04 Jan 08
3 edits
Originally posted by bbarrThanks for that. I am of course interested in propositions of the second sort; and a universe of discourse identical to our own save the complete absence of any genuine moral agents.
Your satisfaction is important to me, so let me try again:
We should distinguish between two classes of propositions the surface grammar of which suggests universal quantification. There are those that would be shown false by a single counterexample, and those that would not. These second sorts of propositions include tacit ceteris paribus clauses; they a t an entailment of your description of the case as merely lacking sentient entities.
My concern is whether the truth of conditional "if there were..."-type statements about this universe (i.e. of the form "If there were a moral agent of a specified nature in this universe, then that agent should [or should not] do x in circumstances yz..." ) satisfies all our intuitions about moral statements, and morality. I think we would want to say something stronger, and that certain non-conditional moral statements can still be true, or false, of that universe.
I will try to explain precisely what I mean when I have more time. For now I'll just say it was your analogy with secondary qualities that set me thinking; I would have similar concerns about analogous statements about those in a post-Holocaust universe.
As an aside, I also do not believe it ultimately makes sense to speak of moral truths being "built into the very fabric of the universe", although I have used this expression (or similar) in the past as a way of trying to make certain theists understand that a moral absolutist need not necessarily believe in god. Intellectually dishonest, maybe; but done for the greater good...
04 Jan 08
3 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloI beg to differ; just as we do not apply baseball rules to a basketball
[b]In the light of evolution I'm not sure what we use to judge moral
facts as being good or bad
That's probably because evolutionary theory doesn't equip us with the means to make such judgments because it doesn't have normative or prescriptive entailments. Where the theory implies that certain things are good or of advantage to a species, those ...[text shortened]... ority who tells us what is right and wrong; or who simply determines what is right or wrong?[/b]
game we do apply baseball rules to a baseball game. What I mean
by that is that we work in the theater we are in, and if life is being
advanced by evolution it does indeed offer up some realities we need
to be aware of, least we find ourselves working toward our own
demise. Morals are just the ‘correct action’ now lions do not have an
issue following their correct actions, what are ours? We do seem to be
able to lie at the drop of a hat, we seem to be able to take what we
want when we want it, we seem to be able to kill when we want, so
the ‘moral facts’ are what, and what do we look at when we are
speaking about them? Where do they come from and again what
are our “moral facts” in light of everything we see around us in how we
act? Is it personal tastes, are we fooling ourselves because it is our
nature to do some of the more base things we see when ever we read
the news? Evolution if it is the means that got us here has all species
taking advantage of their environment to survive, so those that do it
the best move on and advance those that don’t, well if what some
think is true we find their remains here and there. So isn’t that the
right answers in all cases? What are the bottom lines when it comes to
doing the right thing when faced with not surviving if we do it?
Kelly
04 Jan 08
Bbarr, I was not familiar with the thread, as was strongly implied by my remark to ATY: "Without seeing the specific details of your argument with Bbarr...". *Should* you have made this deduction? 🙂
Also: When I wrote "You did not mention cases where..." this remark was clearly identified as part of a private message to ATY, who was therefore the "you" referred to. It was a further attempt to get him to relate details of the thread -- which I did not decide to participate in until he made it clear that he would not continue my conversation with him unless it was reproduced in public, and also because he suggested the possibility of posting his "summary" of my remarks even without my participation, and why not post them myself, verbatim, given their brevity?
Yet, you ask me "Why would I mention cases that were irrelevant to the point I was making?" as if my remark had been directed to you. *Should* you have seen the fact that your question was a non sequitur?
Alright, having shown myself your peer in irascibility, let's proceed to a dispassionate discussion of the issue at hand. (I'll post it to a separate reply so as to avoid repeating this prologue.)
04 Jan 08
Originally posted by KellyJayYou seem intent on suggesting that the supporter of evolutionary theory is thereby committed to certain moral claims. You should be able to present argument to that effect, but your argument here fails for reasons I will discuss below.
