What is wrong with being ATHIEST?

Originally posted by bbarr
Truth is an objective matter. Either a proposition is true or it is not. Truth is a metaphysical relation that holds between things that are assertorial and have propositional content (like propositions, beliefs, statements, sentences, and so on) and the way the world is. Take the proposition 'snow is white'. This proposition is true just in case snow is ...[text shortened]... vity of truth as claims concerning certainty. These are radically different sorts of relations.

I see, so truth is objective because you say so. You must know it. You believe it. We'll pretend that you are justified in having that belief. But is it true that truth is objective? It appears to me we can't know anything according to JTB without first establishing a truth with which to compare our beliefs.

Originally posted by yousers
I see, so truth is objective because you say so. You must know it. You believe it. We'll pretend that you are justified in having that belief. But is it true that truth is objective? It appears to me we can't know anything according ...[text shortened]... hout first establishing a truth with which to compare our beliefs.

No, truth is objective because that is its nature. If I were to deny the objectivity of truth, it wouldn't magically make truth relativistic. Our beliefs about truth are immaterial to truth's objectivity. If you think that a belief is true or false depending on whether it corresponds with the way the world is, then you also think that truth is objective. If someone denies that truth is objective, if they are relativistic about truth, then they would be contradicting themselves, because they would be claiming that it is an objective matter that truth is relativistic, and that is an internally inconsistent claim. The denial of the objectivity of truth is self-refuting, and that is why I am justified in claiming that truth is objective.

Your comments about the JTB analysis of knowledge are nonsensical. We can know any number of things about the world without having to show conclusively that our beliefs are true. Once more, certainty is not a requirement for knowledge. If our beliefs are true, and we are justified in believing them in virtue of having reasons for our belief sufficient to show the belief likely, and if our justification for our belief is not accidental in relation to the truth of the belief (this is the Gettier condition), then we have knowledge.

Originally posted by bbarr
No, truth is objective because that is its nature. If I were to deny the objectivity of truth, it wouldn't magically make truth relativistic. Our beliefs about truth are immaterial to truth's objectivity. If you think that a belief is true or false depending on whether it corresponds with the way the world is, then you also think that truth is objective. ...[text shortened]... n relation to the truth of the belief (this is the Gettier condition), then we have knowledge.

Ok, let me ask you this: What is truth? How do we know what corresponds with truth and what does not when using JTB?

Originally posted by yousers
Ok, let me ask you this: What is truth? How do we know what corresponds with truth and what does not when using JTB?

You are not paying attention to what I'm writing, so I'm not sure what the point is in continuing this conversation. I have, more than once in this thread, pointed out that the JTB analysis is an analysis of knowledge. It is not an analysis of truth, nor does it assume anything about truth, nor does it entail anything about truth other than that truth is a property that a belief must have for that belief to qualify as knowledge.

As I mentioned previously, there are any number of theories of truth out there. There are correspondence theories, coherence theories, pragmatist theories, minimalist theories, deflationary theories, and disquotational theories among others.

I advocate a correspondence theory of truth. That is, I think that truth is a relational property that obtains between a proposition (or a belief, or a statement, or a sentence, or anything else that expresses a proposition) and the world just in case the proposition in question corresponds to the facts of the world. The proposition 'snow is white' is true if and only if, in the actual world, it is a fact that snow is white. It is the correspondence between the meaning of the proposition and the facts of the world that constitutes the truth of the proposition.

I think this theory of truth is, far and away, the best account available of truth. If you want to argue for some other theory of truth, then I am prepared to defend this one and provide criticisms of the one you offer (just as I am prepared to defend the JTB analysis of knowledge against alternative analyses; analyses which, despite my repeated requests, you have failed to provide).

If you don't like my theories of knowledge or truth, then present criticisms of them that do not consist merely of expressions of self-refuting forms of global skepticism.

Originally posted by bbarr
You are not paying attention to what I'm writing, so I'm not sure what the point is in continuing this conversation. I have, more than once in this thread, pointed out that the JTB analysis is an analysis of [b]knowledge. It is not an analysis of truth, nor does it assume anything about truth, nor does it entail anything about truth other than t ...[text shortened]... them that do not consist merely of expressions of self-refuting forms of global skepticism.
[/b]

When we say something is justified TRUE belief, I think it is rather important to know what truth is. If we start from scratch, with no knowledge and only the justified true belief method, we must assume a truth a priori in order to compare beliefs and distinguish them as true or false. I think that is a pretty big assumption. If we call truth that which corresponds with the facts of the world, we must apply our knowledge of reality to determine truth. The reasoning here seems circular to me. Truth is necessary to find knowledge, but knowledge is needed in order to determine truth.

Another problem I see with correspondence theory is its dependence on observation. Your snow example requires that we rely on imperfect senses in order to determine the truth value of a statement.

As far as an alternative theory, I have none and do not see the need to provide one. In fact, I don't know of a theory of truth or knowledge which is not problematic in one way or another. That is precisely my point. Philosophy, science, and all other secular knowledge areas are incapable of providing us with a clear-cut truth. There is no certainty or absolutes - all we can acheive is probabilities. These things are wonderful and useful, but they do not have the answers to all the questions. To call yourself an atheist because you do not see the need for a higher power, I think, is foolish.

