Originally posted by PalynkaAtheism attempts to describe God: his nonexistence. Therefore it qualifies as a spiritual claim. If you say that there can be no absolute/objective truth for spiritual truth-claims, then you should apply it across the board.
On the contrary, I cannot deny the existence of spirituality through a spiritual claim. That would have been hypocritical.
Originally posted by HalitoseNo, atheism doesn't attempt to describe God. You think atheism amounts to the claim that God has the property of nonexistence. This is a mistake. Indeed, if an atheist did claim that, it would be self-contradictory, because only things that exist can have properties. Atheism (in its strong version) is the claim the concept 'God' is not instantiated in the world. Hence, it is not making any spiritual claim. It is merely making a claim about the relationship between some concept and the actual world.
Atheism attempts to describe God: his nonexistence. Therefore it qualifies as a spiritual claim. If you say that there can be no absolute/objective truth for spiritual truth-claims, then you should apply it across the board.
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Originally posted by HalitoseAtheism at most requires the concept of god to be meaningful.
Atheism attempts to describe God: his nonexistence. Therefore it qualifies as a spiritual claim. If you say that there can be no absolute/objective truth for spiritual truth-claims, then you should apply it across the board.
We are both sitting in front of the fire on Christmas Eve. You say: "Santa is coming down the chimney." I say: "There is no Santa."
These could both be called Santa-claims.
So what?
Originally posted by bbarrSemantics aside, would the negation of proposition X not be tantamount to a truth claim about X?
No, atheism doesn't attempt to describe God. You think atheism amounts to the claim that God has the property of nonexistence. This is a mistake. Indeed, if an atheist did claim that, it would be self-contradictory, because only things that exist can have properties. Atheism (in its strong version) is the claim the concept 'God' is not instantiated in the wo ...[text shortened]... It is merely making a claim about the relationship between some concept and the actual world.
Originally posted by dottewellIgnoring the guilt by association, if you claimed that all "Santa-claims" cannot be objective doesn't it constitute shooting yourself in the foot (as this would also be a santa-claim)? 😕
Atheism at most requires the concept of god to be meaningful.
We are both sitting in front of the fire on Christmas Eve. You say: "Santa is coming down the chimney." I say: "There is no Santa."
These could both be called Santa-claims.
So what?
Originally posted by HalitoseI don't know what "objective" means here; but Santa-claims can certainly be true or false, and there is no obvious equivalence between them.
Ignoring the guilt by association, if you claimed that all "Santa-claims" cannot be objective doesn't it constitute shooting yourself in the foot (as this would also be a santa-claim)? 😕
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Originally posted by HalitoseAs opposed, presumably, to true-for-me. Only I can't make much sense of that, either. Something is true, or else it isn't true. Why complicate things?
Nnnggggg! ðŸ˜
Objective=Absolute=Nada
Take it in the context of my discourse with Palynka.
To me it seems harmless to categorise things into "types" of claims, and to identify two claims as the same "type" of claim (e.g. santa-claims) - unless we can then show that there is some important similarity between them. And of course we can talk of the truth or falsity of e.g. santa-claims.
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Originally posted by HalitoseWell, since you were talking about the content of claims, it would seem perverse to set semantics aside.
Semantics aside, would the negation of proposition X not be tantamount to a truth claim about X?
The negation of some proposition P is simply ~P, which can be read "is is not the case that P" or (redundantly) as "it is true that it is not the case that P" NOTE: The fact that the predicate 'true' above adds nothing to the claim "it is not the case that P" is one motivation for deflationary or minimalist theories of truth. The negation of the proposition 'God exists' is the proposition "it is not the case that God exists". Now, you can read that as entailing that God has the property of not existing, but that would render a perfectly sensible claim literally incoherent, since only things that do exist can have properties. So, that claim should be read as asserting that the concept 'God' (or term 'God'😉 isn't instantiated (or has no referent) in the world.
