Originally posted by Bosse de NageIf I am not part of the causal antecedents of (i.e. did not directly or through intermediate entities cause) the Battle of the Bulge, then my mere act of knowing about it does not change its nature.
That's because you're alive now. Certain German generals knew that the Battle of the Bulge was going to occur before it happened--they planned it that way. And there were German troops behind the lines in American uniforms who knew that the Battle of the Bulge was occurring while their American counterparts did not. Of course the Battle of the Bulge wa ...[text shortened]... d until it was over.
But yes, I agree with you--you didn't cause the Battle of the Bulge.
In particular, if a certain German general had the choice of trying to get his Panzer divisions over bridge A instead of bridge B, then the mere fact of my knowing that he chose bridge A does not change the fact that he could have chosen bridge B, given all the causal antecedents leading up to that decision.
Originally posted by lucifershammerSure.
In particular, if a certain German general had the choice of trying to get his Panzer divisions over bridge A instead of bridge B, then the mere fact of my knowing that he chose bridge A does not change the fact that he could have chosen bridge B, given all the causal antecedents leading up to that decision.
Originally posted by lucifershammerI don't know. Between now and the future people can always change their minds. Is the future fixed? Do you have knowledge of the future?
My point is simple - if this is true of historical events then, in general, it must be true of future events as well. The only grounds on which it would not be true of future events would be if we assumed causality to be strictly unidirectional in time.
Originally posted by Bosse de NageWhat does it mean to ask if the future is fixed?
I don't know. Between now and the future people can always change their minds. Is the future fixed? Do you have knowledge of the future?
"Future" is a subjective term in itself - what is past/present/future depends on where on the timeline a particular observer is. My future is someone else's past. So, in the context of this discussion, I prefer to speak of alternate timelines or possible worlds.
Is our timeline "fixed"? I think that one (and only one) timeline is true (i.e. actualised), but it is not the only logically possible one.
Originally posted by lucifershammerWhatever.
What does it mean to ask if the future is fixed?
"Future" is a subjective term in itself - what is past/present/future depends on where on the timeline a particular observer is. My future is someone else's past. So, in the context of this discussion, I prefer to speak of alternate timelines or possible worlds.
Is our timeline "fixed"? I think t ...[text shortened]... ine is true (i.e. actualised), but it is not the only logically possible one.
"Only if knowledge of an object can logically (not necessarily in time) precede the object known." If somebody invents an object, is the object preceded by knowledge?
Originally posted by Bosse de NageKnowledge, in the technical sense, is always knowledge that something is true (or is the case, or is real).
Whatever.
"Only if knowledge of an object can logically (not necessarily in time) precede the object known." If somebody invents an object, is the object preceded by knowledge?
So, if someone invents an object, his knowledge that the object exists in reality would be logically antecedent to the object existing in reality.
Originally posted by LemonJelloLook, for the umpteenth time: use your own definitions here.
Our function here is not to hammer out a ‘standard of suffering’ or a ‘level of moral acceptability’ whatever you take those phrases to mean. Look, for the umpteenth time: use your own definitions here. Exactly what do you not understand about that? Again: does the aforementioned Down’s baby experience logically unnecessary pain and suffering or not?
...[text shortened]... ithin the context of this discussion, who the hell cares? Keep your eyes on the ball, Freak.”
I can't use my definitions for your silly little argument. You are the one raising the issue of suffering, and since you seem unable or unwilling to define what that standard should be, I will use what you have put forth thus far.
You assert that a person suffering from Down's syndrome is unacceptable suffering. I say that it is nothing compared to the suffering that perfection must necessarily experience in order to have a relationship with imperfection. Imperfection cannot attain perfection; perfection must elevate imperfection in order for affinity to exist.
The so-called evidential problem of evil is a smoke screen of absurdity. You must eliminate at least two entire aspects of God's attributes in order for POE to even get to the table. Oh sure, it sounds impressive, but it is readily refuted and dismissed, when seen in the light of God's attributes. It certainly does not belong in the toolbox of the intellectually honest.
if that skinned knee is not somehow logically necessary for the greater good to obtain...
This may be difficult to get your mind around, but all pain and suffering is necessary, because PAS is necessarily a result of man's free will. Hell is first the choice of Satan and the fallen angels, and second the choice of unrepentant man. God had to create a place of habitation for those creatures who did not want Him as God.
“Within the context of this discussion, who the hell cares? Keep your eyes on the ball, Freak.”
Until you are able to answer that question, you're not going to see the salient issue involved.
Originally posted by LemonJelloI think LH is doing a good job of explaining this aspect of ominscience. Simply put, our knowledge of anything is limited, at best including those events which have certainly already occured. That God knows perfectly all known things, you are able to grasp. I'm sorry that you are not able to grasp that He knew all known things prior to their occuring.
Nope. If God has perfect knowledge of all my future actions, then my future is determined. Libertarian free will goes out the window right there. You still have compatibilist free will to consider, but as I stated before, there is absolutely nothing about free will that logically necessitates the existence of hell. So your claim that hell is necessary ...[text shortened]... to your premise.
What? I’m afraid I don’t speak Gibberish. I make little sense of this.[/b]
As He did not coerce the free will of agents who have acted in history, nor is He coercing the free will of agents acting presently (you aren't compelled to worhsip Him suddenly, are you?), nor will He coerce the free will of agents in acting in the future. Yet, He still knew all the knowable prior to the instant of the decree.
