Now, the theist who rejects premise (2) cannot merely claim that each instance of suffering is causally efficacious in bringing about some good or other. For instance, they cannot merely claim that some instance of suffering, as a matter of fact, brought about some good. They are committed to the much stronger claim that the good brought about by the instance of suffering in question could not have possibly been brought about in any way that involved even slightly less suffering without there being some tradeoff in goods such that the world would be thereby less good, and hence less morally preferable to God. Think carefully about this stronger claim. It entails that given some instance of suffering, the good brought about thereby could not possibly have been brought about, even by the direct intercession of an entity (God) that is both omnipotent and omniscient, without the world thereby being worse. In short, the theist is committed to the claim that every instance of suffering is such that God finds it morally preferable that that suffering occur.
This claim faces two serious objections:
CFW (Conflict with free will): Suppose S tortures, rapes and murders his neighbor. Many theists will claim that since S has free will, he could have chosen to do otherwise. But if the theist rejects premise (2), then it follows that S's torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor was logically necessary for the greater good. Hence, it follows that God finds it morally preferable that S torture, rape and murder his neighbor (else God would have prevented it because he is morally perfect). Hence, God would prevent it from being the case that S not torture, rape and murder his neighbor. Hence, it is logically impossible that S could choose to refrain from torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor. Hence, S cannot choose to refrain from torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor. Hence, S's torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor is the only logically possible option available to S. Hence, in regards to his torturing, raping and murdering his neighbor, S's will is not free.
NOTE: CFW presumes that the sort of freedom of the will that the majority of theists endorse is of the libertarian sort. Those who endorse a compatibilist view of free will are not faced with this consequence of rejecting premise (2). Of course, endorsing a compatibilist version of free will has its own costs (e.g., being committed to the claim that one can be morally responsible for acts that one could not have done otherwise than).
NPG (No Plausible Goods): There are no plausible goods logically necessitated by the diversity and severity of suffering evident in the actual world. Consider the three basic sorts of goods commonly presented by theists to explain the presence of suffering in the world:
I) Freedom of the Will
II) Virtue or Moral Uprightness
III) Salvation
Let's take these by turn:
Free will is often cited by theists in their explanations of evil. Free will, it is claimed, is itself a substantial good and logically necessary for the presence of other goods (e.g., love, kindness, etc. which are plausibly of more value if chosen freely). But along with having free will comes the capacity to choose between being virtuous and being vicious. So, the moral evil in the world is explained by humans' being free, and the goodness of free will and that which it allows is sufficient to justify the moral evil in the world, that is, to explain why God finds it morally preferable that there be free will even though this brings about things like murder, rape, theft, deception, and so on. It is often claimed that if God were to prevent these sorts of moral evil, then humans would not have free wills.
But this is surely mistaken. First, there is no reason to think that we have free will if God exists and premise (2) is false (see CFW, above). Second, it is not contradictory to suppose that God could have created human beings with slightly more benevolent characters, and thereby be less predisposed towards violence. After all, my sister has a substantially more benevolent character than I, but nobody would suggest that this entails that her will is not free. Third, preventing someone from harming another is not a violation of their free will, but merely the prevention of the successful pursuit of that which they will. For instance, if I come across an attempted rape in progress, and I stop the aggressor, I am not thereby preventing him from willing that he rape, nor am I preventing him from attempting to act in accord with his will. I am merely preventing him from being successful in his pursuit, but this is consistent with his will being free. Being prevented from X-ing by the actions of another agent is equivalent to being prevented from X-ing by virtue of natural laws, as far as the will of the actor is concerned. The actor may freely will that he X (say, that he rape, or levitate), and then fail despite his free choice. But if I can prevent a rapist from being successful at raping without thereby violating the freedom of his will, then God can do the same. Hence, God could have intervened in at least one case of moral evil without violating the freedom of our wills. Hence, explanations of evil the rely on the freedom of the will fail.
Note: As if this weren't bad enough, most Christian theists are committed to the claim that God has intervened to prevent instances of moral evil, as even a cursory examination of the bible will make clear.
Theists also often claim that the suffering brought about by moral and natural evil is necessary in order for there to be occasions for virtues such as compassion, generosity, and so on (so-called “second-order goods&rdquo😉. However, such an explanation for evil can only be partial, as these second-order goods will not be able to explain the presence in the world of the variety of second-order evils (e.g., callousness, cruelty, miserliness, jealousy, etc.). Perhaps the theist could posit some third-order good (perhaps being saved, or being fit for the bestowal of grace) to explain these second-order evils. But, of course, there will be third-order evils as well (being damned, unfit for grace), and it is doubtful that the theist will find any higher-order good without an evil analogue. Since no infinite regress of symmetrical higher-order goods and evils will suffice to explain and justify those evils, this response to the problem of evil fails. Further, even if this objection could be overcome, it still is radically implausible that these second-order goods could justify instances of moral or natural evil where the victims are unknown and undiscovered. For instance, there were victims of the recent tsunami (not to mention the historical Chinese flood which killed roughly three million people) that will never be known because either they were not known well enough at the time to be remembered by survivors, or because those who would have remembered them were also victims. Such victims cannot serve as the objects of virtuous states like compassion, of generosity, or even sympathy in any real sense (although we may experience sympathy for 'all the victims', but we would experience this anyway had one unknown victim not been killled, correct?). Hence, their suffering and death cannot be justified by virtue of these second-order goods. The theist may respond that such victims may themselves have an opportunity to manifest some second-order good by virtue of their own suffering, but this overlooks three obvious objections. First, some suffering is of such intensity that victims are completely consumed by it. Second, infants and young children will not, in general, have the emotional or even the conceptual resources necessary for manifesting these second order goods. Third, the suffering of animals (via forest fire, for example) often both leaves no trace (the bodies are consumed or hidden), thus providing no opportunity for anybody to manifest a second-order good, and brings about no manifestation of second-order goods among the victims themselves ('cause they lack the intellectual hardware).
Finally, theists often claim that the suffering experienced in the world is more than made up for by the joy experienced during the afterlife. First, such a response seems to misconstrue the argument, as the problem facing the theist is not to show that suffering gets made up for by future joy, but to show that suffering is logically necessary to bring about the greater good. After all, if God gets to decide who goes to heaven, then it will be logically possible that God could decide, for any person at all, that that person goes to heaven. But if this is logically possible, then whatever suffering they endured was not logically necessary for their salvation, because regardless of what suffering they had endured, God could choose to save them. Second, unless animals also go to heaven, such a response will be unable to deal with the prevalence of animal suffering. Further, this response would only apply to those who, as a matter of fact, get saved, but presumably the suffering of those who will not be saved is also of concern to God ('cause he loves us all). Hence, this response fails.