We know nothing

Originally posted by twhitehead...
4. We cannot ever be sure that our justified beliefs are in fact knowledge. I am OK with that....

I apologize for getting rude.

The JTB definition for knowledge, as you show here with your fourth point, results in the strange position that we cannot know if our knowledge is knowledge. Of what use is that definition? Why not drop the T. Science knowledge, for example, is of the JB type.

Also, your method of avoiding the regress is to claim that the justification used need not be knowledge. You don't see the problem with that? If non-knowledge is legitimate justification, then anything goes. We have no grounds to reject any conclusions offered as knowledge.

Originally posted by apathist
I apologize for getting rude.

The JTB definition for knowledge, as you show here with your fourth point, results in the strange position that we cannot know if our knowledge is knowledge. Of what use is that definition? Why not drop the T. Science knowledge, for example, is of the JB type.

Also, your method of avoiding the regress is to claim that t ...[text shortened]... n, then anything goes. We have no grounds to reject any conclusions offered as knowledge.

In the face of extreme skepticism there is no way of knowing that any particular empirical claim is true, since any truth test is in principle confoundable. However, unless you absolutely insist on epistemological solipsism you are forced to accept the existence of a confoundable truth test whose results are acceptable.

Regarding the regression: there are a collection of ontological beliefs any individual has, that the world is pretty much as it appears and is more-or-less predictable is a fairly common one especially among scientists. Eventually a given belief is justified by a regression back to an ontological position. The regression stops there. That ontological beliefs include things for which there is no evidence (matter past the cosmological particle horizon is a good example of a scientific one) does not invalidate justifications based on those beliefs.

Your argument seems to be along the lines of the following: Passing a truth test provides justification and that since the truth test is potentially confounded we should just talk about justification. But not all justified beliefs that are true have been justified by a truth test. So you'd at least have to acknowledge a hierarchy of beliefs based on the level of justification - unjustified beliefs, justified beliefs and beliefs justified by passing a truth test of acceptable strength. A truth test should be reliable at the same level as a well conducted scientific experiment where what is being measured is well within the state of the art. A justification for a knowledge claim does not have to be as certain as that. Since it is possible to have a justified belief that is demonstrably untrue we can rule out a set of propositions, the ones that are untrue, from the set of knowable propositions. So I think that the 'JTB' definition is of use, if only for identifying clearly what is demonstrably not knowledge.

Originally posted by DeepThought
In the face of extreme skepticism there is no way of knowing that any particular empirical claim is true, since any truth test is in principle confoundable. However, ...

Good post, thank you. Much of it moves past the point I'm trying to establish though, the very point you illuminate above. I believe that truth is not a quality or property of knowledge, merely a desired attribute, and the definition for 'knowledge' should reflect that fact. I buck the long-established trend here, I know this. Examining justification is the way forward,

Is it raining now?

Originally posted by apathist
Good post, thank you. Much of it moves past the point I'm trying to establish though, the very point you illuminate above. I believe that truth is not a quality or property of knowledge, merely a desired attribute, and the definition for 'knowledge' should reflect that fact. I buck the long-established trend here, I know this. Examining justification is the way forward,

Is it raining now?

No, it's not raining here. My justification for this raises an interesting point. If it were raining then I would be able to hear it, I can't hear it and so it is not raining. Here the justification is in terms of a counterfactual, the claim that I would have reasonable grounds for thinking I would know that it is raining if it were. In this case we have an acceptable truth test - I can go outside and look to see if it is raining. The only possible confounder I can think of which does not require some sort of Cartesian demon is that if it were raining but stopped while I was on my way to look then the truth test would fail but I do not think that this confounder prevents me from having a reasonable claim that the truth test is adequate, at least for purposes of verifying the state of the weather.

While typing the above it occurred to me that the atheist position is based on a similar counterfactual argument, basically that if God did exist then the atheist would know that God existed and that the knowledge would be accessible. The big difference is that there does not appear to be an adequate truth test. Interestingly, the Christian retort to this, at least the one one often hears here, is that God only reveals himself to believers. This seems to do some real damage to the concept of a truth test. Normally one is presented with evidence and forms some belief on the basis of that evidence or hears an argument and either agrees with it or does not. The truth of the belief can be tested with an adequately strong truth test and neither the availability of the test nor the result depends on adhering to the belief. This 'belief first' doctrine requires that one forms the belief and then God's revelation will provide an acceptable truth test not available to unbelievers. This truth test has a number of unusual properties: it depends on the state of one's belief, there is no negative result (never mind a false negative), God simply hasn't revealed himself yet so the test fails to produce a negative result, and the claim is that a false positive is impossible as well. So I feel it requires a little more justification than has been presented since it requires that one forms beliefs which are not adequately justified.

Originally posted by DeepThought
No, it's not raining here. My justification for this raises an interesting point. If it were raining then I would be able to hear it, I can't hear it and so it is not raining. Here the justification is in terms of a counterfactual, the claim that I would have reasonable grounds for thinking I would know that it is raining if it were. In this case we hav ...[text shortened]... m that the truth test is adequate, at least for purposes of verifying the state of the weather.
...

Hear? The neighbor's new lawn sprinkler is too energetic. Go outside and look? Hollywood is filming a movie. As you know, I'm objecting to the T part of JTB; here you confirm that the T test is nothing more than J.

Btw, afaik, the JTB definition grew up in the 1700's, the age of reason, and 'justification' was meant in direct contrast with 'revealed'.

