Originally posted by lucifershammer
So a perfectly intelligent, conscious, sentient being would fail to be a person simply because it cannot experience physical pain or negative emotions?

Is there a reason behind it or is it just an arbitrary line-in-the-sand definition thingy? Why is this whole "capacity for suffering" bit so critical to your definition of personhood?

EDIT: This ...[text shortened]... ginning to remind me of the case of R. Andrew Martin in Asimov's The Bicentennial Man.

No, for the last time. The capacity to suffer is important because it is a precondition for having interests. If there are no psychological states an entity would prefer; if nothing could go better or worse from its own point of view, then it could have no desires for alternate states of affairs and, hence, no interests. Being a creature that can have interests certainly seems morally relevant to me! Also, and for the last time, Data has psychological states that are functionally identical to our emotional states, and though he explains them in different ways, he has states that are (both cognitively, affectively, and motivationally) clearly meant by the writers of TNG to be analogues of our emotional states. Maybe his states don't have the felt "oomph" of ours, but they certainly suffice for meeting my criterion as specified above.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
The following cases are about rational, sentient beings (human or otherwise).

1. X is injured in a car accident and is in a coma. X's brain seems to be physically undamaged, but X shows no signs of responsiveness.

a. Is X a person?

The experts say this phenomenon is quite routine and fully expect X to wake up any time.

b. Is X a person?
...[text shortened]... s and personality in the process, but retain intelligence and sentience.

b. Is X a person?

None of these cases are explained in sufficient detail. The short answer to your budget of cases is this: If they have the capacities, then they are persons.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
What does 'nomological' and 'mereological' mean? Could you define these please?

If X is in potency Y, then X is in the process of becoming Y.

That's the simplest way of putting it. It might be more or less the same as your third formulation. But a simple sum of some particular sperm and some particular ovum would not qualify as in potency anythi ...[text shortened]... course, we can speak of a new substantial being (the older sperm and ovum cease to exist).

'Nomological' and 'Mereological' are technical terms in philosophy, LH.

'Nomological' relates to the actual, phyiscal laws of the universe. So, to say that some event is nomologically possible means that the physical laws of the universe do not preclude that event. So, there may be some events that are logically possible but nomologically impossible, but all nomologically possible events are logically possible. Other modal concepts (e.g., necessity) also have nomological analogues.

'Mereological' relates to the relation of parts to wholes, and a 'mereological sum' is an object composed of distinct parts. So, for any object A and object B there will be an object C of which A and B are parts and which is the mereological sum of A and B.

Now, you claim the following:

"If X is in potency Y, then X is in the process of becoming Y."

Does the converse relation hold? Is the following claim true?:

"If X is in the process of becoming Y, then X is in potency Y"

There is no reason to think that merelogical sums can't be substantial in any philosophically interesting sense. Go back and read that Stanford Encyclopedia article on substance. Once you find the notion of substance that you think undergirds your theory, then we can proceed. You probably don't want to go with that little definition provided above, because that is primarily concerned with using 'substance' in a manner that distinguishes objects from properties (accidents, in the old jargon), and properties can certainly inhere (if anything can actually inhere) in merelogical sums.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
something that exists by itself and in which accidents or attributes inhere; that which receives modifications and is not itself a mode; something that is causally active; something that is more than an event.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/substance
(Defn 10a)

Then so is the germ that causes bad breath a "substantial being". Of what possible relevance is meeting this definition as regards this particular topic?

Originally posted by dottewell
Indeed, there is a healthy debate about when the right can be said to be acquired; there seems to be general agreement, however, that is it at "adulthood" (though differences on how that is defined). And even if there wasn't, that wouldn't affect the moral point that the right to participate directly in representative democracy (by voting) is acquir ain age, whatever that age may be. It's just a difference of opinion over the detail.

No rights are absolute, all are subject to reasonable regulation if that relations furthers a legitimate state interest and is the least restrictive means of acheiving the interest. LH is correct that a right exists in the stakeholder even if it cannot be presently exercised; in the case of an 11 year old his right to vote is "inchoate". However, since it is beyond question that he is being with rights while the entire question here is whether a zygote has rights at all, it aids him none in this discussion.

EDIT: Locke argues that children have the same moral rights as any other person, though the child's inadequate mental faculties make it permissible for his parents to rule over him to a limited degree. "Thus we are born Free, as we are born Rational; not that we have actually the Exercise of either: Age that brings one, brings with it the other too." (Second Treatise, sec.61)

http://www.cyberessays.com/Politics/111.htm (I don't agree with all the points made in this discussion though the issue of a parent's obligation to its child is outside the scope of this thread).

