14 Jul '07 19:14>
I found this on the net. I know that copy and pasting too much is not really on but I rarely do it so I thought I would indulge myself....
" Try the following thought experiment. Our
brilliant neurophysiologists come up with an equation
that they claim will predict all of our behavior. The
equation is so good that it even incorporates our reaction
to the equation, our reaction to knowing that it
incorporates our reaction, and so on indefinitely. Suppose
that the equation says that the next thing that you
will do is raise your arm. Do you seriously believe
that you couldn’t falsify this prediction by failing to
raise your arm? But if you can falsify any prediction
about your arm, and if the prediction is derived perfectly
from a comprehensive knowledge of your
body’s constituent micro-particles, then your mind
must be free. In a crucial sense, then, the denial of
free will is predicated on our ignorance of the very
causal laws that supposedly show that free will is impossible.
For once these allegedly binding laws of nature
were compiled and capable of making falsifiable
empirical predictions, it would be child’s play to falsify
them forthwith. Surely if human behavior were unfree,
then science could in theory at least predict when
I am going to raise my hand. And why should the
equations be unable to compensate for the subject’s
knowledge of the prediction? And yet, it is very hard
to believe that upon the proclamation of these alleged
causal laws, that I would find it any harder to falsify
them than I would find it to falsify e.g. the reader’s
prediction about when I will raise my hand.
Nor would it help if these scientific laws were probabilistic
rather than deterministic. It is child’s play to
falsify the prediction that I will raise my right hand
now with certainty. Is it any harder to falsify the
claim that I will now raise my right hand with probability
.3? Simply by deciding not to raise it, couldn’t
I instantly make the probability equal to zero?"
" Try the following thought experiment. Our
brilliant neurophysiologists come up with an equation
that they claim will predict all of our behavior. The
equation is so good that it even incorporates our reaction
to the equation, our reaction to knowing that it
incorporates our reaction, and so on indefinitely. Suppose
that the equation says that the next thing that you
will do is raise your arm. Do you seriously believe
that you couldn’t falsify this prediction by failing to
raise your arm? But if you can falsify any prediction
about your arm, and if the prediction is derived perfectly
from a comprehensive knowledge of your
body’s constituent micro-particles, then your mind
must be free. In a crucial sense, then, the denial of
free will is predicated on our ignorance of the very
causal laws that supposedly show that free will is impossible.
For once these allegedly binding laws of nature
were compiled and capable of making falsifiable
empirical predictions, it would be child’s play to falsify
them forthwith. Surely if human behavior were unfree,
then science could in theory at least predict when
I am going to raise my hand. And why should the
equations be unable to compensate for the subject’s
knowledge of the prediction? And yet, it is very hard
to believe that upon the proclamation of these alleged
causal laws, that I would find it any harder to falsify
them than I would find it to falsify e.g. the reader’s
prediction about when I will raise my hand.
Nor would it help if these scientific laws were probabilistic
rather than deterministic. It is child’s play to
falsify the prediction that I will raise my right hand
now with certainty. Is it any harder to falsify the
claim that I will now raise my right hand with probability
.3? Simply by deciding not to raise it, couldn’t
I instantly make the probability equal to zero?"