On Delusion

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
The positivism generated by Descartes has generated many a delusion, in my opinion, beginning with the concept of the rational subject.

What form of positivism do you think Descartes generated? How did he do it? Typically, 'positivism' refers to some optimistic theses about scientific inquiry, some pessimistic theses about metaphysics, and some pretty robust commitments to empiricism. I'm not sure how you're using the term.

Originally posted by bbarr
What form of positivism do you think Descartes generated? How did he do it? Typically, 'positivism' refers to some optimistic theses about scientific inquiry, some pessimistic theses about metaphysics, and some pretty robust commitments to empiricism. I'm not sure how you're using the term.

Comte claimed Descartes, along with Bacon and Galileo, as the founders of 'the positivist philosophy', which holds that science alone can yield knowledge. I use positivism, somewhat loosely, in that sense (since I felt comfortable black beetle would understand me). Descartes helped generate positivism by living, nothing more! The delusion of positivism is merely the idolatry of thought that can arise in any dogma. Comte's gradual transformation into the ''High Priest of the Religion of Humanity' is a case in point.

I don't think any life can be reduced to a bundle of propensities. Descartes, for me, is a complex sign much more than a 'generator of positivism'. I recently enjoyed a book on Descartes by Greyling which sustained the idea that Descartes, among other things, was a spy. This modified the sign of Descartes very favourably for me ...

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Comte claimed Descartes, along with Bacon and Galileo, as the founders of 'the positivist philosophy', which holds that science alone can yield knowledge. I use positivism, somewhat loosely, in that sense (since I felt comfortable black beetle would understand me). Descartes helped generate positivism by living, nothing more! The delusion of positivism ...[text shortened]... other things, was a spy. This modified the sign of Descartes very favourably for me ...

Well, that's a strange charge to level against Descartes; accusing the father of modern rationalism of being an empiricist. His epistemology is based on an a priori argument aiming to establish that God exists and is not a deceiver, hence that we can trust our 'clear and distinct' perceptions, hence that the world is roughly as it appears to us. Presumably, if one thinks that scientific knowledge is only possible if based on knowledge derived from the exercise of reason, then one is thereby not really positivistic.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, that's a strange charge to level against Descartes; accusing the father of modern rationalism of being an empiricist. His epistemology is based on an a priori argument aiming to establish that God exists and is not a deceiver, hence that we can trust our 'clear and distinct' perceptions, hence that the world is roughly as it appears to us. Presu ...[text shortened]... n knowledge derived from the exercise of reason, then one is thereby not really positivistic.

Descartes is not responsible for the uses to which Descartes has been put.

I wouldn't call Descartes a positivist, but his assertion that God is discoverable, as opposed to the apophatic traditions (who considered such an attitude frankly idolatrous), put a very 'positive' spin on things. If God is out there to find, it's obligatory to look, and when you're looking, there is a method you must follow ... Similarly, far from acting like a positivist, Newton thought he was deciphering the Book of Nature, an exercise secondary to deciphering Holy Writ. Of course the energies he spent on the latter endeavour are not thought much of today ...

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Descartes is not responsible for the uses to which Descartes has been put.

I wouldn't call Descartes a positivist, but his assertion that God is discoverable, as opposed to the apophatic traditions (who considered such an attitude frankly idolatrous), helped shift things in a very 'positive' direction. If God is out there to find, it's obligatory to ...[text shortened]... . Of course the energies he spent on the latter endeavour are not thought much of today ...

Ha! Yes, but Descartes didn't set off in search of God "out there". His ontological argument pretty much starts with the claim that he couldn't have come up with the idea of God on his own (there's all that silly Scholastic stuff about the objective reality of representations and the formal reality of their referents), so it must have been planted there by God (again with the weird ontological hierarchy). To the extent that Descartes discovers God, he does so via introspection into the contents of the representations of his mind.

Originally posted by bbarr
Ha! Yes, but Descartes didn't set off in search of God "out there". His ontological argument pretty much starts with the claim that he couldn't have come up with the idea of God on his own (there's all that silly Scholastic stuff about the objective reality of representations and the formal reality of their referents), so it must have been planted there by G ...[text shortened]... ers God, he does so via introspection into the contents of the representations of his mind.