Originally posted by Bosse de NageNot really.
Changed your sentence slightly. Seems you agree with me: knowledge can precede, or form, its own object.
Knowledge that an object 'can' exist is really judging that the proposition "This object can exist in reality" (let's call it P) is true. However, your judging P to be true does not make it true - it is already true or false prior to your act of judgment.
So, once again, knowledge cannot [ontologically] precede its object.
Originally posted by FreakyKBHJust to point out that, based on my reading of what you've been posting, we may have slightly different views on free will. You appear to be espousing a compatibilist view; I'm holding to a non-deterministic (a more general form of the libertarian) view.
I think LH is doing a good job of explaining this aspect of ominscience. Simply put, our knowledge of anything is limited, at best including those events which have certainly already occured. That God knows perfectly all known things, you are able to grasp. I'm sorry that you are not able to grasp that He knew all known things prior to their occuring.
...[text shortened]... acting in the future. Yet, He still knew all the knowable prior to the instant of the decree.
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Originally posted by FreakyKBHYou assert that a person suffering from Down's syndrome is unacceptable suffering.
[b]Look, for the umpteenth time: use your own definitions here.
I can't use my definitions for your silly little argument. You are the one raising the issue of suffering, and since you seem unable or unwilling to define what that standard should be, I will use what you have put forth thus far.
You assert that a person suffering from Down's syndrom you are able to answer that question, you're not going to see the salient issue involved.[/b]
I did not assert this, and I'm not even sure what 'unacceptable' is supposed to mean here. What I asserted is that the suffering of the aforementioned Down's baby (referenced in the Sinnott-Armstrong quote) is not logically necessary for bringing about the greater good. Further, I claim this assertion holds for just about any reasonable ethical theory one can devise. So, once again: use your own lights here.
I say that it is nothing compared to the suffering that perfection must necessarily experience in order to have a relationship with imperfection. Imperfection cannot attain perfection; perfection must elevate imperfection in order for affinity to exist.
So, is it your claim that the suffering of the Down's baby is logically necessary for the greater good? First of all, why should we think that a relationship with God is an essential good? Second, why is it that this all-important relationship could not possibly be brought about without the suffering of this Down's baby (this is, after all, what logical necessity entails)?
This may be difficult to get your mind around, but all pain and suffering is necessary, because PAS is necessarily a result of man's free will.
Oh, really? Then please explain to me why the pain and suffering experienced by the Down's baby is necessarily a result of human free will.
God had to create a place of habitation for those creatures who did not want Him as God.
It contradicts His purported omnipotence to Say that God simply has to do this or that when other logical possibilities exist. The non-existence of hell is a logical possibility that is perfectly compatible with his other attributes. So this is another false statement from you.
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Originally posted by FreakyKBHI am able to grasp things just fine. Again, free will does not necessitate the suffering and pain that you keep falsely claiming it necessitates.
I think LH is doing a good job of explaining this aspect of ominscience. Simply put, our knowledge of anything is limited, at best including those events which have certainly already occured. That God knows perfectly all known things, you are able to grasp. I'm sorry that you are not able to grasp that He knew all known things prior to their occuring.
acting in the future. Yet, He still knew all the knowable prior to the instant of the decree.
Originally posted by LemonJelloI did not assert this, and I'm not even sure what 'unacceptable' is supposed to mean here.
[b]You assert that a person suffering from Down's syndrome is unacceptable suffering.
What I asserted is that the suffering of the aforementioned Down's baby (referenced in the Sinnott-Armstrong quote) is not logically necessary for bringing about the greater good. Further, I claim this assertion holds for just about any reasonable ethica ...[text shortened]... fectly compatible with his other attributes. So this is another false statement from you.[/b]
Of course you did. You have asserted that the suffering of a DS baby is not compatible with the greater good, i.e., the greater good cannot be the "greater" or the "good" if a baby has DS. Ergo, that suffering is unacceptable to your view of both "greater" and "good."
So, is it your claim that the suffering of the Down's baby is logically necessary for the greater good?
Again, all that occurs is necessary. Could it have been different? Only if the agents involved had made different decisions.
First of all, why should we think that a relationship with God is an essential good?
'Why' is a good question. Why are we here? Where did we come from? Where are we going? With whom do we have to do? General revelation will only get us so far. The divine revelation (God's word) tells us everything we need to know regarding Him, His character, as well as answers all of nagging questions of life. Once God's character is revealed, the question becomes, "Why would anyone not want a relationship with Him?"
Second, why is it that this all-important relationship could not possibly be brought about without the suffering
Free will necessitates the possibility of failure, the possibility of one choosing wrong instead of right. Even in that choice, however, the One presenting the choice has provided the solution. No one dies for their sin.
It contradicts His purported omnipotence to Say that God simply has to do this or that when other logical possibilities exist.
A singular view of one of God's attributes to the exclusion of His other attributes will necessarily result in absurdities, as your statement shows.
The non-existence of hell is a logical possibility that is perfectly compatible with his other attributes.
Sure: if He had remained by Himself, among the members of the Godhead, hell was not a possibility. The old grouch was somewhat close to the source when he said, "Hell is other people." When free will is granted to any other agency, hell becomes a possibility, and thus a necessity based upon the others' actions.