God's Freedom?

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]Anyone with marginal reading capabilities can see that the argument does not ultimately purport to show "that choosing perfectly rationally somehow precludes free will".

You're too funny LJ.

Anyone with marginal reading capabilities can see that my post does not say that the argument "ultimately purport[s] to show 'that choosing perfectly ra ...[text shortened]... You might want to make sure you understand what others have written before throwing a hissy fit.[/b]

Chaff.

Originally posted by LemonJello
What on earth does any of this have to do with the argument in the opening post? Are there are premises there that you disagree with? If so, which ones and why?

You said it wasn't a free choice, if God had good reasons to choose it.
My statement is so what it was the choice to make, so God makes it.
It is stiff a free choice, being able to make a choice means just that, you
are able to make a choice. To always pick the best one does not take
away that choices are being made, it only reveals that the best choices
will always be made.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
You said it wasn't a free choice, if God had good reasons to choose it.
My statement is so what it was the choice to make, so God makes it.
It is stiff a free choice, being able to make a choice means just that, you
are able to make a choice. To always pick the best one does not take
away that choices are being made, it only reveals that the best choices
will always be made.
Kelly

So which premise are you rejecting?

Originally posted by LemonJello
So which premise are you rejecting?

(C1) Therefore, God's choice to A was not free.

Originally posted by KellyJay
(C1) Therefore, God's choice to A was not free.

That's the conclusion, not a major premise. C1 follows from the premises that precede it, so you need to reject one of those.

Originally posted by LemonJello
That's the conclusion, not a major premise. C1 follows from the premises that precede it, so you need to reject one of those.

(9) From (2) & (6) & (8), God could not have chosen not to A.

If God could not chose, than it wasn't a choice. If God could chose than
God had a choice and picked the correct one.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
(9) From (2) & (6) & (8), God could not have chosen not to A.

If God could not chose, than it wasn't a choice. If God could chose than
God had a choice and picked the correct one.
Kelly

Of course it was a choice: premise (5), taken on supposition, entails that God made a choice to A, and premise (9) does not contradict this. Premise (9) is not claiming that "God could not choose". It is basically claiming that God could not have chosen other than He did choose.

At any rate, Premise (9) follows from (2)&(6)&(8). So are you rejecting one of these? Or are you saying that (9) does not logically follow from them?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Of course it was a choice: premise (5), taken on supposition, entails that God made a choice to A, and premise (9) does not contradict this. Premise (9) is not claiming that "God could not choose". It is basically claiming that God could not have chosen other than He did choose.

At any rate, Premise (9) follows from (2)&(6)&(8). So are you rejecting one of these? Or are you saying that (9) does not logically follow from them?

If God cannot choose than there isn't a choice to be made now is there?
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
If God cannot choose than there isn't a choice to be made now is there?
Kelly

I'm not understanding your objection to (9). Premise (9) does not assert that "God cannot choose". From premise (5), God can choose and in fact did choose to A. Now, given that and the other premises, what premise (9) is basically asserting is that God could not have chosen not to A.

Again, according to the argument, (9) follows from (2)&(6)&(8). So, to help me understand your objection to (9), it would be helpful to know if you would reject one or more of (2), (6), or (8); or else if you would claim that (9) does not logically follow from them.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I'm not understanding your objection to (9). Premise (9) does not assert that "God cannot choose". From premise (5), God can choose and in fact did choose to A. Now, given that and the other premises, what premise (9) is basically asserting is that God could not have chosen not to A.

Again, according to the argument, (9) follows from (2)&(6)&(8). ...[text shortened]... re of (2), (6), or (8); or else if you would claim that (9) does not logically follow from them.

" God could not have chosen..."

If God could not have chosen, than there isn't a choice. So what are you
asking about? If there is a choice to be made, and one is made, okay,
but as soon as you take away a choice there isn't one.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
" God could not have chosen..."

If God could not have chosen, than there isn't a choice. So what are you
asking about? If there is a choice to be made, and one is made, okay,
but as soon as you take away a choice there isn't one.
Kelly

Kelly, premise (9) is basically asserting that the fact God could not have chosen not to A is contigent upon the truth of all the following: God chose to A; God is perfectly rational by definition; God knew all relevant reasons for and against His choosing to A; and on the basis of all those relevant reasons, the reasons for God's choosing to A outweighed reasons against God's choosing to A.