I beg to differ; just as we do not apply baseball rules to a basketball
game we do apply baseball rules to a baseball game. What I mean
by that is that we work in the theater we are in, and if life is being
advanced by evolution it does indeed offer up some realities we need
to be aware of, least we find ourselves working toward our own
demise. Morals ...[text shortened]... lines when it comes to
doing the right thing when faced with not surviving if we do it?
Kelly
Your argument as best I can tell (you should of course correct me if I misstate it) is along the lines of the following. Let's suppose evolutionary theory is true. Then, we have good reasons to think that we are "hard-wired" in a sense (through natural selection) such that our natural inclinations are oriented toward survival of the species. Therefore, you claim, anyone who thinks evolution is true is committed to the idea that we ought to just follow our natural inclinations (in the way that lions and other animals seem to do).
But, the supporter of evolutionary theory is not committed to that at all. He can believe that the mere fact one has an inclination to X does not mean one ought to X. We differ from lions and other animals in that we have the deeper ability to distance ourselves from our natural inclinations, to deliberate on them, and abandon them if they are not accordant with our own values and evaluative commitments. Even if one were deeply committed to the Darwinian survival of the species, he could still reach the conclusion that certain natural inclinations are simply "misfiring" in that capacity. Further, supposing that one accepts that a certain inclination does have some Darwinian basis to it, he could still conclude that our acting on it is not conducive to a good quality of life, collectively and individually.
Beyond that, as an aside, you seem to think they only way that human genes "ensure" their own survival is by programming us to be selfish and to have continual inclinations to lie, steal, and kill. But, on the contrary, there are many reasons to think that natural selection would produce in us certain inclinations toward altruistic behavior.
04 Jan 08
Originally posted by bbarrI confess I have a great deal of trouble understanding your argument. It seems to me that your definitions are internally inconsistent.
The claim, again, was that if one believes P, and one understands a deduction from P to Q, then one has sufficient reason to believe Q. It is a stipulation of the thought experiment that P is taken by the subject to be true, and that the subject understands the deduction to Q.
If one "understands the deduction from P to Q", then (in the current context) by definition one accepts that Q not only does follow from P, but MUST follow from P. If the subject does not understand that Q MUST follow from P then he does not understand the nature of deductive argument and, therefore, cannot meaningfully be said to "understand the deduction".
I can think of only two exceptions, neither of which seems to apply in the context of the present discussion.
The first would occur if the subject, while understanding the deduction within a particular framework of the rules of deduction, rejects the validity or truth of (at least some of) those rules of deduction. For example, if someone understands the so-called standard "laws of logic" and understands that under them Q follows deductively from P, but rejects Q because he rejects one or more of the laws despite accepting P, that is a different matter and would need to be elucidated: but you don't seem to be arguing that here. (One can argue whether rejection of the laws of logic is logical, or rational, but such meta-logical considerations need not detain us in the present thread.)
The other case would occur when a subject rejects the validity of deductive reasoning altogether. Again, that doesn't seem to be what you are postulating. (And again, one can argue whether or not such a position is tenable, but that subject matter lies outside the scope of the present thread.)
To reiterate: if one "understands the deduction from P to Q", then definitionally (here), one believes that this deduction exists, and accepts its "validity": but the act of accepting its validity, if genuine, entails the acceptance of Q if P. So, there can be no category of subject such as you propose. And if one *does not* understand the deduction, it is difficult to argue that one "should" accept it on the basis of logical deduction.
04 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloAbsolutely.
You seem intent on suggesting that the supporter of evolutionary theory is thereby committed to certain moral claims. You should be able to present argument to that effect, but your argument here fails for reasons I will discuss below.
Your argument as best I can tell (you should of course correct me if I misstate it) is along the lines of the followi at natural selection would produce in us certain inclinations toward altruistic behavior.
Evolution embraces Christianity as a factor in your survival.
edit: sorry, it is not clear that I agree with LemonJello's comments, and that Christianity is a factor in the evolution of humanity... This of course includes all sub elements, including morality etc etc etc. It matters not, however, from an evolutionary point of view what you believe after you are dead; simply how that belief together with all others contributed to your genes' ability to pass themselves(or related genes) on.
