, was not that such an explanation is sufficient,
if by sufficiency is meant
complete. His argument was that such a complete explanation is not possible—at least without question-begging of the sort that I tried to show.
Is this a Humean argument? I presented as a different one from the Hume/Blackburn argument in my III.