Theologian John Haught on evolution, etc...

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Perhaps this post of yours added to the overall confusion of your claims:

[b]I am claiming that it is logically possible for one to suffer from the failure to believe in accord with what one takes to be sufficient evidence.

A reasonable person would conclude that your use of the word logically herein is specifically meant to be applied to ...[text shortened]... b] occur, logic is certainly not employed by the person in question, as inferred by your claim.[/b]

Yeah, could be. I thought it was absolutely clear from the discussion that I was taking the term 'logically' to modify the term 'possible'; that I was talking about a particular sort of possibility. This is why I was continually contrasting logical possibility with nomological possibility. I certainly did not mean that one could possibly fail to believe Q and still be logical (if by 'logical' in this sense one means something like rational or justified), and would be astounded if Adkins interpreted me in this way, since the whole point of the example was to illustrate a clear case where one could fail to believe as they should. I think one could only interpret me in the manner you suggest if one radically fails to understand what the whole discussion was about.

Originally posted by bbarr
Yeah, could be. I thought it was absolutely clear from the discussion that I was taking the term 'logically' to modify the term 'possible'; that I was talking about a particular sort of possibility. This is why I was continually contrasting logical possibility with nomological possibility. I certainly did not mean that one could possibly fail to believe Q a ...[text shortened]... nner you suggest if one radically fails to understand what the whole discussion was about.

These things happen. Words.

Originally posted by bbarr
Your view confuses me for two reasons. First, your claim about it being wrong to kill is translatable into a conditional claim that has in its antecedent some reference to agents (it has to, since actions are only done by agents). But this conditional claim is one I agree with, and this conditional claim is true even where there are no agents. I am not sure ...[text shortened]... somehow smuggling my own perspective into the imagining of a universe putatively without agents.

My point is that certain moral qualities of a particular nature would exist in that universe regardless of the nature of any putative moral agents we care to imagine in it, or whether they were any moral agents at all.

Assuming the primary/secondary quality analogy - if a (non-human) moral agent apprehended these moral qualities differently, and acted accordingly, they would be apprehending (and acting) wrongly.

Perhaps you are entitled to say this from your position. If so I'm either confused about Locke, or reflecting his own occasional confusion.

Clearly you're quite right about the central point of disagreement. I'll just say that I find it literally impossible to imagine a world without intrinsic value.

Anyway, it seems you've gone again. Good luck in the future.

Originally posted by dottewell
Clearly you're quite right about the central point of disagreement. I'll just say that I find it literally impossible to imagine a world without intrinsic value.

I am not sure if I understand what you are saying correctly. To help me clarify, lets suppose the universe in question is similar to ours in that energy is never destroyed and information (patterns in the energy) is in a constant state of flux, any destruction or action is really merely a change in the information. Are you implying that all information change (which generally results in loss of information as well as creation of new information) is morally wrong? or are you saying that some changes are right and some are wrong?
If we treat time as a dimension and thus effectively the past is still present in the 'universe' and nothing is ever truly destroyed then does an action which removes a possible future outcome become morally wrong?

Originally posted by dottewell
My point is that certain moral qualities of a particular nature would exist in that universe regardless of the nature of any putative moral agents we care to imagine in it, or whether they were any moral agents at all.

Assuming the primary/secondary quality analogy - if a (non-human) moral agent apprehended these moral qualities differently, and ...[text shortened]... ithout[/i] intrinsic value.

Anyway, it seems you've gone again. Good luck in the future.

One last point. I guess our disagreement, at the end of the day, is about whether Kant was right that everything that is valuable is so by virtue of being valued by the good will. I think that value, or normative reasons generally, are constructed by our nature. You think our nature is such that we can come to see value or detect reasons that are there anyway. This is an important debate relating to what practical reason is really all about. In fact, part of my dissertation is about this very point (whether virtues are constellations of dispositions to take certain considerations as reasons, or whether virtues are constellations of dispositions to detect reasons that are there anyway). This is a really hard problem, and the only way out of it (I think) is to reject foundationalism about justification in favor of ideal reflective equilibrium.

It's always nice chatting with you.

Originally posted by bbarr
One last point. I guess our disagreement, at the end of the day, is about whether Kant was right that everything that is valuable is so by virtue of being valued by the good will. I think that value, or normative reasons generally, are constructed by our nature. You think our nature is such that we can come to see value or detect reasons that are there any ...[text shortened]... justification in favor of ideal reflective equilibrium.

It's always nice chatting with you.

What?

"This is a really hard problem, and the only way out of it (I think) is to reject foundationalism about justification in favor of ideal reflective equilibrium."

Ideal reflective equilibrium, is that another way of saying opinion over
a set standard or your foundationalism I believe, which in my opinion
is like saying there are no moral facts until we say so, again we find
ourselves back to nothing but moral opinions.
Kelly