22 Sep '10 20:29>
How should we formulate the notion of 'omnipotence'. And, for those theists who hold that God is omnipotent, what exactly is meant by this?
I have been thinking about it, and I have many concerns for the prospects of formulating the notion in terms of either the power to bring about certain states of affairs or the power to do certain things.
For example, suppose we started with something like:
O1. Omnipotence is the power to anything that is logically possible.
An objection that concerns me here is related to the so-called "paradox of the stone". There is no actual paradox: even if it were the case that X cannot create a stone that X cannot lift, that does not entail any genuine (non-ersatz) limitation on X's power (since it only seems to translate to something like 'if X can create a stone, then X can also lift it'😉 and would not suggest that X is not "omnipotent". Regardless, to me, an upshot does seem to be that we should not demand that an omnipotent being be able to do anything whose description per se is logically consistent (such as the creation of something with the property that its creator cannot lift it) because some are such that, when they are done, they should decisively count against the doer's being "omnipotent" (because they entail some genuine limitation on power). For instance, there are logically possible things I can do that it seems we should not demand an omnipotent being be able to do.
It seems like this should be easy to get around, but I am not convinced. For instance, common sense says that it is not logically possible for Y to create a stone Y cannot lift if it happens to be that Y is "omnipotent" because a stone which an omnipotent being cannot lift should be a logically impossible object. Okay, granted, but it will do us no good to try to revise O1 into something like:
O2. Omnipotence is the power to anything that is logically possible for an omnipotent being to do.
Or consider the following (from some wikipedia article**):
O3. "Y is omnipotent" means whenever "Y will bring about X" is logically possible, then "Y can bring about X" is true.
Now, the article there claims this gets around the stone problem. But why should I think it does? Presumably because I should think "Y will bring about a stone Y cannot lift" is logically impossible. But why should I think it is logically impossible? Presumably because here a supposition is that Y is omnipotent. But, according to O3 itself, the supposition "Y is omnipotent" just means [insert the rest of O3 here]. So, not only do I not see how O3 gets around the stone problem; but further I can find no actual content in O3. To understand if statements like "Y will bring about X" are logically consistent with the supposition that Y is omnipotent, I would think one would need to have already some idea of what "Y is omnipotent" means. So I have no idea why we should think something like O3 is satisfactory.
Perhaps I am missing something, so I would be interested in your thoughts.
Also, this brief article has some discussion on this, and it outlines a number of other and related concerns:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/omnipotence/
In this article, they seem to conclude that the only practical option for an intelligible notion of 'omnipotence' is in a comparative sense of "maximal power, meaning just that no being could exceed the overall power of an omnipotent being".
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**http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnipotence_paradox
I have been thinking about it, and I have many concerns for the prospects of formulating the notion in terms of either the power to bring about certain states of affairs or the power to do certain things.
For example, suppose we started with something like:
O1. Omnipotence is the power to anything that is logically possible.
An objection that concerns me here is related to the so-called "paradox of the stone". There is no actual paradox: even if it were the case that X cannot create a stone that X cannot lift, that does not entail any genuine (non-ersatz) limitation on X's power (since it only seems to translate to something like 'if X can create a stone, then X can also lift it'😉 and would not suggest that X is not "omnipotent". Regardless, to me, an upshot does seem to be that we should not demand that an omnipotent being be able to do anything whose description per se is logically consistent (such as the creation of something with the property that its creator cannot lift it) because some are such that, when they are done, they should decisively count against the doer's being "omnipotent" (because they entail some genuine limitation on power). For instance, there are logically possible things I can do that it seems we should not demand an omnipotent being be able to do.
It seems like this should be easy to get around, but I am not convinced. For instance, common sense says that it is not logically possible for Y to create a stone Y cannot lift if it happens to be that Y is "omnipotent" because a stone which an omnipotent being cannot lift should be a logically impossible object. Okay, granted, but it will do us no good to try to revise O1 into something like:
O2. Omnipotence is the power to anything that is logically possible for an omnipotent being to do.
Or consider the following (from some wikipedia article**):
O3. "Y is omnipotent" means whenever "Y will bring about X" is logically possible, then "Y can bring about X" is true.
Now, the article there claims this gets around the stone problem. But why should I think it does? Presumably because I should think "Y will bring about a stone Y cannot lift" is logically impossible. But why should I think it is logically impossible? Presumably because here a supposition is that Y is omnipotent. But, according to O3 itself, the supposition "Y is omnipotent" just means [insert the rest of O3 here]. So, not only do I not see how O3 gets around the stone problem; but further I can find no actual content in O3. To understand if statements like "Y will bring about X" are logically consistent with the supposition that Y is omnipotent, I would think one would need to have already some idea of what "Y is omnipotent" means. So I have no idea why we should think something like O3 is satisfactory.
Perhaps I am missing something, so I would be interested in your thoughts.
Also, this brief article has some discussion on this, and it outlines a number of other and related concerns:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/omnipotence/
In this article, they seem to conclude that the only practical option for an intelligible notion of 'omnipotence' is in a comparative sense of "maximal power, meaning just that no being could exceed the overall power of an omnipotent being".
-----------
**http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnipotence_paradox