But Marge....

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]vistesd - I hope you're reading this.

I am. I don’t know if we’re in disagreement or not, as I would use a wholly different terminology (without regard to the dictionary here)—

Love: a passionate concern and caring for the beloved. I agree that that is antithetical to “controlling” the beloved, but it is not antithetical to seeing the beloved ...[text shortened]... ght of Rob's post above, I'm going to offer "sharing" as the alternative to "submission."[/b]

I didn't use the word "submission". I spoke of being vulnerable, of relinquishing control. Here's another phrase for you (a favourite of JPII's) - 'complete self-giving'. The submissiveness that gives rise to fascism is an extreme form, in an unhealthy context. Just as being vulnerable and relinquishing control with your boss as you would with a spouse is unhealthy.

I wonder how much of the debate is really a debate over terminology.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
“How things are” is a different question from “Why things are the way they are.”

The first is merely descriptive ("Things that are thrown up come down" ). The second presumes a coherent and rational structure to the Universe ("Things that are thrown up come down because of gravity" ).

Suppose you ask: “Why is there anything at e definition of the term “God”?

Sure. Just give me time till the Final Judgment. 😉

The first is merely descriptive ("Things that are thrown up come down" ). The second presumes a coherent and rational structure to the Universe ("Things that are thrown up come down because of gravity" ).

“Gravity” is not a descriptive answer? Why does the fact of gravity need a “metaphysical” explanation? Why does the apparent fact that the universe has a coherent structure need such an explanation?

No, it doesn't. But it does mean that you are conceding that the contingent Universe you inhabit really has no reason for being what it is; it is an effect without a cause. You are, effectively, conceding that fundamental notions of reason such as causality don't apply to your Universe.

Causality applies within the universe—an aspect of its coherent structure. If by “universe” we mean the “all of all of all of it," whence the need to ascribe a cause to that? And how does the proposal of a supernatural being “transcendent to” the universe resolve the question without the assumption that such a being is itself causa sui? Why does that assumption not carry a greater burden of proof than the one that the universe itself is causa sui?

By positing the supernatural, you are introducing a whole other category of “reality” that is presumably also rational and coherent, and then positing within that cartegorical framework a causa sui. It seems to me that it is only in light of that attempt to step outside the natural universe, that the universe itself, as a whole, can be treated as an effect in need of a cause.*

* In fact--though I'm still thinking about this--I'm not sure that it isn't a matter of question-begging...

EDIT: pointing to Wittgenstein quote below...

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't agree with any of that.

As consequence: God didn't really love anyone until he made Himself vulnerable through the human form of Jesus, I presume. And God loves us; ergo He cannot be in control.

EDIT: Nevermind, God's lack of control may be explained with the existence of human free will, I presume.

I always sorta thought that if an all- ...[text shortened]... creating is itself an act of vulnerability? Besides, creation implies control, doesn't it?

I was about to answer free will to your first question, but you've beaten me to the punch.

But Creation itself is an act of love, of being vulnerable to the fate of the Created, of opening oneself up to hurt, rejection and disappointment (especially if some created beings have free will).

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I didn't use the word "submission". I spoke of being vulnerable, of relinquishing control. Here's another phrase for you (a favourite of JPII's) - 'complete self-giving'. The submissiveness that gives rise to fascism is an extreme form, in an unhealthy context. Just as being vulnerable and relinquishing control with your boss as you would with a spouse is unhealthy.

I wonder how much of the debate is really a debate over terminology.

Well, let's just not debate the meaning and nature of "true" love... 🙂

"The mystical is not how the world is, but that it is." (Wittgenstein). And for Wittgenstein, the mystical comes under the heading of that “whereof we cannot speak” and therefore, “thereof we must remain silent.”

Originally posted by lucifershammer
And, no, I am not just a "worthless sinner" to my "big pal in the sky" (funny; I encountered that expression in a book on the Philosophy of Religion yesterday -- as an example of people you shouldn't try discussing philosophy with) either. I am, objectively, a worthless sinner but, since my "big pal" wants to save me anyway, He endows me with worth by his saving action.

