Calling out KellyJay

Originally posted by LemonJello
Here is the Dallas Willard essay link again:

http://www.dwillard.org/articles/artview.asp?artID=42

DW opens with some discussion about some argument that he attributes to Nielsen. DW appears here to be defending against some version of theological noncognitivism. Since I am also generally not a noncognitivist regarding theological discourse, I gue ...[text shortened]... is a problem here.

Before we move to Stages 2 or 3, what is your take on Stage 1?

What is your definition of 'non-physical'? Is a force field physical, for instance? Are virtual particles physical? What is your definition of physical?

Originally posted by twhitehead
I get it now.
I would question 1.2 and ask:
a) Does every entity of physical reality owe its existence to another element of physical reality? If so, then the whole argument results in a contradiction proving the premises wrong.
b) If some elements of physical reality owe their existence to non-physical entities, then do we have known examples of this? ...[text shortened]... nt, then I would think that knowing the validity of 1.2 would be impossible. I find it circular.

I get it now.

I guess I would add that the argument strictly speaking is clearly NOT valid (for example, if the premises are true they presumably would show that there has existed at some point the non-physical state that DW has in mind, but it would not follow that any such thing still exists). But DW in fact explicitly already acknowledges this in his essay. So I said I would "roughly" grant it is valid. Or we could simply revise 1.C to state that such a thing has existed (not to imply that it still exists). From the essay, it seems DW would be okay with that too.

a) Does every entity of physical reality owe its existence to another element of physical reality? If so, then the whole argument results in a contradiction proving the premises wrong.

Of course, DW would simply deny that every entity of physical reality owes (or has owed) its existence to another element of physical reality.

I'm not sure I understand your other criticism. Are you saying that DW's argument is circular?

Originally posted by sonhouse
What is your definition of 'non-physical'? Is a force field physical, for instance? Are virtual particles physical? What is your definition of physical?

Although I am not an expert on what is physical, I believe anything that is not
spiritual is physical or at least has some physical component. I believe the
spiritual, if strong enough, may produce the same effect of something physical.
I believe the physical can be experienced through sight, smell, taste, sound, or
touch associated with the senses of the brain. In contrast, the spiritual is usually
sensed through the mind or soul in association with the spirit of man.

Originally posted by JS357
This would be better with a thread title that is easier to remember, so as to know where to look.

Some comments.

"Every entity of physical reality owes its existence to something other than itself."

That awfully anthropomorphic. I think it has to start with this: "Apparently, every physical state of affairs E(n) that is instantiated, is preceded spati stion now is, what are we rationally compelled to say about E(0)'s non-physical provenance?

Yes, DW uses some anthropomorphic language. More troubling than that, he is very vague about just what exactly he means when he talks about some thing owing its existence to something else. This is unfortunate for his argument.

I'm a little confused about the rest. Are you saying the rest constitutes a better restatement of DW's premises 1.2 and 1.3? Or are you saying the rest constitutes the start of a better argument than DW's argument?

The idea that every E(n) has antecedent(s) sufficient for its instantiation is false. For instance, quantum indeterminacy entails that it is false.

And how would modern cosmology show that there cannot be an unlimited series of physical states culminating in any given E(n)?

Originally posted by sonhouse
What is your definition of 'non-physical'? Is a force field physical, for instance? Are virtual particles physical? What is your definition of physical?

DW's argument does not really go into such details. I would say this is unfortunate for his argument.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I'm not sure I understand your other criticism. Are you saying that DW's argument is circular?

Yes, I think his argument is circular. I think he cannot know premise 1.2 without having used his argument to support it.

Possibly worse, is that I think the conclusion that non-physical entities can lead to physical entities would also make 1.2 unknowable. If we for example accept that God made the universe, then we might also accept miracles, and the possibility that angels occasionally make extra atoms here and there. But if extra atoms are popping into existence can we really know whether it is angels or causing this? If we do not know that angels are the cause, then how did we know there was a cause?

Originally posted by LemonJello
(1.3) For any physical entity E, the series of causes eventuating in E's being must be structured such that this series has a first term.

Does he explain why this is not the case for non-physical entities?

Originally posted by JS357
That awfully anthropomorphic. I think it has to start with this: "Apparently, every physical state of affairs E(n) that is instantiated, is preceded spatio-temporally by a different physical state of affairs E(n-1) such that the instantiation of E(n-1) is sufficient for the instantiation of E(n). The manifold of states of physical states of affairs preceding E(n) we call its physical provenance.

This is a basic tenet of science and courtroom drama.

