Originally posted by vistesd
I was using the term “fact” to refer to pre-conceptual, pre-propositional reality, which may be an error. That is, I would have said there are facts, and then there are propositions that may or may not be true in terms of the facts. Can you define for me what constitutes a fact as “an entity”? Do you mean, ala Wittgenstein perhaps, an entity in logical, a same thing as saying “a proposition is true if it corresponds to (is isomorphic to) reality.”
What I was trying to convey in my previous remark--no doubt too concisely, and perhaps not very clearly--was that, if we hold to the correspondence theory of truth, then we have, on one side, propositions, and on the other side, reality, with the correspondence between the two, or the lack thereof, determining whether they propositions bear the property of being either true or false.
The problem, as I see it, is with characterizing what it is about reality that makes it correspond, or not correspond, with the content of propositions. But, once we try to say what that is, we start making assertions or assumptions about the nature of reality. And then the question arises: in virtue of what are these assertions or assumptions about reality either true or false? And then we seem to be back where we started.
So, if I say >, am I not asserting or assuming that [snow is white]? But what makes this assertion or assumption true? Perhaps the meta-fact that [[snow is white]]. But then, we could get stuck in infinitely recursive loop, without the correspondence theory of truth helping to extricate us.
Does this strike anyone else as a problem?