Originally posted by vistesd
Can a fact be false?

Here is my personal take as it relates to correspondence theories of truth: the facts that exist in the world are neither true nor false. The correspondence theory certainly does not imply that facts are true. What it implies is that propositional content that corresponds to facts is true. I don't think it makes any sense, strictly, to say a fact itself is true if we are working within a framework that says that truth is a property of propositions.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Here is my personal take as it relates to correspondence theories of truth: the facts that exist in the world are neither true nor false. The correspondence theory certainly does not imply that facts are true. What it implies is that propositional content that corresponds to facts is true. I don't think it makes any sense, strictly, to say a fac ...[text shortened]... s true if we are working within a framework that says that truth is a property of propositions.

I agree with you. "Reality" isn't true or false, but it is rather our beliefs, that are true or false.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Here is my personal take as it relates to correspondence theories of truth: the facts that exist in the world are neither true nor false. The correspondence theory certainly does not imply that facts are true. What it implies is that propositional content that corresponds to facts is true. I don't think it makes any sense, strictly, to say a fac ...[text shortened]... s true if we are working within a framework that says that truth is a property of propositions.

I’m not sure I agree. (Always a dangerous thing to disagree with you on this stuff, though!) A “fact” that is determined to be false seems no more a fact to me. If it’s a matter of semantics, could not one say “putative fact”?

I admit that I’m feeling my way here. But how we treat these words seems to depend on the domain of discourse. If one wants to remove the words true, false and fact from the ontological domain, and use them strictly in terms of concepts and propositions, I really have no problem. But it hardly make sense to say that what is real can be false (which does not seem to me to be what gaychessplayer or you are saying; rather, it seems to me that you are saying those terms don’t belong in that domain).

On the other hand, these rules of discourse seem to me to be strictly “western.” You could only talk to a Hindu in these terms if the both of you first stipulated the limits on the terminology. It makes no more sense here to say that one is right and the other wrong, than it does to say that English (or the Germanic roots here) is right and Sanskrit is wrong, or vice versa. It’s simply a matter of stipulating how you’re going to use the terms.

________________________________

Aside on another subject: My arguments lately seem to have led me, perforce, around to your ideas of intuitionism . . .

Originally posted by Starrman
I like this notion; that the truth is the real. I'll have to think on it for a while, but at first glance it seems to me that the actual essence of existence must be what is true it. That which is false must therefore be that which opposes the actual or in some way misrepresents it, consequently that which is surreal?

Well, it seems to me that LJ and GCP are arguing that the terms “truth” and “falsehood” simply belong to the realm of propositional discourse about “the real.” Which is not the same thing as saying that the “real” could ever be “false”—which would be a surreal statement.

I’m not sure how useful the semantic distinction is. But maybe I don’t understand it correctly. If I say, “The fact is, there’s a tree over there”—I am making a statement about reality; one could say that I am making a statement about my perception of reality, but then they would have to show why my perception may be false in that instance. Of course I grant that my perception is my perception.

Since one cannot say anything at all about reality without forming concepts, I’m wondering if LJ’s and GCP’s distinction means that we can, in fact (irony intended), (1) say nothing at all about reality, or (2) say nothing at all about even our perception/experience of reality (which, I have argued, is all we have)?

I certainly intend to say something about reality (again, yes, within the limits of human perceptual apparatus) when I say, “There is a tree over there.”

To invoke my old semiotics: “t-r-e-e” is a sign; what I mean by that sign is the signifier; the actuality is the referent. I see no reason to confine the terms truth, falsehood and fact to the sign and signifier; and say that the referent may be real, but not true.

Perhaps I’m hopelessly confused. What would Quine say?

EDIT: Could you give me the citation for my "Quine assignment" again? I tried reading The Philosophy of Logic, despite your warnings (since I had already bought it). 'Fraid I didn't get much out of it, except for his argument that we should just admit that we talk in sentences, rather than propositions.

EDIT 2: Then again, if LJ hits me with Hafiz, I'll probably get it! 🙂

Originally posted by vistesd
I’m not sure I agree. (Always a dangerous thing to disagree with you on this stuff, though!) A “fact” that is determined to be false seems no more a fact to me. If it’s a matter of semantics, could not one say “putative fact”?

I admit that I’m feeling my way here. But how we treat these words seems to depend on the domain of discourse. If one wants ...[text shortened]... : My arguments lately seem to have led me, perforce, around to your ideas of intuitionism . . .

I don't think we really disagree here -- or by much at any rate.

