12 Jul 05
Originally posted by gentlegilI agree with LJ's response to this. I must ask you though gentle, are you posting with a telegraph?
I may be on the wrong track.....but heres my thoughts to this thread.....
Having free will.......our morals and ethics are based on.....what we believe within ourselves to be moral and ethical..........with or without the dct we have standards either learned through parenting.....or guidance through school years and as adults we have conscience.....
. ...[text shortened]... good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you;
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12 Jul 05
If God is perfect in all attributes and we are made some way in his image wouldn't it follow that we too should attempt to be like God (because of freewill we could also try not to be like God) and it is for this reason (us trying to imitate God) that morality exists.
12 Jul 05
2 edits
Originally posted by Conrau KEDIT: actually, telerion's following post is correct in that your view of morality does not necessarily rest on the existence of god. i deleted my comment accordingly.
If God is perfect in all attributes and we are made some way in his image wouldn't it follow that we too should attempt to be like God (because of freewill we could also try not to be like God) and it is for this reason (us trying to imitate God) that morality exists.
sufficient for this discussion, however, i don't agree with your concept of morality.
12 Jul 05
Originally posted by Conrau KIf God is perfect in all attributes . . .
If God is perfect in all attributes and we are made some way in his image wouldn't it follow that we too should attempt to be like God (because of freewill we could also try not to be like God) and it is for this reason (us trying to imitate God) that morality exists.
First, what does it mean to be perfect in an attribute? Second, what sort of attributes are you describing? For instance, if weakness and attribute, am I correct in deducing that God is perfectly weak? Further, if you include statements of character in your term "attribute," then is God both perfectly hateful and perfectly greedy? I just don't have any clue what you mean by the words "God is perfect in all attributes."
and we are made some way in his image wouldn't it follow that we too should attempt to be like God
No, I don't think that it does follow. Perhaps you could carefully relate the exact way in which we are "in his image." Maybe then the validity of your conclusion would be easier for me to weigh.
Finally, your statement has nothing to do with Euthyphro's Dilemma. Whether or not, morality exists because we should attempt to be like God, says nothing about whether morality is dependent or independent of God. Are we to be like God solely because God has commanded that imitating him is good or does God command that we be like him because it is good to be like God?
13 Jul 05
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarrOk, my €0,02.
A: O.K. So, does God have a reason to will that we be happy? If so, what is it?
This is the core of the problem on point (8).
Assuming that God exists,
then it follows that something exists in a plane outside our reality (defined as everything he created). Like you said before, God is not the creator everything because he didn't create himself.
If this is true, then at the point where the quoted question is asked, the finding of God's reason would take us back to (7):
If there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A, then he could have just as well been silent concerning A or commanded A.
There's the possibility that the main reason for forbidding A might not be on our plane. This could mean that although there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A, it was NOT indifferent for him to be silent concerning A or to command A. Even if the world (his creation) remained the same if he did, the explanation might be in another plane.
In that sense, I don't see why theists have to reject any of your premises.
Edit: Obviously, what I meant with the last phrase is that (7) would not logically follow from the fact that there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A.
13 Jul 05
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaI agree with you on this and few theists i've encountered consider it. The dilemma for the theist here though is that if God is contained a greater reality than our own and is constrained by rules which govern it then the theist basically concedes something at least as great as his/her god. Since theists tend to have a need to explain the existence of things with creators, they naturally wonder, "Who created this greater existence in which God resides?" Soon we have turtles all the way up if you know what I'm saying.
Ok, my €0,02.
This is the core of the problem on point (8).
Assuming that God exists,
then it follows that something exists in a plane outside our reality (defined as everything he created). Like you said before, God is not the cre ...[text shortened]... he fact that there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A.
This problem is similar to one that arises from one horn of the original Euthyphro dilemma, the one where God declares things to be good because they are good. This option implies that a standard of morality exists independently of God. The theists wonders from where did this independent morality come if not from God and so commences the progression of turtles.
13 Jul 05
Originally posted by telerionYes, I thought of that.
I agree with you on this and few theists i've encountered consider it. The dilemma for the theist here though is that if God is contained a greater reality than our own and is constrained by rules which govern it then the theist basically concedes something at least as great as his/her god. Since theists tend to have a need to explain the existence of th ...[text shortened]... did this independent morality come if not from God and so commences the progression of turtles.
However, I think that is beyond the scope of this thread and therefore it does not invalidate my point. Also, the fact that God was undefined, makes me think that Bbarr didn't want to focus on any particular God.
Besides, Bbarr himself rejected the possibility of God creating himself, which would imply that such a problem (the creator of the creator) is accepted or negligible for the point at stake.
My point is that it is possible, for certain theists, to overcome that problem if they accept that another plane exists and God is the creator of this reality alone.
That said, this argument by itself is not sufficient to counter DCT, only in conjuction with other premises.
13 Jul 05
Originally posted by PalynkaI don't think that I am focusing on a particular God (as you probably know the original Euthyphro's dilemma is presented in the context of multiple gods.). Further I don't think that I suggested anywhere that your point is invalid. The theist can always get out of the dilemma by admitting something that exists independently of God shapes morality. I was just pointing out that most monotheists I know are uncomfortable with such a concession.