Originally posted by bbarrCould that be mathematically stated as 0(0(0^n))+0=0
Well, since you were talking about the content of claims, it would seem perverse to set semantics aside.
The negation of some proposition P is simply ~P, which can be read "is is not the case that P" or (redundantly) as "it is true that it is not the case that P" NOTE: The fact that the predicate 'true' above adds nothing to the claim "it is not the cas ...[text shortened]... ept 'God' (or term 'God'😉 isn't instantiated (or has no referent) in the world.
Originally posted by PalynkaIf you want to state "there are cases where P" - you have to provide at least one example of P. You gave two examples claiming they proved your point - both of which I showed to be ~P.
By comments on quotes:
First two are irrelevant because they state cases that do not contradict my point. I mentioned "there are cases where P" and you simply stated "but there are cases where non-P". Strawmen since I'm not claiming "all cases are P".
Third one is a reformulation of what I said making it sound as a contradiction.
Fourth and fifth are irrelevant.
Sixth avoids the issue.
It's not a strawman. Sorry.
The third point is not just a simple reformulation of what you said, but an argument that such a comparison is unreasonable (if not invalid).
The sixth point highlights where you have been chasing a strawman.
Originally posted by bbarrThis is exactly the charge against atheism: it is self-contradictory, and cannot wrestle itself out of its own vaccum no matter how hard its adherents try.
No, atheism doesn't attempt to describe God. You think atheism amounts to the claim that God has the property of nonexistence. This is a mistake. Indeed, if an atheist did claim that, it would be self-contradictory, because only things that exist can have properties. Atheism (in its strong version) is the claim the concept 'God' is not instantiated in the wo ...[text shortened]... It is merely making a claim about the relationship between some concept and the actual world.
Atheism is making the claim that the ontological evidence is not supported, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Further, it embarasses its supposed seriousness by attempting to equate the idea of a perfect being with imaginary absurdities such as invisible unicorns, for instance.
Originally posted by FreakyKBHWhat "ontological evidence"?
This is exactly the charge against atheism: it is self-contradictory, and cannot wrestle itself out of its own vaccum no matter how hard its adherents try.
Atheism is making the claim that the ontological evidence is not supported, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Further, it embarasses its supposed seriousness by attempting to equate the idea of a perfect being with imaginary absurdities such as invisible unicorns, for instance.
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Originally posted by FreakyKBHIf atheism is self-contradictory then you ought to be able to present an argument of following form:
This is exactly the charge against atheism: it is self-contradictory, and cannot wrestle itself out of its own vaccum no matter how hard its adherents try.
Atheism is making the claim that the ontological evidence is not supported, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Further, it embarasses its supposed seriousness by attempting to equate the idea of a perfect being with imaginary absurdities such as invisible unicorns, for instance.
1) Atheism is committed to P (some proposition).
2) Atheism is also committed to Q1,...Qn (some other proposition(s))
3) Q1,...Qn entails ~P (where a member of the set of propositions Q1,...Qn may itself be ~P)
4) Hence, atheism is committed to P and ~P.
I eagerly await your presentation of this argument. Though perhaps you meant to say not that atheism was self-contradictory, but that it contradicted some other proposition there are independent reasons for thinking are true. If that is what you meant, then you should be able to present a non-question-begging argument (in this context, one that doesn't presuppose the existence of God) showing that atheism entails a proposition that there are good reasons for thinking are false. If this is what you meant, then, again, I eagerly await your argument (and please provide your reasons for thinking that the claim atheism putatively entails is, in fact, false).
Anyway, the ontological arguments presented by Descartes and Anselm are very different. They are committed to the claim, however, that existence is type of perfection (that is, a property). Since there is no reason to grant this claim, and good reasons to think that it is false, I don't lend ontological arguments any weight. Atheists don't equate the idea of a perfect being with the idea of an invisible unicorn. They do equate the evidence offered in support of the existence of a perfect being with that available to be offered in support of the existence of invisible unicorns.