Now, do you have some actual reason to think this is not so?

Again, it would be very helpful for me if you would state whether or not you would reject any of (2), (6), or (8); or whether or not it is your stance that (9) does not logically follow from these premises.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Kelly, premise (9) is basically asserting that God's not being able to have chosen not to A is contigent upon the truth of all the following: God chose to A; God is perfectly rational by definition; God knew all relevant reasons for and against His choosing to A; and on the basis of all those relevant reasons, the reasons for God's choosing to A outweighe ...[text shortened]... ons against God's choosing to A.

Now, do you have some actual reason to think this is not so?

You are still doing it, "God's not being able to have..." if God is not able,
than you are not speaking about a choice. If God has all the information
than makes a choice on data, than God makes the best choice, that is
just that. You cannot say God is "not being able..." because the ability
of choice is being able to make one.

Where "not being able" is not a choice, it is the only thing that was
ever going to happen no matter what.
Kelly

Originally posted by LemonJello
Premise (3) is not only false but outrageously false. I have argued against such an incompatibilist notion on these boards for years and years, on the basis that such a view is hopelessly confused and incoherent. Premise (4) is also outrageously false too, when the conception of freedom at issue is of this incompatibilist sort. I have also argued that ...[text shortened]... r God is not free, by your very own lights of what freedom consists in (given also (1) and (2)).

Fair enough.

Taking that as given...

Would it be possible to square the circle as it were, by checking to see if the
god was free to choose whatever option god wanted BEFORE taking into account
gods wishes?

So that god has the capability of choosing anything, but then gods nature dictates
which options god does in fact actually pick?


If I was a theist committed to such a view of free will and such a view of god that
would probably be my attempted out.


EDIT: Interestingly it looks to me like Kelly is taking exactly this route.

Originally posted by KellyJay
You are still doing it, "God's not being able to have..." if God is not able,
than you are not speaking about a choice. If God has all the information
than makes a choice on data, than God makes the best choice, that is
just that. You cannot say God is "not being able..." because the ability
of choice is being able to make one.

Where "not being able" is not a choice, it is the only thing that was
ever going to happen no matter what.
Kelly

Ok, I can see we are getting nowhere here. In what follows below, I will simply make my case for why (9) does in fact follow from (2)&(6)&(8). Then, it will be your turn to tell me why (9) should still be rejected: be prepared that it will require your presenting some actual argument against (2) or (6) or (8); or your presenting some actual argument for why (9) does not follow from the conjunction of these.

Again, we have supposed for the sake of this discussion that God has chosen to A. Now, since God is perfectly rational, it follows that God made this choice to A on the basis of reasons for His doing so and that these reasons for His doing so outweighed reasons for His not doing so (and He has full access to all such reasons in virtue of His omniscience). Now, given this, could God have chosen not to A? No...because to choose not to A when armed with the knowledge that the reasons for choosing to A outweigh the reasons for choosing not to A would be a violation of perfect rationality; and hence would contradict the supposition that He is perfectly rational.

Now, the above alone is not sufficient to support (9). That's because one could simply object that although God is perfectly rational and always so acts, this is still consistent with its being possible that God could act otherwise. That is, they could object that it is merely contingently the case that God is perfectly rational, such that there is still some possible world where God chooses to not A even armed with the knowledge that the reasons for His A-ing outweigh those against His A-ing. But this is where we need to invoke the "by definition" part of premise (2). If perfect rationality is simply definitionally part of the concept 'God', then if God exists, God is necessarily perfectly rational. Hence there are no possible worlds wherein such a being chooses not to A when doing so would entail violation of perfect rationality, since it results in contradiction with that being's putative essence.

Ok, now your turn....

Originally posted by googlefudge
Fair enough.

Taking that as given...

Would it be possible to square the circle as it were, by checking to see if the
god was free to choose whatever option god wanted BEFORE taking into account
gods wishes?

So that god has the capability of choosing anything, but then gods nature dictates
which options god does in fact actually pick?


...[text shortened]... attempted out.


EDIT: Interestingly it looks to me like Kelly is taking exactly this route.

If the theist wants to stick to his incompatibilist conception of freedom and wants God to be free, I think the theist should simply deny that God is necessarily perfectly rational...such that God is, in fact, perfectly rational in the actual world but such that there are possible worlds in which He is not. I think this particular problem with God's freedom then evaporates.