I was tempted to write a post about how you had an inherant self worth independant of your big pal, but I couldn't bring myself to do it.

Originally posted by vistesd
"The mystical is not how the world is, but that it is." (Wittgenstein). And for Wittgenstein, the mystical comes under the heading of that “whereof we cannot speak” and therefore, “thereof we must remain silent.”

I thought the first quote was the later Wittgenstein, who pretty much completely rejected his earlier work in the Tractatus.

EDIT: Just wanted to point out what I think is a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein. 🙂

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I thought the first quote was the later Wittgenstein, who pretty much completely rejected his earlier work in the Tractatus.

EDIT: Just wanted to point out what I think is a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein. 🙂

Might be, but Wittgenstein did not reject the Tractatus en toto; he did reject logical atomism and replaced his notion of "elementary propositions" with "language games," I believe.

Also, both quotes are from the Tractatus.

From: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/ --

The later Wittgenstein holds, as he did in the Tractatus, that philosophers do not -- or should not -- supply a theory, neither do they provide explanations. "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, nor deduces anything. -- Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain" (PI 126). The anti-theoretical stance is reminiscent of the early Wittgenstein, but there are manifest differences. Although the Tractatus precludes philosophical theories, it does construct a systematic edifice which results in the general form of the proposition, all the while relying on strict formal logic; the Investigations points out the therapeutic non-dogmatic nature of philosophy, verily instructing philosophers in the ways of therapy. "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose" (PI 127). Working with reminders and series of examples, different problems are solved. Unlike the Tractatus which advanced one philosophical method, in the Investigations "there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (PI 133). This is directly related to Wittgenstein's eschewal of the logical form or of any a-priori generalization that can be discovered or made in philosophy. Trying to advance such general theses is a temptation which lures philosophers; but the real task of philosophy is both to make us aware of the temptation and to show us how to overcome it. Consequently "a philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don't know my way about.’" (PI 123), and hence the aim of philosophy is "to shew the fly out of the fly-bottle" (PI 309).
...
Still, it is precisely via the subject of the nature of philosophy that the fundamental continuity between these two stages, rather than the discrepancy between them, is to be found. In both cases philosophy serves, first, as critique of language. It is through analyzing language's illusive power that the philosopher can expose the traps of meaningless philosophical formulations. This means that what was formerly thought of as a philosophical problem may now dissolve "and this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear" (PI 133). Two implications of this diagnosis, easily traced back in the Tractatus, are to be recognized. One is the inherent dialogical character of philosophy, which is a responsive activity: difficulties and torments are encountered which are then to be dissipated by philosophical therapy. In the Tractatus, this took the shape of advice: "The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science ... and then whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions" (TLP 6.53) The second, more far- reaching, "discovery" in the Investigations "is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to" (PI 133). This has been taken to revert back to the ladder metaphor and the injunction to silence in the Tractatus.

Originally posted by vistesd
“Gravity” is not a descriptive answer? Why does the fact of gravity need a “metaphysical” explanation? Why does the apparent fact that the universe has a coherent structure need such an explanation?

Gravity (more generally, the idea of gravitational forces) is not merely a description of what happens ("things go up, then they come down"😉 but the first step in the search for why; i.e. the search for cause.

It is not so much the fact that the universe has a coherent structure (I see you used the adjective "apparent"😉 that needs explanation, but that the universe is what it is when it needn't have been so (i.e. it is contingent). And, if the universe (the physical or "natural" universe) can just be what it is for no reason at all, then why must one suppose there is a cause behind the entities within it? Why must one suppose that there is a reason why objects thrown up come down?

Note - the problem is not in the "brute fact" or the coherence, it is in the contingency of the universe. A thing that is contingent could have been otherwise and requires an explanation as to why it is precisely what it is and not the alternatives; i.e. it is an effect that requires a cause. This is part of the reason why some scientists/philosophers posit an Infinite Worlds' Hypothesis - that our [contingent] universe is just one among an infinity of contingent universes that exhaust all the possibilities.

