God's Freedom?

Originally posted by BigDoggProblem
It IS watching two people who speak different languages. One speaks English; the other speaks well, whatever the hell that is.

I think the whole audience would agree with that statement, even if they do not agree on which one is which. 🙂

And now we have the forum motto.

Originally posted by KellyJay
How would you or I know, since neither of us are? I acknowledge His ways
are not mine, so does that mean being "perfectly rational" don't know, that
is your term not mine! It could be that being perfectly rational is flawed for
all I know! I've been asking you about choices, if they are real or not? If they
are the right ones or not? Can you have a good ...[text shortened]... tional"? I'd say if the answer to that question would go to
the heart of the discussion.
Kelly

Can you have a good, correct, right choice that is
not "perfectly rational"? I'd say if the answer to that question would go to
the heart of the discussion.

The answer is yes you can, but I guess I do not understand why you think this question would "go to the heart of the discussion". Here is a general example to show that the answer is yes. Suppose an agent has at least a couple live options in front of him -- say, A1 and A2. Suppose that A1 is the option in front of him that has the most and weightiest reasons behind it. Suppose A2 also has good reasons behind it, albeit not as numerous and weighty as A1. Then, it seems that the agent's choosing A2 is a good choice, even though the agent's choosing A1 would be maximally rational and to that extent better. The agent could presumably be deserving of praise for either choice, subject also to the extent to which the relevant reasons are available to the agent and depending on the extent of his or her cognitive abilities. But how is any of this relevant to the opening argument? The point is that being perfectly rational will entail always going with the choice that has the most and weightiest reasons behind it (A1 in this case) and there is no cognitive limitation here because the agent at issue is putatively omniscient. So, relative to the conception of freedom at issue, the question is still how is it possible that God could choose not to A1, if He is supposedly perfectly rational and omniscient by definition?

The only potential problem I see here for the argument is a technical issue, dealing with a special case. The special case would hold if A1 and A2 are, say, both equally rational. Then it appears that a being could choose either and still remain perfectly rational. In that case, I doubt premise (7) of the argument holds. I will consider what can be done to revise the argument to get around this problem.

Originally posted by RJHinds
Obviously, you're not perfectly rational.

It's okay. I will console myself with the fact that at least I can understand and follow simple arguments, discussions, etc.

Originally posted by LemonJello

Can you have a good, correct, right choice that is
not "perfectly rational"? I'd say if the answer to that question would go to
the heart of the discussion.

The answer is yes you can, but I guess I do not understand why you think this question would "go to the heart of the discussion". Here is a general example to show that the answer ...[text shortened]... ment holds. I will consider what can be done to revise the argument to get around this problem.

How about something like this to go between 4 and 5?

Specify a subset out of "all possible choices" in which there is one available option [A]
where the net positive relevant reasons for choosing that option outweigh the net
relevant reasons for choosing any other available option. [or words to that effect]

Then have the remainder of the argument restricted to that subset.

Given that the argument is valid as long as this new set is not vacant it doesn't diminish
the power of the argument and solves the problem.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Chaff.

Seems that LJ isn't done with his hissy fit.

Originally posted by BigDoggProblem
It IS watching two people who speak different languages. One speaks English; the other speaks well, whatever the hell that is.

I think the whole audience would agree with that statement, even if they do not agree on which one is which. 🙂

Yeah, it's pretty funny.

Much of the problem is that the argument has various conceptual problems which isn't surprising as LJ has not shown himself to be a very strong conceptual thinker over the years.

As an example consider the following conception of God:
1) God has free will.
2) God always chooses to be "perfectly rational".

A person with this conception of God could rightly define God as "perfectly rational".

A person with this conception of God would not say that "God COULD not have chosen not to A" but instead that "God WOULD not have chosen not to A".

A person with this conception of God might say something like the following as did KJ:

I have an issue that you set up your question so that God has no choice, than you asked me about God's choice!...If there is a choice and there is only the correct one to be made, well yea He will make the correct one. It isn't that He could not make the bad one, He just will not, as I wish I was like in all of mine.

