Originally posted by KellyJay
Sorry for my long delay, life has me jumping through hoops of late.
"Accepting 1.2 appears to commit us to denying that there could be elements of the physical world that are either (a) simply brute, in that they are not explained by anything or (b) metaphysically random. And I see no reason for doing this, and DW does not seem to actually offer reasons ...[text shortened]... , so are these just things that "COULD" be a cause, but
we have no examples for?
Kelly
Sorry for my long delay, life has me jumping through hoops of late.
No worries. 🙂
What has caused you to believe that there could be either something that
falls into your 'a' or 'b'
Concerning category a, I would say that my considerations and introspections on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) have led me to believe that it is highly likely that are at least some brute facts or brute aspects to reality. Honestly, when I consider a strong version of the PSR (such as one that states there must be an explanation of the existence of any entity and of any positive fact whatever), I am left wondering how such a demand could
even in principle be satisfied. For example, in the cosmological argument, there is often discussion regarding "dependent" entities (roughly, this is an entity whose existence is explained by the causal activity of other entities); "necessary" entities (roughly, this is an entity that must exist or exists in every possible world or some such); "self-existent" entities (roughly, this is an entity whose existence is putatively explained by its own nature or some such) . No matter how these play out, I do not see any getting around at least some brute fact. Consider the possible options. You could hold that there are only dependent entities where every dependent entity is explained by others in some infinite or circular string. Fine, but you still have a brute fact: the fact that there are and always have been dependent entities. You could try to get around this by positing that there is at least one necessary or self-existent entity that explains why there are also dependent entities. Fine, but if it is a necessary entity, then what explains this necessary entity's existence? Nothing as far as I can tell: a necessary entity by definition must exist and is a case where it just could not be otherwise, which fails in my book as any sort of substantive or non-ersatz explanation. And in the case of a so-called self-existent entity, I disagree that there could be such a thing whose existence is explained by its nature. I take that to be nonsense, on the grounds that existence is not a predicate: since existence is not a predicate, it cannot be part of the nature of a thing that this thing exists; however you want to conceptualize the nature of a thing, it is still a further question whether that thing exists, whether or not that concept is instantiated. Basically, if I play out all the conceivable options in my mind, there remains at least some brute fact in all of them.
Concerning category b, I would say that my study of quantum, for example, has led me to believe that it is highly plausible that are countless physical events that are random or uncaused. Twhitehead brought up the roll of a die as an example of a random event. I think DW could very easily object to this type of example on the following grounds. It may well be the case that the outcome of some die roll is determined. The specification of the universe just prior to the roll may be sufficient to bring about a particular outcome; it may well be that the die's coming up some particular number had causally sufficient antecedents, in which case it was not random. (Of course, we may still call it 'random', but that would just reflect an epistemic matter; given our epistemic limitations we may still only be able to assign some epistemic probability of the die roll's having a given outcome which reflects the ideal rational confidence or credence level one should have given our information and cognitive limitations). So these examples may fail to show that one ought to reject DW's premise. However, I think there are other considerations that show there likely are many random events, in a more robust sense. Honestly, I am a little confused on what exactly DW means when he talks of some entity's owing its existence to something else. But, based on my reading, I take it that metaphysical randomness would be problematic for his argument.