Omnipotence?

To Tacoandlettuce.

If only all persons of christain faith had your depth of understanding, then christianity would certainly have much more worth.

vishva

Originally posted by tacoandlettuce
Also, pardon if I sound any self righteous, for I am far from living in full abidance of my Heavenly Father Mother God Good, yet am in a rather LARGE rectification process, and have been, for the past 7 yrs. on the streets of Waikiki Oahu, with not a place to lay my head...

At least you have a computer or access to one.

Originally posted by josephw
At least you have a computer or access to one.

Amen, yes, I goto a cafe, which in much ways is my sanctuary, a sort of therapy from my hell I have built upon me that I will overcome!

And thank you vishva

As I can say the same of you...

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Thinking about the stone thing again, I realise I treated the unliftability of the stone as brute. But if the problem is framed as a stone too heavy for an omnipotent agent G to lift, then the contradiction is there from the start, because omnipotent agents can exert any amount of lifting force. So it reduces to 'can G who possesses an ability to e ...[text shortened]... force create an immovable object?'
O3 says no because this state of affairs is contradictory.

I was thinking of G playing a game: a state of affairs is brought about according to the rules of which G is constrained (eg. in a universe that contains a rock that G cannot lift); only by ending the game (lifting the rock) can G escape from self constraint -- but then it's game over, a universe is destroyed ... If G wishes the game to continue, then the rock is de facto unliftable.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
I was thinking of G playing a game: a state of affairs is brought about according to the rules of which G is constrained (eg. in a universe that contains a rock that G cannot lift); only by ending the game (lifting the rock) can G escape from self constraint -- but then it's game over, a universe is destroyed ... If G wishes the game to continue, then the rock is de facto unliftable.

That's an interesting idea.

I suppose what this problem is about is whether there are any global constraints on all games available to G. Perhaps, even for G, there are certain things that must obtain in order for it to be the case that G is playing a game.

Originally posted by tacoandlettuce
My friend, I did not graduate from High school, nor could I ever fathom to. However, what is considered knowledge that is earthly has never mattered to me.. True- knowledge is wisdom of spiritual understanding, which is all I have interest in attaining, not what "would be called" scholastic.

Fair enough but that's no excuse for cut-and-paste. I think it's much better when you just say what you think.

Originally posted by Palynka
Well, the temporal relations are not necessarily an issue for the theist in my view, as he can simply claim that such a God could limit his omnipotence...but why would he? As you note, capacity for change is not the same as executing change.

In fact, from a first glance it seems to me that such an accidental omnipotent God can actually do more than ...[text shortened]... what the theists have more in mind.

Sorry if I'm hijacking your thread with this tangent...

You are not hijacking at all. This is all completely relevant. I agree with you that it could seem at the surface that this accidentally omnipotent (AO-) being can do more than an essentially omnipotent (EO-) being. I am unsure, though, whether or not this claim will survive deeper scrutiny; and, even supposing it does, I would still be unsure as to whether or not this ability for the AO-being to "do more" actually translates into any genuine power advantage.

Here are some (hopefully) relevant considerations. Taking your example earlier, the AO-being could (let's suppose) bring it about that he is an amoeba (and no longer omnipotent). The EO-being cannot, for although presumably he could behave as an amoeba and willfully refrain from fully exercising his capacities, he cannot stand in every relation as an actual amoeba stands to the world (since, for one thing, the EO-being cannot give up his omnipotence). It is not clear, though, that this nets the AO-being any more actual power. It would be kind of similar to my arguing that I can create stuff with the property that its creator cannot lift it; whereas an EO-being cannot; hence, I can do something an EO-being cannot. Okay, but this does not show I possess any actual power that an EO-being does not; it really only speaks to a limitation I have (that I could intend to lift some created object and fail; whereas the EO-being cannot). The AO-being can bring it about that he can fail in such ways, whereas the EO-being cannot; the AO-being can presumably bring it about that he is genuinely limited in, say, his lifting capacities, whereas the EO-being cannot; but this does not really seem to translate into any actual power advantage for the AO-being. There are other reasons as well why it is not clear to me that there is any practical advantage. For instance, if the AO-being is not in direct control over when he loses or gains his omnipotence, then perhaps his capacity for change in this respect entails some limitation on his overall power. If, on the other hand, he is in direct control over the changes, then it is not all clear to me how any of this would work. If he brings it about that he is an actual amoeba, then what? Actual amoebas do not have the capacity or potentiality to suddenly become omnipotent. If the AO-being can become as an amoeba but can still simply decide to reacquire omnipotence, then it seems (just like the EO-being), the AO-being has not really stood in every relation as an actual amoeba does to the world. For practical purposes, I see no difference between that and the case of an EO-being who chooses to behave as an amoeba (even though he retains omnipotence, as an EO-being must).