Of course LJ hilariously responded with the following:

Do you see premise (5)? Premise (5) directly entails that God had a choice and that He chose to A...Yes, He has made the correct choice to A (the one with the relevant reasons in its favor). But if one's choosing to A is the most rational thing to do based on one's complete and exhaustive knowledge that the relevant net reasons are in favor of doing A; then choosing not to A would be less than perfectly rational on the same basis. So you explain it to me: how could it be possible for a being who is putatively perfectly rational, by definition, to do something that entails the lack of perfect rationality?

Originally posted by googlefudge
How about something like this to go between 4 and 5?

Specify a subset out of "all possible choices" in which there is one available option [A]
where the net positive relevant reasons for choosing that option outweigh the net
relevant reasons for choosing any other available option. [or words to that effect]

Then have the remainder of the argumen ...[text shortened]... is new set is not vacant it doesn't diminish
the power of the argument and solves the problem.

Yeah, thanks for the suggestion. I will consider this....

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Yeah, it's pretty funny.

Much of the problem is that the argument has various conceptual problems which isn't surprising as LJ has not shown himself to be a very strong conceptual thinker over the years.

As an example consider the following conception of God:
1) God has free will.
2) God always chooses to be "perfectly rational".

A person wit ...[text shortened]... tional, by definition, to do something that entails the lack of perfect rationality?
[/quote]

Seems to me that the one who does not understand how argumentation works is you.

This sort of argument is specific to a particular definition of God. If a theist's concept of God is different, then this particular argument simply does not apply to their notion of God, and they can safely write it off as N/A (not applicable). That is a fair and proper way of responding to this sort of argument.

What you are NOT supposed to do is change the definitions and yet still fight on within the argument's structure. The argument is tailored to specific definitions, so it is not reasonable to expect it to hold under different definitions.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Yeah, it's pretty funny.

Much of the problem is that the argument has various conceptual problems which isn't surprising as LJ has not shown himself to be a very strong conceptual thinker over the years.

As an example consider the following conception of God:
1) God has free will.
2) God always chooses to be "perfectly rational".

A person wit ...[text shortened]... tional, by definition, to do something that entails the lack of perfect rationality?
[/quote]

Apparently, you still have major reading comprehension issues. As I already clearly explained to you back when you first misrepresented the argument, the opening argument only purports to show that there is a problem when the attribute of perfect rationality is taken to be definitional to God, or part of His essential nature. See my second to last post on page 5 to understand why this distinction is important. (Not that I expect you to understand it.)

The conception of God you outline only seems to entail that it is a contingent fact that God, supposing He exists, chooses to be perfectly rational, not that it is a necessary attribute. It also does not follow, as you mistakenly seem to imply, that your (1) and (2) effectively equate to defining God as perfectly rational. Either that, or you are just being question-begging. A person can "rightly define" God by perfect rationality as well as omniscience and other omni-attributes, but then that person will need to jettison your (1), supposing the freedom at issue is of the relevant incompatibilist sort: that's basically what the argument purports to show.

Originally posted by BigDoggProblem
Seems to me that the one who does not understand how argumentation works is you.

This sort of argument is specific to a particular definition of God. If a theist's concept of God is different, then this particular argument simply does not apply to their notion of God, and they can safely write it off as N/A (not applicable). That is a fair and prop ...[text shortened]... specific definitions, so it is not reasonable to expect it to hold under different definitions.

This was the premise provided:
God is, by definition, perfectly rational.

This is what I wrote:

As an example consider the following conception of God:
1) God has free will.
2) God always chooses to be "perfectly rational".

A person with this conception of God could rightly define God as "perfectly rational".

Are you claiming that a person with that conception of God could not rightly define God as "perfectly rational"?

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
This was the premise provided:
God is, by definition, perfectly rational.

