Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI can't speak for what others were taught in Catholic schools or for anything more recent than 30+ years ago, but the OT books regarding the ancient Israelites were generally treated with some skepticism. The RCC teachers didn't want to say that God actually approved of the atrocities committed throughout Joshua and other parts of the OT and implied that this was "Jewish" history and that the Jewish authors had justified such monstrous crimes by using the "God said to do it" defense. Rather oddly though, they always treated the story of Moses, which included the slaughter of the first born, as an absolute historical event.
Sounds like another case of Simon Says. They teach it's true without "officially" teaching that it's true. Shameful that they'd run such a play on children.
Originally posted by ivanhoeI don't think the Schiavo case qualifies as euthanasia under the definition given by the US National Right to Life:
Does this really matter in the context of the actual euthanasia practice ?
Euthanasia is the intentional killing by act or omission of a dependent human being for his or her alleged benefit.
Since Terri was incapable of suffering, the removal of the feeding tube was not for her "benefit" as she couldn't "benefit" at all from anything. I suppose you could argue that she "benefited" because her wishes were honored but if you accept that rationale then the "benefit" certainly isn't alleged.
Originally posted by ivanhoeSure it matters. If the moral permissibility of euthanasia (active or passive) is at least partly determined by the moral status of the euthanized, then it matters whether the euthanized lacks the capacity for even a minimal mental life.
Does this really matter in the context of the actual euthanasia practice ?
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Originally posted by bbarrI hope you will be watching closely the developments in the euthanasia practice in the US and notice how the role of the notion (criterium) you described in your post (the capacity for even a minimal mental life) will change in morally justifying euthanasia.
Sure it matters. If the moral permissibility of euthanasia (active or passive) is at least partly determined by the moral status of the euthanized, then it matters whether the euthanized lacks the capacity for even a minimal mental life.
Originally posted by ivanhoeIf he's not, I'm sure you'll mass post everything of remotest import
I hope you will be watching closely the developments in the euthanasia practice in the US and notice how the role of the notion (criterium) you described in your post (the capacity for even a minimal mental life) will change in morally justifying euthanasia.
on these forums.
Nemesio
Originally posted by ivanhoeAre rocks worthy of moral consideration?
I hope you will be watching closely the developments in the euthanasia practice in the US and notice how the role of the notion (criterium) you described in your post (the capacity for even a minimal mental life) will change in morally justifying euthanasia.
Originally posted by ivanhoeI didn't say that lacking the capacity for a minimal mental life was a criterion for euthanization. Hell, I don't even think that lacking this capacity is sufficient for making euthanasia permissible.
I hope you will be watching closely the developments in the euthanasia practice in the US and notice how the role of the notion (criterium) you described in your post (the capacity for even a minimal mental life) will change in morally justifying euthanasia.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI'm not convinced. Let's suppose that we were only 50% sure about the scientific laws that prohibit interplanetary frog-jumping (or whatever), rather than, as it actually the case, something like 99.99999999999999999 sure. Wouldn't that make it just a little bit harder to declare credibly that there was a completely zero probability that interplanetary frog-jumping could occur? It seems to me indubitable that the probability of any event violating alleged laws of nature depends inversely upon the probability of those alleged laws being true; and because that probability can never be fully 1, the probability of events violating them can never be fully 0.
Accurate probabilistic assessments do not require certainty. If they did, then the whole science of probability would be pointless as it would have no application in reality. Clearly accurate probabilisitc descriptions and predictions about the universe are made, so it must be that they do not rely on certainty. All they rely on is the incorporati ...[text shortened]... se isn't as the available information, from which alone probabilities are derived, depicts it.
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Originally posted by PawnokeyholeIf you're going to suppose that it is 50% likely that frogs can jump to Jupiter, then yes, it is quite a bit harder under that supposition to conclude that it is 0% likely that frogs can jump to Jupiter. In fact, it is logically impossible to do so.
I'm not convinced. Let's suppose that we were only 50% sure about the scientific laws that prohibit interplanetary frog-jumping (or whatever), rather than, as it actually the case, something like 99.99999999999999999 sure. Wouldn't that make it just a little bit harder to declare credibly that there was a completely zero probability that interplanetary ...[text shortened]... bability can never be fully 1, the probability of events violating them can never be fully 0.
However, there is no evidence that would lead me to accept your supposition as having any bearing in reality, so it is not an obstacle that I would ever be compelled to overcome.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesForget about Terri Schiavo. Yet again, we need to ressurrect Irving J. Good and Rev. Bayes.
If you're going to suppose that it is 50% likely that frogs can jump to Jupiter, then yes, it is quite a bit harder under that supposition to conclude that it is 0% likely that frogs can jump to Jupiter. In fact, it is logically impossible to do so.
However, there is no evidence that would lead me to accept your supposition as having any bearing in reality, so it is not an obstacle that I would ever be compelled to overcome.
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI think we have vastly different notions of probability. To me, a statement of probability is nothing more than a summary of available information.
It seems to me indubitable that the probability of any event violating alleged laws of nature depends inversely upon the probability of those alleged laws being true; and because that probability can never be fully 1, the probability of events violating them can never be fully 0.
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Originally posted by royalchickenThis is just Bayes v. Skepticism. Under Pawnokeyhole's view, any event can be given any desired likelihood of occuring by skeptically constructing a sufficient number of possible but imaginary cases to offset by the desired amount those cases indicated by actual information and evidence. This reduces probabilistic statements to worthless nonsense.
Forget about Terri Schiavo. Yet again, we need to ressurrect Irving J. Good and Rev. Bayes.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesRegardless of how probably true that information is?
I think we have vastly different notions of probability. To me, a statement of probability is nothing more than a summary of available information.
Suppose the only "information" I have about who committed a crime is the testimony of a witness who says X did it. Suppose I also have reason to believe that the witness is only 60% reliable. Should I now conclude that the probability that X did it is 100%, summarizing the available information?
Similarly, if I am going to judge the probability that an event occurred, should I just assume that the law permitting it or forbidding it true, or should I also factor in its reliability (always less than perfect)?