Originally posted by telerion
My version is consistent with (1) and (2), by (3)(i). This is the case that God forbids A in virtue of A being wrong.

I'm trying to hold assumption (2) that DCT is true. I don't think (3) and (4) can be affirmed by the same postion, so I chose (3). Since God knows the independent moral perfectly and never lies, God's forbidding action A is equivalen ...[text shortened]... ly if it violates the moral god, an action is morally wrong if and only if God forbids action A.

Do you mean (4) and (5)?

I think you are forgetting that the dillema begins with the assumption of (5).

I think your view is consistent with how Bbarr defines DCT (he goes only that far), but not with most theists who accept it, who choose (5). The dillema applies to those and those alone.

Originally posted by Palynka

Look, first of all I'm a devout atheist, so in my experience, most theists are quite imaginative. What I'm saying, is that it's not hard to escape the dillema for them. Take the Christian God, for example:

- Other planes exist (heaven).
- What we do may affect those planes in the future (we may enter it or not)
- It is repeatedly said that we canno ...[text shortened]... this defense, so I can use this dillema. I think the whole exposure is quite elegant, in fact.

What I'm trying here is finding a way to go around this defense, so I can use this dilemma.

Well, I figured you might be taking some kind of “devil’s advocate” approach to it (hence my last parenthetical statement in my last post)….It will be interesting if you find a way, but—my point is that someone who is willing to use the HPD, or some analogue to it, is already willing to move into the “twilight zone” to come up with imaginative scenarios to defend DCT.

Also, the assumption of higher planes or the like is unnecessary, because all the DCT defender really needs to say is: “I assume that God has good reasons that I can’t know because I’m not God.” HPD might be a “for instance…,” but if you shoot down the “for instance, there might be higher planes, etc,” you really haven’t dented the DCT defender’s underlying position, at least as long as we’re talking about a God who—

1) is in any way “transcendent” to our realm of reality (a standard theistic view), and

2) is a generator of moral dicta.

It strikes me again that I might be behind your curve here, but I see no way around someone who is simply willing to stand on the assertion that God must have good reasons accessible only to God, and not us poor mortals. That, I still think, is a discussion stopper….

Originally posted by Palynka

Do you mean (4) and (5)?

I think you are forgetting that the dillema begins with the assumption of (5).

I think your view is consistent with how Bbarr defines DCT (he goes only that far), but not with most theists who accept it, who choose (5). The dillema applies to those and those alone.

Right. I should have said (3)(i) and (3)(ii). I got my wires crossed somewhere between my brain and my fingers.

I don't see where Bennet assumes (5). It only comes as a consequence of supporting assumptions (1) and (2) with (3)(ii.

Now choosing (3)(i), which is essentially what my argument, DOG, does without sacrificing the relevance of God, is certainly a way out of the dilemma. If I remember correctly, Socrates (3)(i) when he attempts to answer the question.

Bennet then writes that while the consequence of (3)(i), (i.e. (4)), is only a problem for the theist since it implies that God is irrelevant to moral problems (DOG challenges this claim.). Assuming then that most theists will take (3)(ii) instead, Bennet continues on to assail that position, eventually reaching (8).

The HPD then challenges (7) by arguing that while there is a reason why God could not (would not want to) command or remain silent concerning act A, this reason however exists in a plane beyond our reality and so it doesn't actually count as a "reason" in the context of (8). That doesn't seem very solid, so I must still be misrepresenting your argument. I think you and I are reading the whole problem quite differently.

From your last paragraph, I guess you have already decided that (3)(i), accepting (4), is a way out. You want to focus on (3)(ii), leading to (5) and eventually to (7)-(8), as you figure most theists will take this course (I have employed Euthyphro's Dilemma many times with theists since re-reading the dialogue a few years back. Nearly every theist chooses (3)(ii), and some defend it even to the point of justifying all sorts of atrocious acts. It's really quite uncomfortable for them 🙂 )

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]What I'm trying here is finding a way to go around this defense, so I can use this dilemma.