Yes, I thought of that.
However, I think that is beyond the scope of this thread and therefore it does not invalidate my point. Also, the fact that God was undefined, makes me think that Bbarr didn't want to focus on any particular God.
Besides, Bbarr himself rejected the possibility of God creating himself, which would imply that such a problem (the ...[text shortened]... his argument by itself is not sufficient to counter DCT, only in conjuction with other premises.
So then which horn of the dilemma would you say the Higher Planes Defense (maybe better called the Layered Realities Defense) takes?
I think it fits under "God declares things good because they are good." He recognizes an independent moral code.
If it were the other, that "things are good only because God declares them to be good," then higher planes or anything else have no direct bearing on morality and are therefore orthogonal (Good word. I wish it was correct to use it like this.) to the problem.
Another possible thought I'm having is that if we assume that the Higher Planes Defense implies a higher ordering of realities each with it's own Creator, then the question becomes "Is there an Ultimate Reality with an Ultimate Creator?"
If yes, then Euthyphro's dilemma applies to the Ultimate Creator. If no, then we have an endless string of Creators, and so Euthyphro's dilemma can never catch up with appropriate authority.
13 Jul 05
1 edit
Originally posted by KneverKnightWould you be referring to the "God is good and good is God" Defense. That is by God's existing good is defined.
Does the neo-xtian tactic of saying "good is in god's nature" avoid the dilemma or is this just a cute trick?
Here are the things I think the theist must concede to hold this position:
1) Some things exist independently of God. For him to have a set of attributes which define his nature, there must exist attributes which are not in his nature. Where did these attributes come from?
2) It begs the question, "Should we behave like God?" By this defense the theist has hijacked our understanding of "good" in the moral sense. We can no longer ask if to behave like God is good because under the defense the answer is a tautology. Nevertheless we still have a sense of what we usually understand to be "good," independent of the new definition. Perhaps the best reply to a theist, using this defense, who claims that something is "good," is "So?" When God declares himself to be "good," he is really saying, "I approve of myself." I would ask, "Why does he approve of himself?" and more importantly do, "Do we approve of him?" It would also be nice if the theist could flesh out the defense a bit more. What is like God and not like God?
I'm sure that there are better ways to handle this defense. Awaiting others thoughts . . .
13 Jul 05
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaFirst, positing other planes of reality inaccessible to us seems to me to be pure speculation whose only purpose would be to avoid such dilemmas, by dismissing them on the basis of a purely speculative premise.
Ok, my €0,02.
This is the core of the problem on point (8).
Assuming that God exists,
then it follows that something exists in a plane outside our reality (defined as everything he created). Like you said before, God is not the cre ...[text shortened]... he fact that there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A.
Second, doesn’t such a premise simply reduce the theist to silence regarding God and morality—since the only meaningful discussion must take place in this plane of reality? To paraphrase Pascal (I think), doesn’t it simply reduce to a statement like, “God has reasons that reason cannot know”—end of discussion?
Third, positing a God who “exists [solely?] in a plane outside our reality,” does impose at least a partial “definition” of God—i.e., what theologian Marcus Borg has called the God of “supernatural theism”—does it not? This may not be the God of those who take, for example, a panentheistic view. (This third point, however, may be trivial.)
13 Jul 05
Originally posted by vistesdIm still wondering why people want to keep God imprisoned in the stone age.
First, positing other planes of reality inaccessible to us seems to me to be pure speculation whose only purpose would be to avoid such dilemmas, by dismissing them on the basis of a purely speculative premise.
Second, doesn’t such a premise simply reduce the theist to silence regarding God and morality—since the only meaningful discussion must take pla ...[text shortened]... take, for example, a panentheistic view. (This third point, however, may be trivial.)
13 Jul 05
Originally posted by vistesd
First, positing other planes of reality inaccessible to us seems to me to be pure speculation whose only purpose would be to avoid such dilemmas, by dismissing them on the basis of a purely speculative premise.
Second, doesn’t such a premise simply reduce the theist to silence regarding God and morality—since the only meaningful discussion must take pla ...[text shortened]... take, for example, a panentheistic view. (This third point, however, may be trivial.)
1. The fact of God being undefined serves only the purpose of generalizing for all types of God. If one particular God is possible that does not commit theist to the dillema, then the dillema is not absolute.
So, for all theists who follow a God(s), that is assumed or possible to live on another plane(s) of existence, then all this does not necessarily apply to all theists. Meaning, DCT is coherent under certain cases.
2. Your second is deduced correctly, but that's exactly what the core of the problem is, I believe. The point is proving that such silence cannot be logical and is not inadmissible. "Proving that God has no reasons that reason cannot know", isn't that the point of DCT?
3. View point 1. I don't want to prove that for ALL types of God(s) DCT is true, I want to prove that DCT is possible for CERTAIN types of God, thus refuting the invalidity of DCT.