Are you saying here that the future is predetermined from a given state, or simply that certain futures are possible from a given state? The former is entirely causal, the latter is not.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Yes, DW uses some anthropomorphic language. More troubling than that, he is very vague about just what exactly he means when he talks about some thing owing its existence to something else. This is unfortunate for his argument.

I'm a little confused about the rest. Are you saying the rest constitutes a better restatement of DW's premises 1.2 and 1.3 ...[text shortened]... ow that there cannot be an unlimited series of physical states culminating in any given E(n)?

You are right, "owes" is his word. I guess I would prefer to argue the best-stated case, but I see the difficulty with that too. Proponents of the case should be the ones to state the case; then if their statement of the case has flaws, they should be the ones to improve it. Otherwise they can claim "straw man" to any case constructed by a non-advocate.

Originally posted by sonhouse
What is your definition of 'non-physical'? Is a force field physical, for instance? Are virtual particles physical? What is your definition of physical?

omit post sorry

Originally posted by LemonJello
Here is the Dallas Willard essay link again:

http://www.dwillard.org/articles/artview.asp?artID=42

DW opens with some discussion about some argument that he attributes to Nielsen. DW appears here to be defending against some version of theological noncognitivism. Since I am also generally not a noncognitivist regarding theological discourse, I gue ...[text shortened]... is a problem here.

Before we move to Stages 2 or 3, what is your take on Stage 1?

One additional comment:

This sort of argument for the existence of God has been presented so many times and in so many different ways that I think the reader of such arguments deserves something from the author of a new presentation. It is for the author, DW in this case, to outline how his argument differs from, and corrects for, previously flawed arguments. (And if there is a previous argument that is not flawed, why present a new one? Just cite the correct one!)

I think one major flaw in any argument based on an entirely causal universe, is that it contradicts the form of free will that the arguments proponents usually also believe in.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Yes, I think his argument is circular. I think he cannot know premise 1.2 without having used his argument to support it.

Possibly worse, is that I think the conclusion that non-physical entities can lead to physical entities would also make 1.2 unknowable. If we for example accept that God made the universe, then we might also accept miracles, and the ...[text shortened]... using this? If we do not know that angels are the cause, then how did we know there was a cause?

I do not see how the argument is circular, but I definitely think his premise 1.2 is just not adequately supported at all. The other problem I see with it is that DW is rather vague about what exactly 1.2 means.

Possibly worse, is that I think the conclusion that non-physical entities can lead to physical entities would also make 1.2 unknowable.

For this criticism, I am not sure it is that problematic per se. Suppose that DW had some set of reasons, R, that lend significant support to 1.2. Now, suppose that we conjoin R with the idea that non-physical entities can bring about physical entities. This inclusion does not seem problematic at all for DW, since the idea that some physical entities owe their being to some non-physical entities is still fully consistent with 1.2, which demands that every physical entity owes its existence to something other than itself. So, prima facie, I do not see this as problematic for DW.

However, it is problematic for DW that he appears to have no such R in the first place.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Does he explain why this is not the case for non-physical entities?

No, not adequately.

Since DW's argument for why a series of causes eventuating in some state must have a first term has nothing to do with the type of state at issue (whether physical or non-physical); he is, as far as I am concerned, fully committed to the idea that if some non-physical state eventuates from some series of causes, then that series must have a first term. His argument for why such series must have a first term only has to do with considerations of the nature of inifinity; it appears to have nothing to do with the type of state (whether physical or non-physical) that eventuates.

However, it is not the case that DW thinks that all non-physical entities eventuated (or came into) being. For instance, he explicitly holds that God did not come into being. Does DW adequately explain or justify why it is explanatorily satisfactory that this may be the case for non-physical entities but not for physical entities? No, I do not think he does.

Originally posted by JS357
One additional comment:

This sort of argument for the existence of God has been presented so many times and in so many different ways that I think the reader of such arguments deserves something from the author of a new presentation. It is for the author, DW in this case, to outline how his argument differs from, and corrects for, previously flawed argument ...[text shortened]... re is a previous argument that is not flawed, why present a new one? Just cite the correct one!)

Explaining how his version of the cosmological argument differs from or corrects for previous versions is not in any way the focus or point of his essay. If this is what you are looking for, you will not find it in this essay. At any rate, his version is neither original nor particularly clear nor all that good.

Here, I just wanted to understand and analyze DW's argument for what it actually is. This is a project or exercise that I owe to KellyJay. So far, no one has even stated that they actually agree with my own restatement of DW's argument. However, I think we can all agree that the argument, as I stated it, has many flaws.