06 May 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesWhoa! Wait a minute. You mentioned a wager. I can assume that you received something as you won the wager. You did didn't you? You didn't? Then how can we conclude that he is reasonable? Maybe that's another issue.
Let us consider a real world example. Approximately 6 months ago, bbarr held a belief that John Kerry would be elected President. Based on this belief, he entered into a wager with me, challenging my belief that George Bush would be elected President.
It turned out that his belief was incorrect and mine was correct. However, one cannot conlcude anything about the reasonableness of either of our beliefs based on this fact.
06 May 05
Originally posted by kirksey957Scribs assumes GWB is president... couldn't this just be a bad dream? Bbarr's bad dream even?
Whoa! Wait a minute. You mentioned a wager. I can assume that you received something as you won the wager. You did didn't you? You didn't? Then how can we conclude that he is reasonable? Maybe that's another issue.
ES
06 May 05
1 edit
Originally posted by ColettiYou seem to be referring to telomeres (the 'tags'😉 and the disease progeria. Children with the disease have cells that divide faster. They don't have shorter telomeres.
That's okay. I'll restate.
It is the opinion of many scientist (who specialize in genetics) that there may be a genetic cure for aging.
It's closely related to the disease that causes premature aging in children - unrelated to envi ...[text shortened]... would cure aging. In their opinion, aging is a genetic disorder.
From what I understand, the telomere limit to lifespan is over 200 years. Humans nowadays don't reach this limit. The factors that kill us now get us before the telomeres run down. First we'd have to cure those other factors, and then at some later point we'd have to deal with the telomere barrier.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3664453.stm
06 May 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI think it would be reasonable to believe the top card is probably black. I think it would be unreasonable to believe that it is black.
A belief's reasonableness does not entail correctness. That is, beliefs can be both reasonable and incorrect.
Here is one example. Suppose I remove 25 red cards from a standard deck, leaving one red card and 26 black. I shuffle the deck. I hold that it is perfectly reasonable to believe that the top card is black, and I acknowledge that that ...[text shortened]... s does not entail that it is reasonable. That is, beliefs can be both correct and unreasonable.
Beliefs can be reasonable but incorrect when they are made on the basis of incomplete information.
06 May 05
Originally posted by ColettiWhat does it mean to 'cure' aging? This makes no sense to me. How old do
If theoretically aging could be cured - I don't know what limit there would be on "life-span." The term would not have the same connotation. It would become a reference to the probability of dieing from some disease or accident over a given period of time. For instance - even if aging were solved - the probability of getting killed by something else ov ...[text shortened]... ut it, it's hard to assume what the conditions were like that existed 1000 years in the past.
you suppose Noah appeared when he was, say, 350? What 'disease' afflicted
all humans that caused them to stop living so long?
We know from copious records of personal lives of people that precious few
people lived to be 100 within the past 2000, and that most people died in or
before their 50s. So, whatever 'afflicted' the entire human race must have
affected it before 2000 years ago.
Nemesio
06 May 05
5 edits
Originally posted by AThousandYoungIs it possible to believe that anything is certainly the case?
I think it would be reasonable to believe the top card is probably black. I think it would be unreasonable to believe that it is black.
Aren't all beliefs essentially probabilistic, and we just treat as negligible conditions such as
the probabilities that we are insane, that our senses are failing us, that God is manipulating our perceptions, that we are dreaming, etc.?
I hold that "to believe" and "to believe probabilisticly" are synonymous. I think this is a standard notion of belief among epistemologists, as I recall bbarr telling me one time that beliefs are justified if their probability of being true is greater than .5.
That's all a long way of saying that "I believe the top card is black" and "I believe the top card is probably black" are equivalent statements under my notion of belief.
After all, people don't make claims of belief about things that are generally accepted as certainly true. For example, nobody claims that "I believe there are 12 months in a year." Knowing that there are 12 months in a year is not a belief. The notion of belief is typically only invoked in universes of uncertainty anyway, so it's mainly irrelevant to have a notion of a belief in a certainty, and thus not much is lost by having the term have an implicit connotation of uncertainty. That is, the benefit of being able to succinctly say "I believe" rather than "I believe it is probably the case given the information available to me" outweighs the loss of not being able to distinguish between belief under certainty and belief under uncertainty without an explicit discussion such as this one.