Yes: ultimately, the contents of the representations of Descartes' mind are proof that God exists. How Gregory of Nyssa would have shuddered.

Descartes is a wonderfully weird product of one of the weirder periods in history. Leibniz, Spinoza too - some pretty supreme fictions.

Originally posted by JS357
BB: Methinks a philosopher has to describe reality as a unique entity and then explain the necessary causal connection between the many things one experiences.

You: Surely neuroscience has made that role redundant?

It's a matter of what level of reductionism is useful. As in, we think physics can explain all chemistry, but explanation at the chemical lev ...[text shortened]... philosopher. The philosopher we rely on may be the one inside us, sophomoric as some may be. 😉

Yes😵

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Sorry to see that you once again declined to provide concrete examples. I was hoping that they may help me to understand where you're coming from.
You seem very reluctant to speak in anything but abstraction - an incongruous abstraction at that. Quite frankly, you seem to be on no firmer footing than those who , for example, believe in an afterlife and ...[text shortened]... uity.

Hopefully someone will come along who is willing and able to engage in "plain talk".

You ask me. This is your mind.
I answer. This is my mind. If I had no mind, how could I reply to you? If you had no mind, how could you ask?
The object that asks, is your mind.
During all the time, whatever you do and whatever you act is a product of your mind.
Beyond your own mind you will find no Buddha, no G-d. You cannot find any kind of "enlightenment" beyond your mind. Your mind is the reality of your nature, therefore your nature is the nature of your mind. You probably think that there is a place like hell or paradise somewhere out of your mind, but such places exist not.
Can you grab the space? The space has name but has no shape. Your mind is like the space. If you think that something exists beyond your mind, go ahead and name it.

So, once more: The nature of one’s self is the nature of one’s mind. This nature exists since the mind is existent;
What exactly you cannot understand?
😵

Originally posted by RJHinds
The existence of God is proved by His creations. There can be no creation without a Creator. The God of the Holy Bible is the only legitimate claimant as the owner and maker of the heavens and the earth. You are without excuse for your non-belief.

Methinks the sole "proofs" for the existence of any kind of "Creators" are the minds of the individuals who came up with these inventions. When I check these minds out, I see merely their unjustified personal projections. If I am really without excuse because I do not follow somebody else blindly, so be it😵

Originally posted by black beetle
You ask me. This is your mind.
I answer. This is my mind. If I had no mind, how could I reply to you? If you had no mind, how could you ask?
The object that asks, is your mind.
During all the time, whatever you do and whatever you act is a product of your mind.
Beyond your own mind you will find no Buddha, no G-d. You cannot find any kind of "enligh ...[text shortened]... mind. This nature exists since the mind is existent;
What exactly you cannot understand?
😵

Well, I think your mind exists. Either your mind exists beyond mine, or it doesn't. If it does, your question is answered. But if I my mind can successfully refer to your mind by representing it, then why can't my mind successfully refer to tables and chairs outside my mind as well? If it can, then you seem to just be failing to distinguish between representations and referents. If it can't, then what is so special about other minds such that I can successfully refer to them but not other objects? But if your mind doesn't exist beyond mine, then your position reduces to something like solipsism. But, of course, my mind has elements within it; thoughts and emotions, to which my mind can refer. I can have thoughts about my thoughts, etc. Since my mind is not identical with any bundle of thoughts, but it more like the space where such objects exist (or events occur), then whatever reason you have for skepticism regarding the independent existence of tables and chairs will equally apply to the quasi-independent existence of thoughts and desires. At which point it seems like all we're left with is ongoing objectless awareness as that which fundamentally comprises my mind. But then the solipsism seems OK. Not because it's just my mind and no other, but because when objects of awareness are stripped away, there is nothing to distinguish minds from each other.

Originally posted by black beetle
Methinks the sole "proofs" for the existence of any kind of "Creators" are the minds of the individuals who came up with these inventions. When I check these minds out, I see merely their unjustified personal projections. If I am really without excuse because I do not follow somebody else blindly, so be it😵

The mind is within the soul.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, I think your mind exists. Either your mind exists beyond mine, or it doesn't. If it does, your question is answered. But if I my mind can successfully refer to your mind by representing it, then why can't my mind successfully refer to tables and chairs outside my mind as well? If it can, then you seem to just be failing to distinguish between represen ...[text shortened]... cts of awareness are stripped away, there is nothing to distinguish minds from each other.