I'll come to the second half of your post presently and hope to be able to write about a necessary cause (i.e. one that must be what it is of logical necessity, regardless of the particular universe). Since a necessary being is due to logical necessity, one needn't look for a further cause for it.

Originally posted by vistesd
Might be, but Wittgenstein did not reject the Tractatus en toto; he did reject logical atomism and replaced his notion of "elementary propositions" with "language games," I believe.

Also, both quotes are from the Tractatus.

From: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/ --

The later Wittgenstein holds, as he did in the Tractatus, tha ...[text shortened]... to the ladder metaphor and the injunction to silence in the Tractatus.

My mistake then.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Gravity (more generally, the idea of gravitational forces) is not merely a description of what happens ("things go up, then they come down"😉 but the first step in the search for why; i.e. the search for cause.

It is not so much the fact that the universe has a coherent structure (I see you used the adjective "apparent"😉 that needs explanatio sary being is due to logical necessity, one needn't look for a further cause for it.

Gravity (more generally, the idea of gravitational forces) is not merely a description of what happens ("things go up, then they come down" but the first step in the search for why; i.e. the search for cause.

Perhaps I should have been clearer: I meant to distinguish physical explanation from metaphysical explanation.

And, if the universe (the physical or "natural" universe) can just be what it is for no reason at all, then why must one suppose there is a cause behind the entities within it? Why must one suppose that there is a reason why objects thrown up come down?

The empirical argument, for one, is that we suppose cause because we observe cause and effect, and generalize inductively from our observations within the universe itself. Not the only argument, and I'm not sure that one must find "just one."

In any event, the very causality you are talking about is a feature of the universe (including ourselves in it). By your argument, any coherent feature of a system--indeed the system's coherency itself--needs a causal explanation from outside that system; except that you do not apply that to God. It is no less logical to stop the regression at the "universe as a whole" than it is to posit a further supernatural being, and then stop by fiat there. It seems to me to be an error to treat the universe-as-a-whole just as you treat entities within that universe. (Fallacy of Composition?)

With or without the "infinite universes hypothesis," (in which case the "cosmos"--if we need a word for the whole--is an infinte set), there is no logical necessity for a supernatural being. One could just as well say that the cosmos has certain natural properties that are not accessible by human reason or empiricism that determine its coherence (that would not be logically different from assuming a supernatural being--you are still just positing a point beyond which we cannot reason, and end by fiat the causal regression).

BTW, the world could not be otherwise than it is--in terms of the logic of its coherence--and us still carry on this logical discussion. 🙂

For the rest, it seems to me you are making a variation of the cosmological argument. So I will take some time to read up on the refutations...

Just a note on my word "apparent" in speaking of the coherence of the cosmos--I was (clumsily) just trying to bypass the question of whether some of the coherency is in the external world, or in the architecture of our consciousness. I don't think it matters for this discussion, since we are part of the cosmos and its coherency.

You can assume that at this point I am a representational realist; whether I'll change that depends on further studies. I think we can cast our discussion in terms of direct realism at least for simplicity's sake.

I look forward to your presentation re a necessary being...

Originally posted by vistesd
Gravity (more generally, the idea of gravitational forces) is not merely a description of what happens ("things go up, then they come down" but the first step in the search for why; i.e. the search for cause.

Perhaps I should have been clearer: I meant to distinguish physical explanation from metaphysical explanation.

And, if the universe (t cosmological argument. So I will take some time to read up on the refutations...

I'm going to pull together points from your previous two posts.

v: it seems to me you are making a variation of the cosmological argument.

I am using part of a cosmological argument. I'm not sure which, but I think it is a variation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

v: Causality applies within the universe—an aspect of its coherent structure.
v: The empirical argument, for one, is that we suppose cause because we observe cause and effect, and generalize inductively from our observations within the universe itself.

