Originally posted by stiletto57
The absolute absence of all deceit.
What do you mean by 'deceit'? Something like the malicious intent to mislead another (or the quality of having such intentions of character or the act of intending as such)?**
If so, I should think a lack of deceit is neither necessary nor sufficient for the utterance of truthful statements. Surely we can come up with examples in which a person means well; has the best of intentions; but is simply mistaken in the judgment he renders? Any such example will show that a lack of deceit is not sufficient for truth. Also, consider a man who somehow meets a traveler at a fork in the road. The traveler inquires which way to London. The man feels quite certain that Path A leads to London, whereas Path B does not. But suppose, actually, it is a fact about this world that Path B leads to London from the fork in the road, whereas Path A does not. So with every intention of deceiving this traveler, the man ends up uttering to the traveler that Path B leads to London. Wouldn't such a hypothetical show that a lack of deceit (again, taking deceit along the lines of the intent to mislead) is also not necessary for truth?
I think we would do better to think about truth along gaychessplayer's notion above (or vistesd's talk of isomorphism): basically that truth is a relational property that involves a correspondence between propositional content and facts about the world.
**Alternatively, I guess, you could mean by 'deceit' the concealment of truth. But that doesn't really help us any because then the word to be characterized shows up in the characterization in a material way. So this wouldn't actually provide any real content in response to the question of what truth is.