I think facts are entities fully in their own right, and yes it is my position that they are neither true nor false. I don’t think there is any content associated with a fact that we should think confers truth-aptness. I realize just about everyone (including myself) in normal everyday conversation conflates facts and true propositions, but if we are going to get particular then I like to make a clear notional distinction between the two. If others want to say that facts, or otherwise articles of objective reality, are themselves true (yeah, as you point out, no one would want to claim they are, or can be, false), I like to think I understand that impulse. I just don't agree with following it or feeding it since I think it is notionally confused. Further, I agree with you that this is somewhat semantic and not a matter of grave importance, and if others want to poo-poo the distinction I make here, it doesn't concern me too much.

Originally posted by vistesd
I’m not sure I agree. (Always a dangerous thing to disagree with you on this stuff, though!) A “fact” that is determined to be false seems no more a fact to me. If it’s a matter of semantics, could not one say “putative fact”?

I admit that I’m feeling my way here. But how we treat these words seems to depend on the domain of discourse. If one wants ...[text shortened]... : My arguments lately seem to have led me, perforce, around to your ideas of intuitionism . . .

By the way, I think it would be very easy to misunderstand Pawno's earlier question:

Pawno: "What exactly is a claim corresponding to that makes it true? You might say that it is a fact about the world. But what makes that fact true?"

Just literally, I would reply that the correspondence theory supporter is not committed to the claim that facts themselves are true. But, Pawno's obviously extremely bright and I think the spirit of his question is much more involved: I think the spirit of the question is whether or not the correspondence theory is true under its own application. But, as I think I have tried to argue in the past, I view it as a normative assessment like one is proposing this is how we ought to view truth. Then if one's metaphysics includes normative facts, then I guess I don't necessarily see a problem here. I don't know, I think it's a very difficult question.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't think we really disagree here -- or by much at any rate.

I think facts are entities fully in their own right, and yes it is my position that they are neither true nor false. I don’t think there is any content associated with a fact that we should think confers truth-aptness. I realize just about everyone (including myself) in normal everyda e, and if others want to poo-poo the distinction I make here, it doesn't concern me too much.

I was using the term “fact” to refer to pre-conceptual, pre-propositional reality, which may be an error. That is, I would have said there are facts, and then there are propositions that may or may not be true in terms of the facts. Can you define for me what constitutes a fact as “an entity”? Do you mean, ala Wittgenstein perhaps, an entity in logical, as opposed to ontological, space? Or, what is the difference between the “facticity” of the real world, and its simple “suchness” (tathata)?

The problem, of course is, as soon as we say (think) “moon”, we have left the pre-conceptual, pre-propositional realm altogether. And that may be the wot wherein my error lies...

EDIT: I'm not sure the distinction ought to be poo-pooed. I think we need to agree on the placement of the terms, for the purposes of any particular discourse. As I noted before, in Sanskrit sat/satya are related so that truth and reality are fairly synonymous. If we are not clear, it can be like a strict theist reading Hafiz and confusing what he means when he uses the word "God."

EDIT 2:

I just read the wiki article on the correspondence theory of truth, and (on the discussion page) found something like this—

The proposition P is true if and only if it is a fact that P.

Example: The proposition “dogs bark” is true iff it is a fact that dogs bark.

This seems to make “fact” refer to what is real, not to the truth of the proposition as such. Hence, it seems to me that “fact” is an ontological, not a propositional, term. And that is how I intended to use it, no matter how confusing my presentation may have been. In other words, to say “a proposition is true if it corresponds to the facts” seems to be the same thing as saying “a proposition is true if it corresponds to (is isomorphic to) reality.”

Originally posted by vistesd
I was using the term “fact” to refer to pre-conceptual, pre-propositional reality, which may be an error. That is, I would have said there are facts, and then there are propositions that may or may not be true in terms of the facts. Can you define for me what constitutes a fact as “an entity”? Do you mean, ala Wittgenstein perhaps, an entity in logical, a ...[text shortened]... same thing as saying “a proposition is true if it corresponds to (is isomorphic to) reality.”

I just lost my edit to the edits.

I am quite willing to use the word "true" in either the ontological sense of, say, a Hindu Vedantist or a Buddhist, or in the propositional sense--as long as it is clear in any discussion.

Originally posted by vistesd
I was using the term “fact” to refer to pre-conceptual, pre-propositional reality, which may be an error. That is, I would have said there are facts, and then there are propositions that may or may not be true in terms of the facts. Can you define for me what constitutes a fact as “an entity”? Do you mean, ala Wittgenstein perhaps, an entity in logical, a same thing as saying “a proposition is true if it corresponds to (is isomorphic to) reality.”