In order to generalize inductively, we must have a reasonable basis for believing that causality is universal within the universe; i.e. every effect has a cause. However, you are also saying that the universe as a whole does not have a cause, despite the fact that it is identifiable as an effect (because of its contingency). If the system (i.e. the universe) as a whole does not possess a particular property (i.e. causality), how do you have an adequate basis for judging that the very same property is universal to every part of the system?

v: By your argument, any coherent feature of a system--indeed the system's coherency itself--needs a causal explanation from outside that system

That is not my argument at all. I am not arguing that the coherence of the universe needs a priori explanation. I am saying that, given the "brute fact" of the incoherence as the universe as a whole, there is no reason to suppose the universality of coherence within the universe.

v: And how does the proposal of a supernatural being “transcendent to” the universe resolve the question without the assumption that such a being is itself causa sui? Why does that assumption not carry a greater burden of proof than the one that the universe itself is causa sui?
v: By your argument, any coherent feature of a system--indeed the system's coherency itself--needs a causal explanation from outside that system; except that you do not apply that to God. It is no less logical to stop the regression at the "universe as a whole" than it is to posit a further supernatural being, and then stop by fiat there.

First of all, I must stress that nothing I've written so far necessitates that the proximate supernatural cause to the universe must be God. It could be a necessary being (which we may call God); it could be another contingent being (or a series of beings) that is itself caused by a necessary being (as the neo-Platonists assumed with their theory of "emanations"😉; or it could be just an infinite series of contingent supernatural beings. I'm not proferring a proof of God; I'm trying to demonstrate the weaker claim that, since the universe is not causa sui, it must have a 'supernatural' cause "beyond" it.

Now, let's ask the question of what it means for something to be causa sui (a term I'm not fond of, btw). A detour into mathematics might clear things a bit. Given a random quadrilateral, we don't know what the individual angles of its corners are (we know the sum of these angles - but not the angles themselves). Now, suppose you are given a random rectangle. Why is it that all its angles are right angles? It follows, of logical necessity from the definition of a rectangle (e.g. a parallelogram with one right angle). This idea of logical necessity is they key to causa sui.

For a thing to be causa sui, that it is must be a sufficient explanation of why it is what it is. Put another way, were it any other way, there would ensue a logical contradiction. Can a contingent thing (such as the universe) be causa sui? Contingency means that it could have been otherwise with no logical contradictions. When a contingent thing exists, its mere fact of existence does not tell us why it exists as it is (e.g. why do we have this particular universe instead of any other coherent alternates?).

A necessary being, on the other hand, could not possibly be any other way. That it is is a sufficient explanation of what it is. A necessary being, and only a necessary being, can be causa sui.

That is why the person claiming that the universe is causa sui has the greater burden of proof - he has to demonstrate that it is a necessary being and that no other universe but the one we live in is coherent; i.e. entails no logical contradictions.

v: there is no logical necessity for a supernatural being. One could just as well say that the cosmos has certain natural properties that are not accessible by human reason or empiricism that determine its coherence (that would not be logically different from assuming a supernatural being--you are still just positing a point beyond which we cannot reason, and end by fiat the causal regression)

As I wrote above, I am not saying the causal regression has to end -- but if it ends, it can only end at a necessary being. And the universe is clearly not such a being - there is no reason I can think of why (say) the value of G (the universal gravitational constant) should not be anything but it is. The person who claims that certain "mystical" properties belong to the universe which determines its coherence is either ignoring the clear evidence of our senses and therefore has the burden of proof to demonstrate why such properties must exist; or is making exactly the same argument as the supernaturalist (and therefore posits the existence of the supernatural - even if he gives it another name) but refuses to admit it.

Originally posted by vistesd
Just a note on my word "apparent" in speaking of the coherence of the cosmos--I was (clumsily) just trying to bypass the question of whether some of the coherency is in the external world, or in the architecture of our consciousness. I don't think it matters for this discussion, since we are part of the cosmos and its coherency.

It does matter because, if the coherence is entirely in the architecture of our consciousness (Kant?), then objective knowledge is impossible.

Originally posted by vistesd
BTW, the world could not be otherwise than it is--in terms of the logic of its coherence--and us still carry on this logical discussion. 🙂

That's the Anthropic principle, isn't it?

Were the world otherwise, perhaps another LH and vistesd would have this discussion. Even if there were no one to have the discussion, the arguments themselves would be valid.