Some of this stuff makes my head hurt, so not sure if I am making complete sense in all places...would not surprise me if am not.

Originally posted by josephw
What is incoherent is your attempt to disassociate omnipotence from the omnipotent.

God is omnipotent and there is nothing He can't do. God created the circle. He can uncreate it too. If it is possible, God can make a circle square.

What is impossible is that you can do nothing about it. You cannot take away from God nor can you add anything to Him. A ...[text shortened]... r your fruitless attempt to diminish God's omnipotence. You are inherently powerless. As am I.

What is incoherent is your attempt to disassociate omnipotence from the omnipotent.

🙄 I don't think that is what I was attempting.

If it is possible, God can make a circle square.

I thought you had already endorsed the idea that all things are possible with God. Why did you feel the need to add "If it is possible" here?

Originally posted by Lord Shark
[b]But that seems like a clearly inadequate result. If, under O3-omnipotence G can create S, then under O3-omnipotence there is some stone that G cannot lift. Then, I do not think O3-omnipotence really survives our common sense intuitions about 'omnipotence'.
Well I'm unsure as to how far we can get by relying on common sense notions of omnipotence ...[text shortened]... long as there is no logical contradiction in doing so. Well where is the contradiction?[/b]

I think O3 does have content though, because it stipulates that G can bring about any state of affairs that is not logically contradictory.

Let's consider an O4:

O4. Omnipotence is the power to bring about any state of affairs that is not logically contradictory.

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that G's being O3-omnipotent entails that G is O4-omnipotent. But, I thought the whole reason why some converge on something like O3 is to try to get around some apparent complications that attend something like O4. Something like O4 seems too demanding because there are some logically consistent states of affairs that cannot be brought about by any Y (and that should be regardless of, as bbarr brought up earlier, whether 'bring about' is construed in terms of direct causation or indirect causation or some combination). For instance, consider necessary states of affairs; or consider states of affairs that deal with metaphysically random events. So, I thought one of the reasons some propose O3 is precisely because it does not entail what you suggest (if, for example, it is not possible for any Y to bring about some logically consistent but metaphysically random event, then it seems O4 just demands too much of omnipotence; but O3 presumably avoids this problem).

To me, there seems to be a substantive difference between O3 and O4: O3 demands of omnipotent being G that if G's bringing about X is logically possible, then G can bring about X; whereas O4 demands of omnipotent being G that if X is logically possible, then G can bring about X.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Thinking about the stone thing again, I realise I treated the unliftability of the stone as brute. But if the problem is framed as a stone too heavy for an omnipotent agent G to lift, then the contradiction is there from the start, because omnipotent agents can exert any amount of lifting force. So it reduces to 'can G who possesses an ability to e ...[text shortened]... force create an immovable object?'
O3 says no because this state of affairs is contradictory.

But this assumes "omnipotent agents can exert any amount of lifting force". So you are assuming the statement "Y is omnipotent" means, in part, that Y can exert any amount of lifting force. But the meaning of this particular statement is just what O3 purports to provide you. To me, this seems like another case where we have imported in an entailment of 'omnipotence' in order to evaluate the logical consistency of the kinds of statements specified under O3 (of the form 'Y will bring about X'😉. So, I am still failing to understand how the notion of O3-omnipotence has any real content that is closed or self-contained.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]I think O3 does have content though, because it stipulates that G can bring about any state of affairs that is not logically contradictory.

Let's consider an O4:

O4. Omnipotence is the power to bring about any state of affairs that is not logically contradictory.

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that G's being O3-omnipo ...[text shortened]... O4 demands of omnipotent being G that if X is logically possible, then G can bring about X.[/b]

I agree, I think I made an error there, I don't think O3 entails O4.
I think:

O3. "Y is omnipotent" means whenever "Y will bring about X" is logically possible, then "Y can bring about X" is true.

deals with the stone problem though. I don't really understand your objection to 'importing content to O3' though. O3 is necessarily general, so considering a particular is like assigning a value to a variable.

In the case of the stone, we consider whether exerting an amount of lifting force F is available to G, under the general formula of O3. The answer is that it is iff 'G exerting F' is logically possible. Then we do the same thing for creating a stone of weight W. Neither of these things in isolation is logically contradictory, so they seem to go through.

What about the creating of a stone S such that W > F? It can't be done because W is unbounded under O3.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
That's an interesting idea.

I suppose what this problem is about is whether there are any global constraints on all games available to G. Perhaps, even for G, there are certain things that must obtain in order for it to be the case that G is playing a game.

That there should be something rather than nothing.

That there should be the notion of a limit.

I like to think of G's laughter at the thought of the notion of a limit. Fiat ludus ...