This is what I wrote:

As an example consider the following conception of God:
1) God has free will.
2) God [b]always chooses to be "perfectly rational".

A person with this conception of God could rightly define God as "perfectly rational".

Are you ...[text shortened]... that a person with that conception of God could not rightly define God as "perfectly rational"?[/b]

If I go to the Sahara and observe 100 days without clouds or rain then the weather will have been
perfectly sunny.

However it is not perfectly sunny by definition, because there is nothing inherent about the Sahara
that guarantees that there will never be any rain. In fact given long enough rain is certain.

Perfect sunniness is not an inherent [definitional] characteristic of the Sahara.

So no, unless god doesn't have a choice about being perfectly rational, then god is not perfectly
rational by definition.

And in fact, for a choice to exist then there must be a non-zero probability that any given choice god
makes will not be perfectly rational. Call the probability '~r'

So the probability 'Pr' of god being perfectly rational over 'n' decisions will be Pr = (1 - ~r)^n

As n --> Infinity so P --> 0

So if god is infinite, then the probability of god always being perfectly rational in your scheme is infinitesimal.

If there is a zero probability of god being not perfectly rational on any given choice then gods not being
perfectly rational is not optional. And god has no choice.



Thus the difference between your god concept and LJ's is that LJ's will be perfectly rational at all times with a
probability of 1.
Yours will be perfectly rational with a probability of 0+e as e tends to zero.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
This was the premise provided:
God is, by definition, perfectly rational.

This is what I wrote:

As an example consider the following conception of God:
1) God has free will.
2) God [b]always chooses to be "perfectly rational".

A person with this conception of God could rightly define God as "perfectly rational".

Are you ...[text shortened]... that a person with that conception of God could not rightly define God as "perfectly rational"?[/b]

If the concept 'God' is partially defined by the attribute of perfect rationality, then it will follow (analytically and thus necessarily) that God, supposing He exists, is perfectly rational. (I don't know what sense it would make to say that such a being "always chooses to be perfectly rational", since if it is perfectly rational by definition, what choice is there about it? But I take it that your 2) is supposed to express the fact that God is in fact always perfectly rational.) So, your 2) would follow from the fact that such a concept, so defined, is instantiated. However, the implication does not work the other way: just from your 1) and 2), it does not follow that the attribute of perfect rationality is definitional to the concept 'God'. This seems to be the source of your confusion.

And, as I already said, if you are just claiming that a person who defines God as perfectly rational is availed of both your 1) and 2), then that is question-begging with respect to the argument in question.

Originally posted by googlefudge
If I go to the Sahara and observe 100 days without clouds or rain then the weather will have been
perfectly sunny.

However it is not perfectly sunny by definition, because there is nothing inherent about the Sahara
that guarantees that there will never be any rain. In fact given long enough rain is certain.

Perfect sunniness is not an inherent ...[text shortened]... robability of 1.
Yours will be perfectly rational with a probability of 0+e as e tends to zero.

Word.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Yeah, it's pretty funny.

Much of the problem is that the argument has various conceptual problems which isn't surprising as LJ has not shown himself to be a very strong conceptual thinker over the years.

As an example consider the following conception of God:
1) God has free will.
2) God always chooses to be "perfectly rational".

A person wit ...[text shortened]... tional, by definition, to do something that entails the lack of perfect rationality?
[/quote]

Hey ThinkOfOne,

"You should read up on ego defense mechanisms. More than a few seem to apply."

🙂

Originally posted by googlefudge
If I go to the Sahara and observe 100 days without clouds or rain then the weather will have been
perfectly sunny.

However it is not perfectly sunny by definition, because there is nothing inherent about the Sahara
that guarantees that there will never be any rain. In fact given long enough rain is certain.

Perfect sunniness is not an inherent ...[text shortened]... robability of 1.
Yours will be perfectly rational with a probability of 0+e as e tends to zero.

Damn I enjoyed reading that... nicely done googlefudge :]