Moral Principles for Catholic Voters

Originally posted by dottewell
You keep saying that but, for example in the case of voting age, the difference between the position I stated and yours is of no practical difference whatsoever.

It's you who are missing the point; I am not saying that you don't have (certain) rights until society says so. I am saying that you acquire (certain) rights with age. Whether society re ...[text shortened]... es that it a different issue entirely. (Although hopefully an enlightened society will do so.)

Dottewell: I am not saying that you don't have (certain) rights until society says so. I am saying that you acquire (certain) rights with age.

Huh? If you don't acquire the right until you reach a certain age, you don't have it before. So in your scenario, a child doesn't have a right to vote (which is, of course, a shorthand way of saying the right to have some say in the political process). However, in my scenario he possesses the right but if society has a sufficiently important countervailing interest it can requlate or restrict his expression of said right. However, such restrictions are disfavored and must be supported by a compelling reason, not just some preference of the majority.

Sorry, but the difference is more than semantics. It is basic to Fundamental Rights philosophy.

Originally posted by no1marauder
Dottewell: I am not saying that you don't have (certain) rights until society says so. I am saying that you acquire (certain) rights with age.

Huh? If you don't acquire the right until you reach a certain age, you don't have it before. So in your scenario, a child doesn't have a right to vote (which is, of course, a shorthand way of saying the r ...[text shortened]... ry, but the difference is more than semantics. It is basic to Fundamental Rights philosophy.

My point is that it is not (on my view) society that decides when rights are acquired, any more than it is society that decides (on your view) that we have rights.

Rather, it is a consequence of our nature and the intrinsic value of human life, autonomy, etc.

Any "compelling reason" for denying someone their right, on your view, would presumably be a "compelling reason" for saying somone has not yet acquired a particular right on the view I am putting forward.

Originally posted by dottewell
My point is that it is not (on my view) society that decides when rights are acquired, any more than it is society that decides (on your view) that we have rights.

Rather, it is a consequence of our nature and the intrinsic value of human life, autonomy, etc.

Any "compelling reason" for denying someone their right, on your view, would p ...[text shortened]... for saying somone has not yet acquired a particular right on the view I am putting forward.

Why? Why would there have to be a "compelling reason" that "someone has not yet acquired a particular right" in your view? Obviously from the standard Fundamental Rights theory a "compelling reason" is needed to restrict or regulate an existing right, but why would you need such a reason to say someone doesn't have the right at all?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I did wonder why you were up so late. 🙂

(1) clearly states that there is no physical damage. One way of looking at it would be to think of, say, an android whose "brain" is shut off while its battery is recharging (1a).

(2) and (3) state that there is physical damage, but I don't see why the "extent" of physical damage is relevant. It's , I am curious as to what conditions would justify treating a non-person as a person.

(1) clearly states that there is no physical damage. One way of looking at it would be to think of, say, an android whose "brain" is shut off while its battery is recharging (1a).

No, you said that V was injured in a car accident, and that there seemed to be no brain damage. One wonders why V would be in a coma after an accident that caused absolutely no damage to V’s brain. You can forgive me for thinking you were making an epistemic point about when we ascribe personhood to folks, since you employed an epistemic term (“seems”, which relates to the evidence one has at one’s disposal). Additionally, why make mention of V’s “showing no signs of responsiveness" in your example, unless you were making a point about the evidence we have at our disposal regarding V’s condition? Further, your examples in 1b, 1c, and 1d all rely on the confidence in recovery that experts have regarding V. Both ‘confidence’ and ‘experts’ are explicitly epistemic notions in this context. So, please, don’t tell me that you weren’t conflating metaphysical points with epistemic ones, because it’s absolutely clear from what you wrote that you were.

But, whatever, just try to be clearer and I’ll try to do the same. Now, if there is no significant damage to V’s brain, then I doubt for neurophysiological reasons that V is no longer a person. Presumably, if there is no actual damage to V’s brain, then V is still aware of all sorts of things, still has beliefs and desires, etc. In fact, I find it hard to imagine how V could be in a coma at all unless there was some sort of insult to his brain.

So, since your example here is less than clear, let’s talk about the android. Suppose that the android is a person and that his brain has some sort of ‘off’ switch. When in the ‘off’ position, I would say the android is still a person, with all the same capabilities, yet that these capabilities can’t be manifested. Similarly, I now have the capability to drive a car, even when I don’t have a car at my disposal. There are factors that prevent me from manifesting that capability, yet the capability remains. Roughly, my having a capacity to X involves possessing the internal causal infrastructure sufficient, in the absence of privation of resources, for X-ing. Apply this to your examples above.

