Originally posted by telerionYou are right, that was my mistake on your interpretation. Anyway, I actually was the one characterizing God, although I did not see it at the time.
I don't think that I am focusing on a particular God (as you probably know the original Euthyphro's dilemma is presented in the context of multiple gods.). Further I don't think that I suggested anywhere that your point is invalid. The theist can always get out of the dilemma by admitting something that exists independently of God shapes morality. I w ...[text shortened]... string of Creators, and so Euthyphro's dilemma can never catch up with appropriate authority.
I concede that my argument is not admissable for all gods, but it maybe be sufficient for some definitions, making DCT possible, under certain circumstances.
I don't understand why it has to choose a horn, you are perhaps being too absolute. If I eliminate the dillema, then both horns can be chosen.
I go along all the way until point (6).
Suppose that A is wrong in virtue of God’s having forbade A. If so, then either there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A, or there was at least one reason in virtue of which God forbade A.
No beef there, but from this, it would not follow (7):
If there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A, then he could have just as well been silent concerning A or commanded A.
He may have other reasons. You might say that this is a case of a capricious God, a God that is being selfish, forbidding us to do something for a reason that is not related to mundane virtue.
(Eating horse-meat might be an example for the Christian God, although I'm not sure I thought this through)
Originally posted by Palynka"I go along all the way until point (6).
You are right, that was my mistake on your interpretation. Anyway, I actually was the one characterizing God, although I did not see it at the time.
I concede that my argument is not admissable for all gods, but it maybe be sufficient for some definitions, making DCT possible, under certain circumstances.
I don't understand why it has to choose a horn ...[text shortened]... meat might be an example for the Christian God, although I'm not sure I thought this through)
Suppose that A is wrong in virtue of God’s having forbade A. If so, then either there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A, or there was at least one reason in virtue of which God forbade A.
No beef there, but from this, it would not follow (7):
If there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A, then he could have just as well been silent concerning A or commanded A.
He may have other reasons. You might say that this is a case of a capricious God, a God that is being selfish, forbidding us to do something for a reason that is not related to mundane virtue."
But aren't your applying the wrong horn? Are you not in some way implying that there is or may be at least one reason why God forbade A? Doesn't the Higher Planes Defense just asserts that the reason(s) come(s) from a higher plane of existence which bounds and contains God? Shouldn't we skip (7) then and apply (8)?
8) If God had at least one reason to forbid A, then it is this reason that ultimately and directly determines the moral wrongness of A, and not the mere fact that God forbade A.
Maybe, I'm not understanding the Higher Planes Defense.
I think then that you are right that the Higher Planes Defense removes God (the immediate Creator over us) from the Dilemma. It basically passes the buck on to the next highest Creator ad infinitum. So in terms of God (the immediate Creator), I think the Higher Plane Defense would have us stop at (4).
Ok, here's my best attempt so far to escape the dilemma.
I will assert that (4) is correct. There does exist a standard of morality that is independent of God. Now as Bennet points out most theists will not want to accept this as it makes God completly irrelevant to issues of morality.
I will assert that God is still relevant; in fact he is central to issues of morality. This is because God is the only person able to know and relate the entire standard of morality. God is a moral Geiger-counter, but he's the only one we've got. Because the moral law is unknowable by man, we must rely on an omniscient guide to relate the code to us.
Only immediate problem I can see is that we must assume that God isn't lying to us. As long as he always tells us the truth, then I think this defense -- I'll call it the Defense from Omniscient Guidance (DOG) -- holds.
Originally posted by telerionThe reason why the HPD cannot stop at point (4) is because (4) is one part of a IF clause, which must be seen in conjunction with (5).
Maybe, I'm not understanding the Higher Planes Defense.
I think then that you are right that the Higher Planes Defense removes God (the immediate Creator over us) from the Dilemma. It basically passes the buck on to the next highest ...[text shortened]... tor), I think the Higher Plane Defense would have us stop at (4).
Both together encompass the possibility of God being a primal source of moral and God being a Geiger-counter. That's why I think you have to go until (7).
I also don't see how it passes the buck to the next Creator. It can be a whimsical reason in the higher plane, turned into a moral reason in the lower plane (God forbids it => it becomes moral) . In that sense, God becomes a primal source of morality, instead of working as a moral Geiger-counter.
Originally posted by telerionTwo things,
I will assert that (4) is correct. There does exist a standard of morality that is independent of God. Now as Bennet points out most theists will not want to accept this as it makes God completly irrelevant to issues of morality.
I wi ...[text shortened]... I'll call it the Defense from Omniscient Guidance (DOG) -- holds.
In your exposure God is not a primal source of moral, therefore the Direct Command Theory would be more of a Indirect Translation Theory.
The purpose of Bbarr here is denying DCT, if I'm not mistaken, and mine is to say that his argument is insufficient.
I believe you are, implicitly, saying that the DCT is untrue as a premise, not as a conclusion. That would not deter a DCT believer, he would hold his premise and you would hold yours. You are denying (2) from the start.
Bbarr (I assume Bennet is bbarr) goes deeper, saying that the DCT contains a dillema in itself. Even if you accept it as a premise, you will face problems sustaining it.
Edit: I'm trying to maintain the assumption that DCT is true.
Edit 2: Perhaps I misinterpreted bbarr's intentions on this thread, which means I've been writing crap all along.
Originally posted by PalynkaI guess I'm not following you're trying to do. (3) stipulates that only (4) or (5) must be the case for the DCT to be true, not both. In fact both cannot be true as they are mutually exclusive conditions.
The reason why the HPD cannot stop at point (4) is because (4) is one part of a IF clause, which must be seen in conjunction with (5).
