Originally posted by Palynka
As you know, I have no formal training in philosophy so I didn't know that there is a standard argument against that.
My own thoughts on this is that I do not see a way for an omniscient being to be fallible on a belief, unless he commits a very basic formal logical mistake.
As far as I see it, all propositions would be completely tautological. If you want to justify proposition P, all you need to do is: Since P, therefore P.
My own thoughts on this is that I do not see a way for an omniscient being to be fallible on a belief
When I talk about (in)fallibility here, the question is not about whether or not God holds any mistaken beliefs. An omniscient being surely won't hold any false beliefs because he will know the truth value of all propositions. Rather, the question is about whether or not it is even possible for God to hold any mistaken beliefs (again, the modal construal, however, is unclear to me, which is the whole reason I started the thread).
Your comment here reminds me of a discussion I had with vistesd where we were considering whether or not omniscience requires (or necessarily supposes) some infallibilist account of knowledge. I didn't and still don't think it does because I don't see why omniscience would be incompatible with a fallibilist account of knowledge. That one's beliefs are fallible just means roughly that it is broadly possible (again, what's the construal?) that he is mistaken; it doesn't necessarily imply that any of his beliefs actually are mistaken. A fallibilist account wouldn't, as far as I can tell, preclude one from knowing the truth value of all propositions. I agree that it is awkward on some level to talk about an omniscient being whose knowledge is fallible, but I do not think it is inconsistent. But at any rate, I think in the VAST majority of cases when a theist talks about God as omniscient, he has in mind an infallibilist account. Beyond saying that God is omniscient, he also means to say that it is also not possible for God to be mistaken (again, though, I am confused as the modal construal, which is what I hope to explore in this thread).
I think these are very interesting questions that I tried to explore in
Thread 88908 and vistesd and others had some great comments there.
As far as I see it, all propositions would be completely tautological. If you want to justify proposition P, all you need to do is: Since P, therefore P.
I'm not sure I follow. Are you saying that all propositions would be tautological to an omniscient being? I guess technically (bbarr can correct me if I am wrong here) a tautology is a logical truth that owes its truth completely to its truth-functional connectives, irrespective of the valuation of its atomic propositions. For instance, "P or not-P" is a tautology, and it is trivially true irrespective of what proposition P is. Since an omniscient being is supposed to know the valuations of all P, it doesn't make sense to me that everything would become tautological to it, where information on the valuations of the propositions becomes immaterial in a sense. So I'm not following.
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Basically, the problem I have is that people often throw around the idea of God's infallibility. But what does it actually mean or entail? I am trying to explore it a bit in this thread (as something of a follow-up to the later pages of the thread I cited above).