But, since you mention it, I am curious as to what conditions would justify treating a non-person as a person.

This is a different discussion, and one we can have after you’ve explained to me the following notions:

(1) ‘in potency’ (pace my previous questions).
(2) Intellect
(3) Will

Originally posted by no1marauder
Why? Why would there have to be a "compelling reason" that "someone has not yet acquired a particular right" in your view? Obviously from the standard Fundamental Rights theory a "compelling reason" is needed to restrict or regulate an existing right, but why would you need such a reason to say someone doesn't have the right at all?

There wouldn't have to be. What I'm saying is that if a reason is, on your view, compelling, then it would presumably carry the same weight on my view, and win the argument. So the moral conclusion, and the consequences (x should not be permitted to do y) would be the same.

I'm worried that there is some slippage here between what is the best way, pragmatically, of arranging a society (knowing people's limitations) and the "metaphysical" question of what rights people actually have (very roughly: what they would be allowed to do in a morally 'ideal' society). Perhaps you can give me an example of where, on your view, someone would be afforded a "full" exercisable right, whereas on my view they would be afforded no right.

Originally posted by dottewell
There wouldn't have to be. What I'm saying is that if a reason is, on your view, compelling, then it would presumably carry the same weight on my view, and win the argument. So the moral conclusion, and the consequences (x should not be permitted to do y) would be the same.

I'm worried that there is some slippage here between what is the best way ...[text shortened]... forded a "full" exercisable right, whereas on my view they would be afforded no right.

My mind reading skills are insufficient to embark on such an exercise.

Fundamental Rights theory begins with the idea that human societies are formed to protect the rights of individuals. Concentrating on the "compellingness" of the reason to deny that someone has a right is putting the cart before the horse.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Well, a zygote at conception carries the genetic blueprint for an intellect and a will and the necessary biochemical processes that will (if uninterrupted) lead to the realisation of those powers. In that sense, it has the "capacity" for an intellect and will.

What do you understand by "capacity for intellect and will"?

What you have described is not a capacity for an intellect and a will -- it's merely the potential to have a capacity for an intellect and a will. A capacity is such that it could be exercised under appropriate conditions. Presumably, though, there are necessary frameworks causally involved in the exercise of an intellect and a will (I'm not exactly sure what precisely you mean by these). The zygote at conception -- a single cell -- lacks this framework, and therefore does not have the capacity for an intellect and a will. It merely has the potential for this capacity.

I think I need clarification on "in potency":

"If X is in potency Y, then X is in the process of becoming Y."

What about the opposite direction? Is it satisfied generally, or is potency something restricted to only certain X? The problem I have is that I am just not sure how I am supposed to identify potency from this. And, supposing the opposite direction holds, how am I supposed to identify a process of becoming? My guess is that you identify the zygote as in potency a being with an intellect and a will basically for the reason you already cited:

Well, a zygote at conception carries the genetic blueprint for an intellect and a will and the necessary biochemical processes that will (if uninterrupted) lead to the realisation of those powers.

So is this generally how I am supposed to identify potency? That I should say that X is in potency Y if it is expected or sufficiently likely that, barring unforeseen circumstance or external imposition, X will become Y? I'm not trying to be dense: I am just trying to understand how you are identifying the zygote as in potency a being with an intellect and a will. And if this is how you are doing it, I just don't see how this is anything other than an identification of potentiality.

Originally posted by lucifershammer

A person is a being that possesses (whether in act or potency) an intellect and a will.

Based on your criterion, am I correct to conclude that some person who experiences higher-brain death is then not a person -- based on the conclusion that they possess neither intellect nor will in potency or in act following higher-brain death?

Originally posted by no1marauder
My mind reading skills are insufficient to embark on such an exercise.

Fundamental Rights theory begins with the idea that human societies are formed to protect the rights of individuals. Concentrating on the "compellingness" of the reason to deny that someone has a right is putting the cart before the horse.

Fine, I'll leave it at that then. But I would point out that a theory that says some rights are acquired at (or before) birth, while others are acquired later, could take a similar view of the formation of human societies.

Originally posted by bbarr
[b]So is 'potency', Bennett. Quid pro quo. But thanks for the definitions.

Right, and so is ‘substance’, pace your response to No1. Look, this exploration is being conducted at a pretty high level, so you shouldn’t hold it against folks that they may not be familiar with philosophical terms of art like ‘substance’ (terms with roughly as many meanings a ...[text shortened]... different sort of state than then beliefs of the layman.[/b]

Right, and so is ‘substance’, pace your response to No1. Look, this exploration is being conducted at a pretty high level, so you shouldn’t hold it against folks that they may not be familiar with philosophical terms of art like ‘substance’

I generally don't.