Well, I figured you might be taking some kind of “devil’s advocate” approach to it (hence my last parenthetical statement in my last post ...[text shortened]... us poor mortals. That, I still think, is a discussion stopper….
[/b]

I see no way around someone who is simply willing to stand on the assertion that God must have good reasons accessible only to God, and not us poor mortals. That, I still think, is a discussion stopper….

In practice, I encounter this line almost immediately after the theist has adopted (3)(ii). First, I will point out something along the lines of (8). I will then ask if God is the creator of this reason (that is did his role as Creator allow him to circumvent or alter the reason). If yes, then the "reason" is no longer a "reason" but still an apparently arbitrary choice. If no, then I assert that this means that God is bounded by some greater reality that contains at least some independent laws which give rise to the reason. They usually don't like this, as they begin to see the next turtle atop their god.

Another tack is then to get down to earth. "Are you saying that child rape is wrong because of something knowable only to God, that is you can think of no reason why child rape is wrong other than God says so (Sometimes I slip in Numbers 31 here to point that God may at times condone child rape.)? This almost always gets a "No!" answer, since it is obvious to nearly everyone that child rape is wrong at least in part because of the pain that it causes to the victim and his/her family.

Originally posted by telerion
[b]I see no way around someone who is simply willing to stand on the assertion that God must have good reasons accessible only to God, and not us poor mortals. That, I still think, is a discussion stopper….

In practice, I encounter this line almost immediately after the theist has adopted (3)(ii). First, I will point out something along the lines o ...[text shortened]... e is wrong at least in part because of the pain that it causes to the victim and his/her family.[/b]

So, basically, you can either "get down to earth" or not? That's basically where I stand. I think Palynka's looking for another way I'm just not seeing...

Originally posted by vistesd
So, basically, you can either "get down to earth" or not? That's basically where I stand. I think Palynka's looking for another way I'm just not seeing...

Well I think you, Palynka, and I all agree that we can concoct some pretty wild excuses to maintain whatever we want. In my discussion with my in-laws about God, I continually made the point when presenting each of my philosophical, moral, or natural problems, that anyone with a sufficiently liberal imagination can come up with an out. The important thing that I stressed to them was the need to always ask yourself, "Do I really believe what I am saying?"

Now they acted from the position of belief is justified so long as any defense can be mustered. That's why I think they just weren't really at the place to doubt.

Originally posted by telerion
Well I think you, Palynka, and I all agree that we can concoct some pretty wild excuses to maintain whatever we want. In my discussion with my in-laws about God, I continually made the point when presenting each of my philosophical, moral ...[text shortened]... at's why I think they just weren't really at the place to doubt.

I don’t think you, Palynka or I are in any real disagreement about the substance of this issue. And I commend P’s efforts to come up with a way to get around something like the HPD.

…the need to always ask yourself, "Do I really believe what I am saying?"

Very wise counsel, Tel. And, I would add, “Why or why not?” And keep doing it until it becomes ingrained. I need to take that to heart myself.

EDIT: I posted before I saw your addition:

Now they acted from the position of belief is justified so long as any defense can be mustered.

Been there, done that. Continually coming round again, trying to find the “what if?” that will allow me to cling to a belief tightly held and frightening to release. And you were, again, very sensitive and wise not to press at that point.

Originally posted by vistesd
[you really haven’t dented the DCT defender’s underlying position, at least as long as we’re talking about a God who—

1) is in any way “transcendent” to our realm of reality (a standard theistic view), and

2) is a generator of moral dicta.

I'm not trying to dent it, I'm defending DCT...

The difference is if God has moral reasons that we do not know, it would still make him an indirect source of moral. My exposure would make him a primal source of moral.

Edit: Primal only for certain instances of A.

Edit: I'm defending it, so I can see how to attack it.

Originally posted by telerion
I don't see where Bennet assumes (5). It only comes as a consequence of supporting assumptions (1) and (2) with (3)(ii.

Originally posted by bbarr
5) If (ii), then the moral wrongness of A is dependent on God’s forbidding A.