04 Jan 08
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsOops, my bad. 😳
Bbarr, I was not familiar with the thread, as was strongly implied by my remark to ATY: "Without seeing the specific details of your argument with Bbarr...". *Should* you have made this deduction? 🙂
Also: When I wrote "You did not mention cases where..." this remark was clearly identified as part of a private message to ATY, who was therefore the " ...[text shortened]... at hand. (I'll post it to a separate reply so as to avoid repeating this prologue.)
04 Jan 08
2 edits
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsI confess I have a great deal of trouble understanding your argument. It seems to me that your definitions are internally inconsistent.
I confess I have a great deal of trouble understanding your argument. It seems to me that your definitions are internally inconsistent.
If one "understands the deduction from P to Q", then (in the current context) by definition one accepts that Q not only does follow from P, but MUST follow from P. If the subject does not understand that Q MUST fol difficult to argue that one "should" accept it on the basis of logical deduction.
Alright, then let’s clear up your confusion…
If one "understands the deduction from P to Q", then (in the current context) by definition one accepts that Q not only does follow from P, but MUST follow from P. If the subject does not understand that Q MUST follow from P then he does not understand the nature of deductive argument and, therefore, cannot meaningfully be said to "understand the deduction".
True, but irrelevant. If one understands the deduction, then one understands that if P is true, Q must also be true. When one antecedently believes P, thiis generally results in the immediate inference that Q is true, but this is not necessarily so. It is perfectly possible that one believes P, believes that P -> Q, and fails to believe Q. The inference from the conjunction that P & (P -> Q) to the conclusion Q is a separate cognitive act, and it is possible for cognitive acts to go astray. In other words, it is possible for us to be irrational in this regard, and thereby to fail to believe as we should.
NOTE: For the purposes of this argument, I'm setting aside cases where one has independent grounds for doubting that Q, and hence takes the deduction from P to Q as a reductio of P. We can assume for the purposes of this argument that the subject has no reason to doubt Q, or is psychologically certain that P. Either assumption generates the results I'm after.
If the subject does not understand that Q MUST follow from P then he does not understand the nature of deductive argument and, therefore, cannot meaningfully be said to "understand the deduction".
This, again, is irrelevant. The example stipulates that the subject understands the deduction. That is, the subject understands that if P is true, then Q must also be true.
To reiterate: if one "understands the deduction from P to Q", then definitionally (here), one believes that this deduction exists, and accepts its "validity": but the act of accepting its validity, if genuine, entails the acceptance of Q if P.
Hooray, we have identified the source of your confusion! The only thing entailed from all that is that one should believe Q, or would believe Q is one was rational. Suppose one believes P, fully understands that P entails Q, and yet has a chip implanted in one’s head that simply prevents the belief that Q. Or suppose that one is psychologically incapable of believing that Q because it would be too painful. Or suppose that there is simply some misfire in the physical substrate that instantiates beliefs and inferences, so that the belief that Q doesn’t arise. Of course, these are failures of epistemic agency (though, pace my distinction in a previous post, the agent may not be blameworthy for such a failure), but they show it is both logically and nomologically possible that one could fail to form the belief that Q despite believing P and believing that P entails Q. Cognitive dissonance occurs, after all.
In brief, then, your argument here is simply question begging. You are assuming it is impossible for people to fail to draw inferences that are entailed by their beliefs, when they also believe that these inferences are licensed by their beliefs. But, first, you have no argument for this, and second I can give you any number of cases where this is actually nomologically possible. Finally, I don't even need to establish the nomological possibility of such cases in order to establish my point. As long as it is simply logically possible that one could fail to form the belief that Q in circumstances as described, it follows that one could fail to believe what one has sufficient reason to believe, and that one can fail to believe what one takes oneself to have sufficient reason to believe. In short, the example I've given simply establishes that there are cases where one can fail to believe as one should.