Originally posted by yousers
When we say something is justified TRUE belief, I think it is rather important to know what truth is. If we start from scratch, with no knowledge and only the justified true belief method, we must assume a truth a priori in order to compar ...[text shortened]... e you do not see the need for a higher power, I think, is foolish.

You state you have no alternative theory while you are presenting one.

"secular knowledge areas are incapable of providing us with a clear-cut truth" is presented as a truism
"There is no certainty or absolutes " is presented as a fact
"all we can acheive is probabilities." is presented as a certainty.

You conclude with " To call yourself an atheist because you do not see the need for a higher power, I think, is foolish."

The use of the word "secular" reveals the theory you are presenting which is:
A creator exists because secular methods to discern truth are fallible

Originally posted by yousers

When we say something is justified TRUE belief, I think it is rather important to know what truth is.

Truth is correspondence to the facts of the world.

If we start from scratch, with no knowledge and only the justified true belief method, we must assume a truth a priori in order to compare beliefs and distinguish them as true or false.

We don't start from scratch. We know all sorts of things about the world.

JTB is not a method, it is an analysis of the concept of knowledge.

We don't 'assume truth' (whatever that means, exactly), we propose theories of truth and then debate them.


If we call truth that which corresponds with the facts of the world, we must apply our knowledge of reality to determine truth. The reasoning here seems circular to me. Truth is necessary to find knowledge, but knowledge is needed in order to determine truth.[/

First, you have no idea what circularity is. You should go look it up.

Second, there is no circularity here. We use what we know to figure out other things all the time, even things about truth and knowledge. There would be a circularity problem if the analysis of truth presupposed a particular analysis of knowledge, but it does not, so there is no problem. The correspondence theory of truth does not presuppose that the JTB analysis of knowledge is correct, and the JTB analysis of knowledge does not presuppose any particular theory of truth. So, no circularity problem.

Seriously, go look up circular arguments.

Another problem I see with correspondence theory is its dependence on observation. Your snow example requires that we rely on imperfect senses in order to determine the truth value of a statement.

You have no idea what you are talking about. The correspondence theory is a theory of truth, it is an account of what truth is. It certainly doesn't rely on observation, nor does it presuppose anything about observation. The snow example was an example of what the correspondence theory says about how a proposition must be related to the world in order for the proposition to be true. Nothing in the example, nor in my discussion of the correspondence theory, had anything to do with knowledge or how we come to know that snow is white, or how we come to be justified in believing that snow is white.

What this response of yours indicates is that you are really, deeply confused about basic epistemological notions. After pages and pages of discussion, you still can't keep straight the difference between a theory of truth (like the correspondence theory) and a theory of knowledge (like JTB).

As far as an alternative theory, I have none and do not see the need to provide one. In fact, I don't know of a theory of truth or knowledge which is not problematic in one way or another. That is precisely my point.

You do too have a theory, as frogstomp points out above. Among the more inane aspects of your theory is your criterion that knowledge requires certainty.

Anyway, since you still can't keep straight the difference between a theory of truth and a theory of knowledge, and since you don't know anything about either the correspondence theory or the JTB analysis outside what I've told you in this thread, I see no reason to take your mere assertion that these theories are "problematic" seriously.

Philosophy, science, and all other secular knowledge areas are incapable of providing us with a clear-cut truth.

This is funny coming from somebody who doesn't know the first thing about philosophy. Do you often make these sorts of grand claims about fields of inquiry of which you are completely ignorant?

Once more, knowledge doesn't require certainty, and the fact that we cannot be absolutely 100% certain about anything shouldn't trouble you. Further, this is not a secular problem, but just a human limitation. You cannot be absolutely 100% certain about anything either, even when it comes to your religious beliefs. The theist and the atheist are in the same boat, in this regard.

This is why I have continually been pointing out to you that our discussion here is just epistemological, issues of theism and atheism are irrelevant to any of this. We have been talking about basic epistemic notions like truth, knowledge, belief, justification, and so on. These notions apply to all forms of inquiry, to all inquirers, regardless of their worldview.

There is no certainty or absolutes - all we can acheive is probabilities.

All we can achieve are beliefs that are justified to a greater or lesser extent.

These things are wonderful and useful, but they do not have the answers to all the questions.

Given any question at all, we may try and determine what the answer to that question is. If the evidence weighs heavily in favor of an answer, then we ought to believe that answer to be correct. If the evidence is insufficient to establish that some answer is likely to be true, then we ought to remain agnostic about the question and continue inquiring. This is just what it is to be rational. If this is not good enough for you, too bad, 'cause that is all you have.

To call yourself an atheist because you do not see the need for a higher power, I think, is foolish.


I call myself an atheist because tradiitional theism is absurd. There is no good evidence for the existence of God, and plenty good evidence against.

That you would choose to call yourself a theist, because you fear freedom and death more than you value truth is, I think, pathetic and infantile.

Thank you, bbarr for sharing your expertise and being tolerant of my minimal background in philosophy. Your posts have been informative and interesting. I will not argue with you any longer.