Originally posted by knightmeister
This is a good discussion , I'm enjoying it.
The evidential problem of Evil , I prefer to re-phrase as the problem of the imperfect of creation. I don't see an earthquake as Evil in this sense , because there is no devious motive or intent to harm. An earthquake cannot be held morally responsible. So for me a natural event that causes suffering is ...[text shortened]... not heaven) does logically have to have some "ickiness" for us to exist as free beings?
Originally posted by knightmeister
This is a good discussion , I'm enjoying it.
Me too.
The evidential problem of Evil , I prefer to re-phrase as the problem of the imperfect of creation.
That makes sense, though we all have our preferences and mine is to run a parallel Problem of Suffering in conjunction with each version of the PoE. I'm happy to use your term though.
I don't see an earthquake as Evil in this sense , because there is no devious motive or intent to harm. An earthquake cannot be held morally responsible. So for me a natural event that causes suffering is not "evil" as such , but a reflection of the imperfect world we live in.
Agreed. But this is difficult to reconcile with the notion of god who is capable of making heaven, which doesn't have natural disasters, and which is populated by people with free will who are precisely the people god knew would be there at the moment of creation. It is difficult to see the best way to argue this I think. You could say that god needed a universe with physical laws that would give rise via evolution to sentient beings, and that this universe necessarily is prone to tsunami, earthquake, flood and so on, because the physics and chemistry for one necessarily involves the other. This doesn't seem to work though, since such a world leaves very little for god to do or explain. It is compatible with turtles all the way down, where by 'turtle' I mean 'blind algorithmic process'.
Ok, suppose we take another path, we could reject evolution and say that the 'icky' factor is a moral test. The world needn't have been so disaster prone, but god wanted to test his created beings by introducing mechanisms that cause massive suffering that is arbitrary. It is arbitrary in the sense that no rational agent could meaningfully link the suffering to our free will. This fits with our experience of earthquakes and the like. But the cost is that prima facie, this seems morally dubious on the part of god, to say the least. Here is a quote (I have posted once before) which captures the notion quite well:
"For now we have to explain not only why an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good God should create such a universe and such a man, but also why, foreseeing every move of the feeble, weak-willed, ignorant, and covetous creature to be created, He should nevertheless have created him and, having done so, should be incensed and outraged by man's sin, and why He should deem it necessary to sacrifice His own son on the cross to atone for this sin which was, after all, only a disobedience of one of His commands, and why this atonement and consequent redemption could not have been followed by man's return to Paradise - particularly of those innocent children who had not yet sinned - and why, on Judgement Day, this merciful God should condemn some to eternal torment." K. Baier
The fact that you say "why does the world have to be quite so icky?" suggests that you maybe accept that the natural world in which we live (ie not heaven) does logically have to have some "ickiness" for us to exist as free beings?
I think that the logical possibility of ickyness is compatible with the OOO god if:
1) we have a libertarian view of free will
2) we assume that this free will is of such intrinsic value that its preservation outweighs the risk that bad things will happen to innocent people as a result of 1)
The reasons for this, as I see them, are twofold.
Firstly, if 1) is true, then god cannot control what we choose without depriving us of our free will. If free will is the good which facilitates a meaningful loving relationship with our creator, then god would choose not to intervene if that meant sacrificing our free will.
Secondly, within this frame of reference, massive arbitrary suffering of innocents on earth needs to be put into the perspective of their eternal bliss in communion with god in heaven. We can then see that even the most terrible agony of an innocent who dies alone through no fault of their own, is small potatoes. (Don't say that to the relatives though...🙂)
I'm not sure some atheists are that good at taking this second point on board. But enough of me griping. What's the problem with this explanation? It seems ok, in logical terms, to me.
My answer is: plausibility. To illustrate, I'll offer a second quote, from the philosopher Simon Blackburn. He draws this analogy:
"Suppose you find yourself in a school or university in a dormitory.Things are not too good. The roof leaks, there are rats about, the food is almost inedible, some students in fact starve to death. There is a closed door, behind which is the management, but the management never comes out. You get to speculate [about] what the management must be like. Can you infer about the management from the dormitory as you find it that the management, first, knows exactly what conditions are like, second, cares intensely for your welfare, and third, possesses unlimited resources for fixing things? The inference is crazy."
Further, if you design a moral test based on no efficient mechanism for punishing the wicked and rewarding the worthy, set that in the context of a dangerous world full of seemingly arbitrary suffering, thus making inferences to a benign creator speculative at best, then
require as a condition for passing said test precisely such an inference..... well have I given you a flavour of why it doesn't work for me?
Your turn.