06 May 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf, in a sack, there are two green balls, one red, one blue and one yellow, and if I
I think this is a standard notion of belief among epistemologists, as I recall bbarr telling me one time that beliefs are justified if their probability of being true is greater than .5.
reach my hand in there and grab one, is it unreasonable to say I believe that it is
green?
Nemesio
06 May 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Aren't all beliefs essentially probabilistic, and we just treat as negligible conditions such as
the probabilities that we are insane, that our senses are failing us, that God is manipulating our perceptions, that we are dreaming, etc.?... The notion of belief is typically only invoked in universes of uncertainty anyway, so it's mainly irrelevant to have a notion of a belief in a certainty, and thus not much is lost by having the term have an implicit connotation of uncertainty. That is, the benefit of being able to succinctly say "I believe" rather than "I believe it is probably the case given the information available to me" outweighs the loss of not being able to distinguish between belief under certainty and belief under uncertainty without an explicit discussion such as this one.
I believe I agree with this.
😉
Nemesio
06 May 05
Originally posted by NemesioYes, and I think I know what paradox you are getting at, which is one that I won't attempt to resolve. I'll leave it for the indebted professional to respond to.
If, in a sack, there are two green balls, one red, one blue and one yellow, and if I
reach my hand in there and grab one, is it unreasonable to say I believe that it is
green?
Nemesio
06 May 05
Originally posted by AThousandYoungMaybe. The show was from last year and it may be out of date. I usually consider NOVA to be a good source of scientific data. What is the latest theory on aging? I don't think the view is that aging is just an inevitable fact of life . It's an interesting subject.
You seem to be referring to telomeric (the 'tags'😉 and the disease Rogerio. Children with the disease have cells that divide faster. They don't have shorter telomeres.
From what I understand, the telomere limit to lifespan is over 200 years. Humans nowadays don't reach this limit. The factors that kill us now get us before the telomeres run ...[text shortened]... e to deal with the telomere barrier.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3664453.stm
I suppose the cells dividing faster was the reason they aged faster. But they never become full grown - so maybe their growth period never finishes before they start aging.
06 May 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesMy question was genuinely motivated. What paradox was I getting at?
Yes, and I think I know what paradox you are getting at, which is one that I won't attempt to resolve. I'll leave it for the indebted professional to respond to.
I was just imagining a bag with 100 balls, 49 green balls and 1 each of blue, yellow,
orange, and every other non-green color and wondering if it was irrational to believe
that I would pull out a green ball.
Everyone thinks I'm up to no good 😞
Nemesio
06 May 05
1 edit
Originally posted by NemesioThe paradox is that given the stated minimal criterion of a .5 probability for a justified belief, you can't believe that the ball is any color.
My question was genuinely motivated. What paradox was I getting at?
I was just imagining a bag with 100 balls, 49 green balls and 1 each of blue, yellow,
orange, and every other non-green color and wondering if it was irrational to bel ...[text shortened]... a green ball.
Everyone thinks I'm up to no good 😞
Nemesio
That is, you are justified in believing that the ball is not green (p=.6), not red (p=.8), not blue (p=.8) and not yellow (p=.8).
Each of those denials is a justified belief under the stated criterion. But their conjunction is equivalent to believing that the ball has no color, which denies the premise of the problem that each ball has a color.
06 May 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesMy question then is for the second scenario, would a person with that same information really believe the red card was on top? That is, without any other sources or experience or outside information to base the belief on - is that really a belief - or is it merely irrational wishfully thinking. I think it is most likely that the no-one would really believe in the red card.
A belief's reasonableness does not entail correctness. That is, beliefs can be both reasonable and incorrect.
Here is one example. Suppose I remove 25 red cards from a standard deck, leaving one red card and 26 black. I shuffle the deck. I hold that it is perfectly reasonable to believe that the top card is black, and I acknowledge that that ...[text shortened]... s does not entail that it is reasonable. That is, beliefs can be both correct and unreasonable.
Ask yourself - would knowing the odds are highly against it, could you believe the red card was on top? How?
06 May 05
Originally posted by NemesioYes, you'll be wrong more than half the time.
I was just imagining a bag with 100 balls, 49 green balls and 1 each of blue, yellow,
orange, and every other non-green color and wondering if it was irrational to believe
that I would pull out a green ball.
If you repeatedly wager even money on your belief, it is inevitable that you will end up broke.