Originally posted by no1marauder
No rights are absolute, all are subject to reasonable regulation if that relations furthers a legitimate state interest and is the least restrictive means of acheiving the interest. LH is correct that a right exists in the stakeholder even if it cannot be presently exercised; in the case of an 11 year old his right to vote is "inchoate". However, since i ...[text shortened]... tire question here is whether a zygote has rights at all, it aids him none in this discussion.

You approach moral issues from a rights-based perspective; I don't. What is the practical difference between saying (a) someone has a right to vote which can be exercised only when they reach maturity, and (b) someone has a right to vote only when they reach maturity? To me the latter is more in accordance with common sense; we would not normally speak of a three-year-old having the (inchoate) "right to vote".

Originally posted by dottewell
You approach moral issues from a rights-based perspective; I don't. What is the practical difference between saying (a) someone has a right to vote which can be exercised only when they reach maturity, and (b) someone has a right to vote only when they reach maturity? To me the latter is more in accordance with common sense; we would not normally speak of a three-year-old having the (inchoate) "right to vote".

Having "rights" that pop up at State OKed stages of an individual's life is an incoherent philosophy not matter how much you think it accords with "common sense".

Originally posted by no1marauder
Having "rights" that pop up at State OKed stages of an individual's life is an incoherent philosophy not matter how much you think it accords with "common sense".

Compare:

Having "inchoate rights" that are fully achieved at State OKed stages of an individual's life is an incoherent philosophy not matter how much you think it accords with "common sense".

Originally posted by dottewell
It is no more or less coherent than saying:

Having "inchoate rights" that are fully achieved at State OKed stages of an individual's life is an incoherent philosophy not matter how much you think it accords with "common sense".

You obviously didn't bother to look at the Locke site provided.

There is nothing incoherent in saying that people have Natural Rights which adhere to them when they are born due to their nature. If there is, then Western civilization is "incoherent". Your paraphrase in a futile attempt to be clever doesn't change that. Either you have a right at birth or you don't and whether and/or when the State recognizes it is irrelevant.

Originally posted by dottewell
Compare:

Having "inchoate rights" that are fully achieved at State OKed stages of an individual's life is an incoherent philosophy not matter how much you think it accords with "common sense".

It avoids the self-contradictory stance that you have "rights" the existence of which are wholly dependent on other's actions.

Originally posted by no1marauder
You obviously didn't bother to look at the Locke site provided.

There is nothing incoherent in saying that people have Natural Rights which adhere to them when they are born due to their nature. If there is, then Western civilization is "incoherent". Your paraphrase in a futile attempt to be clever doesn't change that. Either you have a right at birth or you don't and whether and/or when the State recognizes it is irrelevant.

Don't try to patronise me. I've read pretty much every word John Locke ever wrote. I doubt you can say the same.

It is simply not the case that the only coherent ethical theory is a rights-based ethical theory.

But anyway, even if we assume that people have rights due to their nature, what is "incoherent" about saying that the rights that a child and a mature adult have could be different? They have different "natures", after all. What on earth is "incoherent" about saying that some rights accrue as our "nature" changes and develops?

Who decides when an incohate right becomes a full right? The state? You? etc. etc. etc. etc.

Originally posted by no1marauder
It avoids the self-contradictory stance that you have "rights" the existence of which are wholly dependent on other's actions.

In the apparent spirit of misrepresentation:

Your children must be so grateful to have "rights" they can only exercise when you tell them they can!

Originally posted by dottewell
Don't try to patronise me. I've read pretty much every word John Locke ever wrote. I doubt you can say the same.

It is simply not the case that the only coherent ethical theory is a rights-based ethical theory.

But anyway, even if we assume that people have rights due to their nature, what is "incoherent" about saying that the rights that a child an cides when an incohate right becomes a full right? The state? You? etc. etc. etc. etc.

Well, let's see. I've read everything Locke wrote concerning Natural Rights theory and a vast amount of material by other authors on the same philosophy. I know you can't say the same.

Second sentence: non sequitur. I merely said your stance was incoherent not any non-rights based ethical theory was incoherent.

"Inchoate" is an adjective modifying right and means that the right is in existence but is not presently capable of being exercised. It is a "full" right so your "objection" is nonsensical.

Originally posted by dottewell
In the apparent spirit of misrepresentation:

Your children must be so grateful to have "rights" they can only exercise when you tell them they can!

They should be. You are again confusing the power to withhold rights (perhaps legitimately depending on the state's interest) with their non-existence. How much Locke did you actually read?

Originally posted by no1marauder
"Inchoate" is an adjective modifying right and means that the right is in existence but is not presently capable of being exercised. It is a "full" right so your "objection" is nonsensical.

Actually, I probably could say that.

Non sequitur - okay, I'll give you that.

It's not an objection. I'm asking what's incoherent about saying - given that we have rights as a result of our nature - that rights accrue as our nature changes.