Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
I may have an emotional reason to want to kill somebody ( for example, out of hatred ) , but that doesn’t make it a “moral” reason to kill him.
If I believe it is moral to pay my taxes, that doesn’t necessarily mean I have an emotional reason to pay my taxes. I may have no emotions for or against paying my taxes or I may hate paying my taxes in wh ...[text shortened]... conflict with my “emotional reason”.
-I hope these examples would show there is a difference.
In philosophy, the term 'reason' is used in a variety of ways. Here are some uses, phrased with regard to action. (and these are just typical uses; different philosophers use even these refined notions differently):
Theoretical Reason: Considerations that relate to what one believes or should believe.
Practical Reason: Considerations that relate to what one does or should do.
Explanatory Reason: Considerations that explain why an agent acted as he did.
Motivating Reason: Considerations that motivate an agent to act as he did, or that an agent took to be his motivation.
Justificatory Reason: Considerations that justify an agent in acting as he did, or justify his action. 'Justify' here means something like 'shows to be reasonable, good, right, etc. [often this is context dependent]'.
Instrumental Reason: Considerations that broadly support some action or the realization of some state of affairs, where that action or state of affairs is reasonable because it is instrumentally related to some other action or state of affairs that is good or right.
Non-instrumental Reason: Considerations that broadly support some action or the realization of some state of affairs, where that action or state of affairs is good or right ultimately, or in and of itself.
Internal Reason: Considerations of which an agent typically has cognitive access and that motivate him by virtue of being connected to his other motivational states (goals, projects, desires, etc.)
External Reason: Considerations of which an agent typically does not have cognitive access, but that may justify his action.
So, you see, when you talk of emotional reasons and moral reasons, I have no idea what you're talking about. Your examples here do not help much.
Tonight I am going to make dinner for the girlfriend. One reason is that I love her. Certainly, my love motivates me. Certainly, my love explains a lot of what I do. But my love also justifies my actions. My making dinner for the girlfriend is reasonable because I love her. There are instrumental reasons for me to make dinner; it contributes to her happiness, and I take her happiness to be good in and of itself. There are also non-instrumental reasons to make dinner; dinners and activities of this sort are constitutive of loving relationships, and I take these relationships to be at least partly constitutive of the good life. It is not just that love, and what follows from it, helps to bring about a good life. Rather, it is that love, and what follows from it, is part of what it means to live a good life.
Now, I have not even mentioned 'moral' in the example above. But it certainly seems to me as though reasons broadly related to emotional states; love, charity, compassion, loyalty, etc. [and, conversely, anger, cruelty, greed, etc] can and do overlap with those reasons that we typically give and take as moral or ethical justifications for our actions. So, again, I am unsure of what your distinction is all about.