Now, if you want to show that I've gone wrong, you should be able to derive a contradiction of the form (P & ~P) from the conjunction of the following two premises:
(1) S believes (P & (P -> Q))
(2) It is not the case that S believes Q.
I await your demonstration of the contradiction.
05 Jan 08
2 edits
Originally posted by snowinscotlandI've tried, but I cannot make sense of your post in the context of the current discussion. My post had nothing to do with Christianity or its role as a "factor in [our] survival". I was responding to KellyJay's contention that the theory of evolution carries moral implications.
Absolutely.
Evolution embraces Christianity as a factor in your survival.
edit: sorry, it is not clear that I agree with LemonJello's comments, and that Christianity is a factor in the evolution of humanity... This of course includes all sub elements, including morality etc etc etc. It matters not, however, from an evolutionary point of view wha ...[text shortened]... er with all others contributed to your genes' ability to pass themselves(or related genes) on.
05 Jan 08
Originally posted by LemonJelloI'm suggesting that an evolutionist can make any claim they want
You seem intent on suggesting that the supporter of evolutionary theory is thereby committed to certain moral claims. You should be able to present argument to that effect, but your argument here fails for reasons I will discuss below.
Your argument as best I can tell (you should of course correct me if I misstate it) is along the lines of the followi ...[text shortened]... at natural selection would produce in us certain inclinations toward altruistic behavior.
not just (certain) moral claims. bbarr and I both agreed that we should
show compassion to everyone, we agreed that it is wrong to limit it
to just (the special few) no matter what the special few is we should
treat everyone equally. That said you cannot really defend that view
within an evolutionary universe and force another to agree with our
stances on treating everyone equally. You can justify making one
group above another by saying it is the higher group according to
evolutionary change, we are the best because we are X whatever X
is, just like those very first life forms that had light sensitive parts to
them that gave them an advantage, our right to being the top of
the food chain is we are higher up the evolutionary ladder. The
term moral fact requires something to lift the fact beyond opinoin
and if we cannot do that, we do not have moral facts, there has
got to be some sort of truth or authority that makes a moral fact
something greater than a moral opinion.
Kelly
05 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by KellyJayNo, you disagree with bbarr on this point. You explicitly said that gays should not be treated with the same moral consideration as straights. You also declined to acknowledge that the Sodomites, Midianites, Canaanites and Jerichoites of the Old Testament should have been given the same moral consideration by God's chosen people as God's chosen people themselves enjoyed.
bbarr and I both agreed that we should
show compassion to everyone, we agreed that it is wrong to limit it
to just (the special few) no matter what the special few is we should
treat everyone equally.
05 Jan 08
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesYou should read the posts again, and see who said what to whom.
No, you disagree with bbarr on this point. You explicitly said that gays should not be treated with the same moral consideration as straights. You also declined to acknowledge that the Sodomites, Midianites, Canaanites and Jerichoites of the Old Testament should have been given the same moral consideration by God's chosen people as God's chosen people themselves enjoyed.
I believe when bbarr and I talked we were in agreement I believe you
brought those points up and I was the only one that answered them
in this thread. Now I'm quite sure bbarr and I would disagree about
more than a few things. I said I don't think being 'gay' is anything
but a personal taste or action, that said it does not lower the person
making them any less than anyone else. Actions and tastes are
without a doubt something we do judge and that is the central topic
of this discussion as well. The other points were addressed in my
answer, and my answer alone in this thread so far. Hard to make
a claim we disagreed if I was the only one saying anything about it.
If he did speak on the subject in this thread I missed it.
Kelly
05 Jan 08
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesWhy didn't you answer my question to you?
No, you disagree with bbarr on this point. You explicitly said that gays should not be treated with the same moral consideration as straights. You also declined to acknowledge that the Sodomites, Midianites, Canaanites and Jerichoites of the Old Testament should have been given the same moral consideration by God's chosen people as God's chosen people themselves enjoyed.
Kelly