Both together encompass the possibility of God being a primal source of moral and God being a Geiger-counter. That's why I think you have to go until (7).
I also don't see how it passes the buck to the next Creator. I ...[text shortened]... at sense, God becomes a primal source of morality, instead of working as a moral Geiger-counter.
Am I right that the HPD is arguing that reason why God forbids an action A is because he can neither command nor remain silent on it because of some reason exterior to our own reality, a higher plane? The wrongness of A is still dependent completely on God, but God's decision is not whimsical because it is compelled by forces beyond his control. Is this right?
Originally posted by PalynkaMy version is consistent with (1) and (2), by (3)(i). This is the case that God forbids A in virtue of A being wrong.
Two things,
In your exposure God is not a primal source of moral, therefore the Direct Command Theory would be more of a Indirect Translation Theory.
The purpose of Bbarr here is denying DCT, if I'm not mistaken, and mine is to say that his argument is insufficient.
I believe you are, implicitly, saying that the DCT is untrue as a premise, not as a ...[text shortened]... isinterpreted bbarr's intentions on this thread, which means I've been writing crap all along.
I'm trying to hold assumption (2) that DCT is true. I don't think (3) and (4) can be affirmed by the same postion, so I chose (3). Since God knows the independent moral perfectly and never lies, God's forbidding action A is equivalent to the action being forbidden the moral code. There since an action A is morally wrong if and only if it violates the moral god, an action is morally wrong if and only if God forbids action A.
Is an act morally wrong because God says so or does God say so because it is morally wrong?
In the first case the act is not morally wrong until He says it is which might lead to a situation where "coveting thy neighbour's wife" was OK yesterday but not today unless He spelled things out at the very beginning so why the wait for the Ten Commandments?
In the second case the act of "coveting etc" was wrong from day one, so why the wait for the Ten Commandments? Why not tell us sooner?
What, so now we're mind-readers already?
EDIT: sorry, that's just the god most of us know, not gods in general ...
Palynka: "Proving that God has no reasons that reason cannot know", isn't that the point of DCT?
I thought the point was this: either 1) something is deemed immoral by reason of God’s saying so—i.e., divine command or fiat—or 2) something is immoral, and that is the reason for God’s proscription. In the second case, as bbarr put it, “The fact that A is morally wrong is explanatorily prior to God’s forbidding A.”
Now, if “God has no reasons that reason cannot know,” then reasonable human beings can potentially identify the reasons for moral behavior without recourse to God. If, however, those reasons are “lodged” in a realm inaccessible to human reason, then we are left with—from the point of view of this plane of existence—strict DCT on the basis of trusting that God’s command stems from reasons that we can’t know--or even know that there are such reasons. The fact that an act, A, might be morally wrong “explanatorily prior to God’s forbidding A,” is then of no relevant consequence, since we can’t know the explanation. That was why I said that would mean essentially saying that “God has reasons that reason cannot know.” For all relevant purposes, A is wrong for us simply because God says it is.
This schema may escape the dilemma, but requires these assumptions to do so:
1) There are other planes of existence inaccessible to human reason; and,
2) Those planes of existence “hold” the explanatory keys to why God deems some behavior in our plane of existence to be immoral/moral—e.g., every time I covet my neighbor’s wife here, a being in another dimension dies a horrible death.
It’s the second assumption that really carries the load here. I admit it’s artful, but—it seems to me to ignore Occam’s warning about multiplying assumptions unnecessarily (unless, of course, the goal is simply to assert that DCT isn’t really just DCT because God has reasons we can’t know), and I don’t find it all that different from, say, assuming that some evil demon planted dinosaur bones to fool us into thinking the earth is far older than it really is (except that it’s more sophisticated than that, so please don’t be offended by the inane example). You can assume almost anything away if you’re just willing to be imaginative about making assumptions. (And maybe that is exactly your point.)
Originally posted by KneverKnightI think any God who makes moral declarations (“divine command&rdquo😉 fits the bill here. Any concept of God that does not make moral declarations leaves the figuring out of morality up to us.
Is an act morally wrong because God says so or does God say so because it is morally wrong?
The term "God" is undefined.
Originally posted by vistesd
Palynka: [b]"Proving that God has no reasons that reason cannot know", isn't that the point of DCT?
I thought the point was this: either 1) something is deemed immoral by reason of God’s saying so—i.e., divine command or fiat—or 2) something is immoral, and that is the reason for God’s proscription. In the second case, as bbarr put it, ...[text shortened]... willing to be imaginative about making assumptions. (And maybe that is exactly your point.)
[/b]
Look, first of all I'm a devout atheist, so in my experience, most theists are quite imaginative. What I'm saying, is that it's not hard to escape the dillema for them. Take the Christian God, for example:
- Other planes exist (heaven).
- What we do may affect those planes in the future (we may enter it or not)
- It is repeatedly said that we cannot understand God's reasons or intents (this points to me that the reason must be somewhere else, where God is or is from God itself)
- He can escape the dillema with my argument.
You see? Bbarr's argument looks solid, but it might not hold under certain assumptions that are quite common among theists.
Note: What I'm trying here is finding a way to go around this defense, so I can use this dillema. I think the whole exposure is quite elegant, in fact.
Originally posted by telerionNo, HPD is arguing that the reason why god forbids A is because he does not WANT to command it or remain silent about it.
Am I right that the HPD is arguing that reason why God forbids an action A is because he can neither command nor remain silent on it because of some reason exterior to our own reality, a higher plane? The wrongness of A is still dependent completely on God, but God's decision is not whimsical because it is compelled by forces beyond his control. Is this right?
I say nothing whether it is because there are forces beyond is control or simply because he wishes it (personal pleasure, personal view of morality, etc...). I would point out that the second is perhaps more consistent with DCT.