This is the reading of the dependency thesis that the vast majority of theists will accept. But there is a dilemma facing the theist who accepts this reading of the dependency thesis:

6) Suppose that A is wrong in virtue of God’s having forbade A. If so, then either there was no reason in virtue of which God forbade A, or there was at least one reason in virtue of which God forbade A.
--------

His exposure begins with the reading of the dependency theory he calls (5). The dillema begins there, for THOSE theists who accept that reading of the dependency theory.

Originally posted by Palynka
I'm not trying to dent it, I'm defending DCT...

The difference is if God has moral reasons that we do not know, it would still make him an indirect source of moral. My exposure would make him a primal source of moral.

Edit: Primal o ...[text shortened]... s of A.

Edit: I'm defending it, so I can see how to attack it.

This is what you said in one post:

Look, first of all I'm a devout atheist, so in my experience, most theists are quite imaginative. What I'm saying, is that it's not hard to escape the dilemma for them….

Note: What I'm trying here is finding a way to go around this defense, so I can use this dilemma.

Now you say this:

I'm not trying to dent it, I'm defending DCT...

I am confused. Is your ultimate intention here to save DCT by escaping the dilemma, or save the dilemma by “finding a way to go around” the HPD?

EDIT: OK, you answered that one with your edit while I was posting.

I might have missed it, but could you tell me how you’re using the word “exposure?” (Or just point me to the page where you explain what you mean by term here? Or just tell me that you did explain it somewhere here, and I’ll go back and hunt for it.)

Originally posted by Palynka
Originally posted by bbarr
[b]5) If (ii), then the moral wrongness of A is dependent on God’s forbidding A.

This is the reading of the dependency thesis that the vast majority of theists will accept. But there is a dilemma facing ...[text shortened]... HOSE theists who accept that reading of the dependency theory.[/b]

I think it begins earlier at (3). Choosing (3)(i) and therefore (4) puts the theist in a bind because it removes their deity as the grounding for morality. Typically, Euthyphro's Dilemma is presented against theists who assert this exact thing.

(5) is just the applicable case, and so Bennet expounds on this avenue further exposing that the dilemma isn't wholly addressed by (3)(ii).

I think I'm on the same page with you though, if I forget about the line (3)(i)-(4), and just assume (3)(ii) and go that route.

Originally posted by vistesd
I might have missed it, but could you tell me how you’re using the word “exposure?” (Or just point me to the page where you explain what you mean by term here? Or just tell me that you did explain it somewhere here, and I’ll go back and hunt for it.)

Probably the problem is with my English, but what do you call what bbarr has just did with the original posts?

Originally posted by telerion
I think I'm on the same page with you though, if I forget about the line (3)(i)-(4), and just assume (3)(ii) and go that route.

What I'm trying to say is that that is not your choice to make. If the theist chooses 3 ii) what do you say then?

Originally posted by Palynka
Probably the problem is with my English, but what do you call what bbarr has just did with the original posts?

Ah. I’d just call it a presentation of the argument—if you call it exposing the argument, that’s fine; I like it. It may even be a common term, just not one that I’d heard. Tel seems to have understood what you meant just fine.

BTW, if English is your second language, you use it well—better than many for whom it’s the first language. I don’t even have a second language.

Okay, I think I need to sit back and follow the discussion for a while…

Originally posted by Palynka
What I'm trying to say is that that is not your choice to make. If the theist chooses 3 ii) what do you say then?

I'm defending the DCT, so it is my choice to make.

Now if I'm attempting to undermine it, then you are right, I have to consider (3)(ii) as well. Bennet has offered the typical response to (3)(ii), namely (6) followed by either (7) and (8).

For anyone attempting to defend assumption (1) and (2), it seems that they have to make 2 choices. First, between (3)(i) and (3)(ii) and second, between (7) or (8). Now, I know the HPD takes the line (3)(ii), but I am still baffled as to whether it then chooses (7) or (8) because there seems to be some equivocation over the word "reason."

I will refer you to the my post above (fourth one on the page) for how I respond to (3)(ii) in practice. There are still more avenues to cover with it though so that post isn't complete by any means.