Originally posted by apathist
The JTB definition for knowledge, as you show here with your fourth point, results in the strange position that we cannot know if our knowledge is knowledge.

I don't find it strange at all.

Of what use is that definition?
Same as all definitions. It helps us communicate.

Why not drop the T. Science knowledge, for example, is of the JB type.
Because it wouldn't make sense to me to call something knowledge when it isn't true. It doesn't fit well with the every day use of the word.

Also, your method of avoiding the regress is to claim that the justification used need not be knowledge. You don't see the problem with that?
No.

If non-knowledge is legitimate justification, then anything goes.
Not so. Now you are falling for the slippery slope fallacy.

Worst of all, I think your idea of dropping the truth requirement solves none of the problems you think you see.

Originally posted by twhitehead

You contribute nothing more than knee jerks. I wonder about you sometimes, tw. You are very smart and have been exposed to a lot and have formed early opinions that sort of solidified like cement. And now you are stuck.

There is a problem with JTB and you are not able to handle it. I get that.

Originally posted by twhitehead...
Worst of all, I think your idea of dropping the truth requirement solves none of the problems you think you see.

Explain, encrusted one.

Originally posted by twhitehead
...
Because it wouldn't make sense to me to call something knowledge when it isn't true. It doesn't fit well with the every day use of the word....

Newton did not advance our understanding of reality? Everything he offered was incorrect.

Science knowledge has been progressing for a while now. It never claimed to be some sort of ultimate truth. It only is our best understanding of the way the world works. Warts and all.

Originally posted by apathist
I apologize for getting rude.

You contribute nothing more than knee jerks.

Didn't last long did it?

I wonder about you sometimes, tw.
I think the problem is all in your mind. You have spend half this thread attacking what you imagined I said not what I said.

You are very smart and have been exposed to a lot and have formed early opinions that sort of solidified like cement. And now you are stuck.
Or rather I don't bow down and kiss your boots every time you open your mouth.

There is a problem with JTB and you are not able to handle it. I get that.
If there was a genuine problem, you would be able to discuss it rationally rather than going for personal attacks.

Explain what the problem is. When you have done that, I will explain why I do not think it is a problem. I assure you, I can handle it.

Originally posted by apathist
Explain, encrusted one.

Is it not obvious?
Here are some issues you have brought up:
1. A supposed Infinite regress.
This doesn't go away when you drop the truth requirement.
2. The inability to know whether something you think you know is true.
This doesn't go away when you drop the truth requirement.
3. Your slippery slope argument about justification follows from the infinite regress problem.
This doesn't go away when you drop the truth requirement.

Originally posted by apathist
Newton did not advance our understanding of reality? Everything he offered was incorrect.

Newtons laws are not 'incorrect', they are merely not the whole story. But you are sadly mistaken if you think that Newtons Laws were the sum total of his contributions to science.
But lets take it that his laws are incorrect as in they do not exactly match the movements of bodies in reality. Is it reasonable to say that if you believe Newtons laws to be an accurate description of the movements of bodies that you then know exactly how motion in the universe works? I think not. I would say that Newton had a justified belief, but it was not a true belief and thus not knowledge. Newton did not know all there is to know about how the motion of bodies works.

Originally posted by apathist
Science knowledge has been progressing for a while now. It never claimed to be some sort of ultimate truth. It only is our best understanding of the way the world works. Warts and all.

And we recognize that. When we discover where we were incorrect, we stop calling that knowledge.

1,500 years ago, everybody knew that the Earth was the center of the universe. 500 years ago, everybody knew that the Earth was flat. And 15 minutes ago, you knew that humans were alone on this planet. Imagine what you'll know tomorrow.

Men in Black.

Based on your argument, people actually knew that the earth was flat. Is that your claim?

Freaky believes the earth is flat. Would you say that he knows that the earth is flat?

Originally posted by apathist
Hear? The neighbor's new lawn sprinkler is too energetic. Go outside and look? Hollywood is filming a movie. As you know, I'm objecting to the T part of JTB; here you confirm that the T test is nothing more than J.

Btw, afaik, the JTB definition grew up in the 1700's, the age of reason, and 'justification' was meant in direct contrast with 'revealed'.

JTB goes back to Plato. In your haste to justify your position you've got the knowledge claim on its head. My claim is that I know that it was not raining. My justification for this is based on a counterfactual claim that I would know if it were. That I might be fooled into thinking it was raining by a sprinkler system (I wouldn't, the sound would come from rain hitting a plastic roof which is distinctive and the neighbours garden is too far away for that to be a viable objection) does not entail that I can be fooled into thinking that it is not raining when it is. To defeat the counterfactual justification you would need to think of a way that it could be raining but no sound be produced. Basically, my justification is based on a negative result, that the counterfactual could produce false positives does not invalidate the negative result - it can only put positive results into question. The same argument applies to the "going outside to see" truth test.

You are insisting on perfect truth tests. Epistemological solipsism is all very well, but you cannot base anything on it. That all things could be an illusion does not entail that all things are an illusion or that we must proceed as if they were. A truth test differs from justification in that while the requirement for justification of a position is that if the justification is confounded the knowledge is false, this is basically the Gettier condition, but that a justification is confoundable does not entail that the belief is not knowledge if true, whereas a truth test should not be confoundable by anything much short of a Cartesian demon. Basically a justified belief can be wrong. Knowledge cannot and the difference is a strong truth test.