Right, so some early fetus lacking mentality is both in act that fetus, in potency a slightly older fetus also lacking mentality, in potency an adult with normal psychology, and in potency a corpse.

I think it's possible to argue that a corpse is not the same being as the person who was alive before, but I'm not making that argument here for the moment.


One wonders why, regarding the moral status of the fetus, we ought to privilege one sort of thing the fetus is in potency.

We aren't. In a discussion on moral status, it stands out on its own as a point where the moral status is very clear.


What else, do you think, has to be added to the account of ‘in potency’?

Well, Y would have to be the same being as X -- but that's where our discussion on boxes comes in.


Also, you seem to be claiming that it is constitutive of personhood in act that an entity has an intellect and will. How sophisticated does a creature’s intellect have to be to qualify? How sophisticated does the will have to be?

Not very sophisticated. I think rudimentary reason should suffice for 'intellect', some degree of intent for 'will'.


Suppose you glued the boxes together, would they then be substantial in a more philosophically interesting sense?

I'm not disputing that the boxes, taken individually, are substantial. But, yes, gluing the boxes together would make the resultant mereological sum substantial in my view.


Do these brute physical manipulations of the boxes fundamentally change their metaphysical status?

Not individually. But it does change the status of the sum.


There will be some different part/whole relational properties, and some different modal properties, but our relational and modal properties change through time and this doesn’t worry you in the slightest.

Could you elaborate a bit more on 'relational' and 'modal properties'?


Why on earth should the respective distance of an object’s parts matter as far as the metaphysical nature of the whole object is concerned?

It doesn't. What matters is that there are properties that inhere to the mereological sum that is not simply adding up similar properties in the constituents. The Spinozan formulation cited earlier is probably a more eloquent way of putting what i have in mind.

Originally posted by whiterose
It can't. It would be like saying that you should not be allowed to cut off your finger because it would not be in the best interest of the cells in the finger, as they would die.

Cutting off your finger harms both you and your finger. Murdering someone harms both you and that individual. Aborting your unborn child harms both you and your unborn child.

Originally posted by sven1000
Cutting off your finger harms both you and your finger. Murdering someone harms both you and that individual. Aborting your unborn child harms both you and your unborn child.

And using Listerine "harms" the germs that cause bad breath. Point?

EDIT: It's debateable whether an abortion truly harms the person getting it; obviously they've made the call that whatever "harm" can and/or does occur to them is more than offset by the benefits they feel they gain from having the abortion.

Originally posted by no1marauder
And using Listerine "harms" the germs that cause bad breath. Point?

EDIT: It's debateable whether an abortion truly harms the person getting it; obviously they've made the call that whatever "harm" can and/or does occur to them is more than offset by the benefits they feel they gain from having the abortion.

If you think using Listerine also harms yourself, then I agree it belongs with the above statements. With each statement, different individuals/societies with differing points of view will value the harm done to the members involved with varying levels of concern.
Most (I dare say all) of us will be more concerned with the suffering we feel from the loss of a finger, than the fact that the cells in the finger die. Likewise, assuming using Listerine causes us essentially no harm, most of us are unconcerned about the fate of those germs causing bad breath, and thus enjoy the use of mouthwash.
However, we certainly have different points of view based on circumstances concerning killing of another human being. The person killed quite likely disapproves (though who is to say once they are dead?). Societies hold the killer accountable in different ways based on the situation; self-defence, euthanasia, abortion, war, cold-blooded unprovoked murder, etc... (Yes, I know that some people disagree that abortion belongs within the context of killing another person.)
How can any one of us decree that another person's valuing of the harm is right or wrong? A person who believes abortion is tantamount to murder has great concern about the ongoing approbation of abortion, while one who feels abortion is on the order of using Listerine certainly disagrees. I don't think either side has a grounded position from which to say the other side is wrong. I wonder if a fetus, which was to be aborted, had a chance to grow into a rational, adult human would say, "You know what, I really wish you had aborted me in the womb, so I wouldn't have had to live." How many of us think our parents should have aborted us? If we had a chance to consult with them as they considered aborting us, what would we suggest? It is easy to consider abstractly aborting some unknown and impersonal clump of cells, just like a case of bad breath. But every one of us, and everyone we love and care about, once was a clump of cells like that.
As entertaining as it has been to read this thread, it only reinforces my point of view that philosophy's only contribution to intellectual life is to provide a framework for us to argue...it doesn't ever come to any unassailable answer or result. The art is to build your framework of definitions so as to hedge in your opponent intellectually until they have no room to maneuver, very much an exalted version of "I'm rubber, you're glue, what you say bounces off of me and sticks to you."