Welcome back, bbarr, I hope you and yours are all good!


Edit: “Well, I think your mind exists. Either your mind exists beyond mine, or it doesn't. If it does, your question is answered.”

I understand both your perspective and the logic of your argument. However methinks our case is not exhausted with a dilemma; instead of this approach, I am using the Nagarjunean Diamond Slivers. Well, for the time being I see nothing existing beyond mind;


Edit: “But if I my mind can successfully refer to your mind by representing it, then why can't my mind successfully refer to tables and chairs outside my mind as well? If it can, then you seem to just be failing to distinguish between representations and referents.”

Your mind can successfully refer to my mind by representing it, but I 'm dead sure you see that there is a distinction between constitutive and instantiated properties. If your mind essentially involves a property (the otherness of my mind) that is conceptually construed, then the object (my mind) is too conceptually construed (by your mind). Of course we human beings have 6 senses (mind, feeling, seeing, tasting etc.) and we are aware of differ sensory and mental events that occur in close causal and temporal connection, however there is no bearer of these properties because the difference between constitutive and instantiated properties does not bear any ontological weight.
In fact, when you are talking about the “otherness” of an individual (my mind), you merely nominalise the predicate expressing the property (otherness) to be constitutive, and you ascribe the instantiated properties to my mind thus created.
I understand this procedure, it is the most common –but things do not really exist this impossible way. Try to find what exactly is the ontological reason why you could not change your view of what the instantiating and constitutive properties are, and then describe exactly this situation in terms of different individuals and properties. Hopefully you will see that the “otherness” you attribute to my mind lacks of any ontological grounding;

Edit: “If… …other."

No.
It’s just your mind and no other (and then, at last the mountains are mountains again).
Not because you can somehow tango your mind down by various means so that “the objects of the awareness of your mind are stripped away”, but because at a specific point of conceptual/ non conceptual awareness you too can experience directly where the mind can exist and where it cannot exist. Whenever you will have on your own this point of attention firmly established, your dualism will disappear on the spot
😵

Originally posted by black beetle
You ask me. This is your mind.
I answer. This is my mind. If I had no mind, how could I reply to you? If you had no mind, how could you ask?
The object that asks, is your mind.
During all the time, whatever you do and whatever you act is a product of your mind.
Beyond your own mind you will find no Buddha, no G-d. You cannot find any kind of "enligh ...[text shortened]... mind. This nature exists since the mind is existent;
What exactly you cannot understand?
😵

What makes it difficult is the incoherence of your explanation.

Following is an example:

You said:
You ask me. This is your mind.
I answer. This is my mind. If I had no mind, how could I reply to you? If you had no mind, how could you ask?

Here you speak as if my mind and your mind BOTH exist.

You follow that with:
If you think that something exists beyond your mind, go ahead and name it.

There's a lot of double-talk in your attempt at explanation.

Originally posted by black beetle
Welcome back, bbarr, I hope you and yours are all good!


Edit: “Well, I think your mind exists. Either your mind exists beyond mine, or it doesn't. If it does, your question is answered.”

I understand both your perspective and the logic of your argument. However methinks our case is not exhausted with a dilemma; instead of this approach, I am usi own this point of attention firmly established, your dualism will disappear on the spot
😵

You too, and it's good to be back!

If, as you say, my mind can successfully refer to yours, then there is something other than my mind, namely, that to which I'm referring. The success conditions for reference are that something in the world is picked out, that the objects/properties I'm representing exist/are instantiated. So, if reference succeeds, then your original challenge has been met.

Of course I employ concepts in successfully referring to your mind. Mental representations are concepts, so of course my representation of your mind is conceptually articulated. It would have to be, in order for that representation to participate in propositional attitudes like thoughts and beliefs. Propositional attitudes are partially individuated by their content, and their content consists of concepts and their formal relations. But nothing follows from this about the existence of the putative referents of concepts or propositions.