I'm using "fact" the same way you are: as an entity of the ontological ground that consists of particulars, properties, relations. We also make the same notional distinction between facts and propositions that may or may not have correspondence with those facts. Further, I agree with you that by "correspondent with fact" and "isomorphic with reality" we are basically saying the same thing.

I guess where we disagree here is in our readiness to work with what you call the "ontological sense" of truth. Again, I just fail to see why we would want to say that facts are themselves truth-apt. I mean, what in the world would a false fact be like? Absurd, right? But, then as absurd as it would seem to label a fact false, it doesn't seem any more meaningful to label it true. Within our talk of correspondence, what would it even mean to say a fact is true? It is true because it is corresponds (indeed, is identical) with itself? That something is identical to itself is basically tautology of sorts, and tautology cannot give us good reasons. The point I am trying to make is that if we are to say that facts themselves are truth-apt, then we are left with the result that facts are simply vacuously true. I just don't see how there is any meaningful content to the claim that some fact is true.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I'm using "fact" the same way you are: as an entity of the ontological ground that consists of particulars, properties, relations. We also make the same notional distinction between facts and propositions that may or may not have correspondence with those facts. Further, I agree with you that by "correspondent with fact" and "isomorphic with reality" we ...[text shortened]... st don't see how there is any meaningful content to the claim that some fact is true.

The point I am trying to make is that if we are to say that facts themselves are truth-apt, then we are left with the result that facts are simply vacuously true. I just don't see how there is any meaningful content to the claim that some fact is true.

Gotcha. (Sorry for being so dense.) And agreed. The only reason that I keep belaboring the sat/satya point—aside from the fact that it goes to my original post—is to stress that that terminology does not treat the real as “truth-apt”; it uses the terms “real” and “true” synonymously. I’m not sure that one can read, say, the Upanishads without such an understanding. When I say the true is the real, that’s my intended sense (and I tried to distinguish between the two senses in my original post, though I was not clear enough).

Another reason I keep wallowing around with this is my recent attempts to explicate the non-dualism of Zen, Vedanta, Taoism in western language, without the “technical” terms. I’m not sure that’s been entirely fruitful labor, though it seems to have been helpful to a few, in terms of understanding. And I have had to correct myself in the face of good criticism as well.

Thanks for your patience.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]The point I am trying to make is that if we are to say that facts themselves are truth-apt, then we are left with the result that facts are simply vacuously true. I just don't see how there is any meaningful content to the claim that some fact is true.

Gotcha. (Sorry for being so dense.) And agreed. The only reason that I keep belaboring the have had to correct myself in the face of good criticism as well.

Thanks for your patience.[/b]

Sorry for being so dense.

Nonsense! You were very clear and perceptive as always. I should have been more clear on my terminology from the beginning because I really don't think we disagree on anything here. I realize some do attribute truth to the ground itself, and I also realize that some use "real" and "true" synonymously. Like you say, as long as the intended sense is understood.... But I personally do not see any good reasons to do either of those things. I also don't see any strong reasons not to either. So, as I sort of mentioned before, I'll not chase it away, but I also won't feed it -- that sort of thing...

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]The point I am trying to make is that if we are to say that facts themselves are truth-apt, then we are left with the result that facts are simply vacuously true. I just don't see how there is any meaningful content to the claim that some fact is true.

Gotcha. (Sorry for being so dense.) And agreed. The only reason that I keep belaboring the have had to correct myself in the face of good criticism as well.

Thanks for your patience.[/b]

By the way, I know how you like your "entanglement" issues (and I think for good reasons!). I don't think we can ever avoid them. I reckon there has to be some entanglement issues here with propositions and our propositional attitudes and the ground itself. It can all get to be rather head-spinning.

Originally posted by LemonJello


I think facts are entities fully in their own right, and yes it is my position that they are neither true nor false. I don’t think there is any content associated with a fact that we should think confers truth-aptness.

Could one who is religious agree that the saying that Jesus is the way, the truth, and the life is a "truth-aptness"? 😛

Originally posted by LemonJello
the facts that exist in the world are neither true nor false.

Is that true?

Originally posted by gaychessplayer
I agree with you. "Reality" isn't true or false, but it is rather our beliefs, that are true or false.

And really, is'nt that what matters to us? We are relational beings that are only concerned with how we relate to the ground rather than simply knowing it exists.