To think otherwise is to commit the same fallacy at the heart of ontological arguments; the mistake of trying to read off metaphysical conclusions from premises regarding the conceptual content. It's just like the old saying that one shouldn't mistake the moon for the finger pointing at it. You're making a correlative error by inferring that because there is a pointing finger, there must be no actual moon!

Yes, I am familiar with constitutive and instantiated properties. An object X has P constitutively iff X is an X-type by virtue of having P. Instantiated properties are just the non-constitutive properties X also has.

Nagarjuna argues that since we can conceptualize objects differently, the set of properties that are constitutive or instantiated respectively can change. If I conceive of that as a chair, then 'sittable' may be constitutive and 'wooden' merely instantiated. If I conceive of that as a former tree, then 'wooden' may be constitutive and 'sittable' merely instantiated.

But, so what? I can conceive of your mind in a variety of ways, and for each of these ways my representation of your mind may be more or less accurate depending upon the correspondence between the properties I take your mind to have and the properties your mind actually has. But if I represent your mind in a fine-grained enough way to successfully refer to your mind, then it doesn't at all matter what properties I must take as constitutive or instantiated.

This should be clear. After all, it's not part of the content of my conception of your mind that this or that property has itself a further property of being constitutive or instantiated. My representations may have modal entailments, but that doesn't mean that these entailments are part of their semantic content or sense. I mean, if I conceive of that thing as a zebra, then I am thereby committed to it not being a cleverly painted horse. But it simply doesn't follow that 'not a cleverly painted horse' is part of semantic content of the concept 'zebra'. If it did follow, then nobody could ever learn a concept, since the semantic content of any concept would consist of an infinite number of distinct propositions. Zebras aren't asteroids or rings of power either.

In any case, you should be suspicious of an argument that starts with a distinction, then denies that that distinction has any ontological import, then concludes with a claim about what actually exists! That's rhetorical hocus-pocus.

Originally posted by bbarr
You too, and it's good to be back!

If, as you say, my mind can successfully refer to yours, then there is something other than my mind, namely, that to which I'm referring. The success conditions for reference are that something in the world is picked out, that the objects/properties I'm representing exist/are instantiated. So, if reference succeed ...[text shortened]... with a claim about what actually exists! That's rhetorical hocus-pocus.

Your mind can successfully refer to mine under specific conditions. According to Madhyamaka, whenever these conditions are not met, one remains with dualism because one extrapolates and implies inherent existence to things that are both existent and “empty”, and thus one ends up delusional.
Nagarjuna argues that when we want to stress certain features we speak of properties as if they were inherently existent, but this attitude does not imply that there is fundamental difference between their properties so that only one of them is constitutive while the others are instantiated (MMK Ch. 2, relation between individuals and their properties: both the motion and the mover exist at a specific sliver of reality, and both they lack of inherent existence). It follows that the existence of the putative referents of concepts or propositions is empty (of inherent existence, because it is merely just another form), and as such the “otherness” does not hold since emptiness still takes just another form and still this form too is empty (Form is Emptiness, Emptiness is Form). Emptiness lacks of inherent existence too, because it arises when one attributes inherent existence to an observer (the false view of things is itself the reason why the theory of emptiness is required as a corrective). Zebras are of course zebras and not asteroids or rings of power -but they are empty.

I am always suspicious of an argument that starts with a distinction, then denies that that distinction has any ontological import and then concludes with a claim about what actually exists, as if this was the Absolute Truth. This, yes, it would be just rhetorical hocus-pocus.
On the contrary, NDS is used as a corrective against any superimposition of self that arises at any cognitive level; once this is conquered, NDS is discarded (and at last the mountains are mountains) and the individual has to make on his own his way out (with the knowledge that no observer of the Floating World has inherent existence).
NDS suggests that both the Cosmic Reality (No Form, no differentiation/ singularity) and the Floating World (Popper’s Three Worlds) must be perceived, decoded, understood and evaluated as neither One, nor Two, nor both One and Two, nor neither (otherwise a self is superimposed). The non conceptual and conceptual awareness of the Cosmic Reality, the so called “going beyond”, it is possible by every human being by means of specific ways; once there, Clear Light. When you will find yourself there, master bbarr, then your mind can successfully refer to mine, changing modes of being from specific slivers of each reality to other specific slivers of each reality
😵